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Preface 
The original idea for this study can be traced to my introduction to 
balance of power theory as a graduate student over a decade ago. 
Particularly interesting to me were the numerous theoretical proposi-
tions linking international war to various structural characteristics of 
the international system, including the size of the system, power 
distributions, alliances, polarity, etc. While recognizing the logical 
flaws in balance of power theory, I was convinced of the importance 
of many of the individual propositions associated with it. They deal 
with theoretically important variables and many have been widely 
accepted. What disturbed me was that the validity of these proposi-
tions is often simply assumed on the basis of a few examples selected 
from narrow slices of historical experience that are not necessarily 
representative of international politics in general. I was convinced, 
therefore, of the importance of subjecting these hypotheses to system-
atic empirical test. The work of Singer and his colleagues associated 
with the Correlates of War Project was quite impressive, but I was 
convinced that many important hypotheses could not be tested with 
their data. Their temporal domain was too short for many slowly 
changing systemic variables and included too few major wars. More-
over, the inclusion in most of the early COW studies of small power 
wars was troublesome because the balance of power framework and 
its associated propositions were intended primarily as a theory of 
Great Power behavior. For these reasons I decided to generate a data 
base for the Great Powers over an extended temporal domain in order 
to test some of the leading hypotheses associated with balance of 
power theory. 
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While driven by the ultimate aim of testing causal hypotheses asso-
ciated with balance of power theory, this study is confined to more 
limited objectives. Its purpose is to generate a compilation of war data 
for the Great Powers for the last five centuries and provide a thorough 
description of the characteristics, patterns, and trends in war involv-
ing the Powers. These are important questions in themselves, particu-
larly given the lack of explicit attention to the Great Powers in earlier 
studies of war and the relatively short temporal domain for which 
these questions are normally answered. These questions are also im-
portant for our ultimate explanatory objectives, for it is assumed that 
the explanation of the causes of Great Power war can best be accom-
plished in the context of a full descriptive analysis of the characteris-
tics, patterns and trends of those wars. 
The testing of bivariate and multivariate causal hypotheses will be 
an even more demanding task, requiring the operationalization and 
measurement of a host of other variables over an extended temporal 
domain, and lying beyond the capacities of a single researcher. I do 
hope that others will see merit in such studies and will seek to use this 
data base where it serves their purposes. One word of caution should 
be noted here, however. The data base is in a constant state of revision 
as subsequent historical research uncovers new information. The 
present compilation involves numerous changes from the compilation 
in my earlier doctoral dissertation and further changes will undoubt-
edly need to be made. Anyone interested in using this data base would 
be advised to contact me for the most recent alterations. Needless to 
say, I welcome any and all notifications of errors and suggestions of 
additional changes in the data base. 
The successful completion of this study would not have been possi-
ble without the help of many people and I would like to express my 
appreciation at this time. The initial stages of this project were con-
ducted under the guidance of David Tarr and Bernard Cohen, and the 
basic design of the project owes much to their criticisms, suggestions, 
and encouragement. The Helen Dwight Reid Award of the American 
Political Science Association for 197 5 and 197 6 provided further 
encouragement, and convinced me of the value of the project and the 
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utility of undertaking a major reworking of the study for the purposes 
of publication. Many others have contributed to the final product. 
Bruce Russett provided many valuable suggestions and helped in 
numerous ways, and I am very grateful. An earlier version of the 
manuscript was also read in its entirety by Theodore Ropp, Richard 
Rosecrance, and Richard Merritt, each of whom provided very useful 
comments. Others have helped through their comments and criti-
cisms of separate papers that have since been incorporated into this 
book. They include J. David Singer, Randolph Siverson, Michael P. 
Sullivan, Stuart Bremer, Harrison Wagner, Karl Schmitt, Terry Sulli-
van, David Furlow, Neil Richardson, and Jim Austin. I owe special 
thanks to Cliff Morgan, my research assistant and colleague, who has 
been involved in every stage of the project over the last several years. 
He has helped not only with the data analysis and interpretation, but 
also by offering valuable theoretical and methodological suggestions 
and generally serving as an indispensible sounding board for my ideas. 
I have relied a great deal upon his good judgement, and this study is 
much better because of his contribution. 
I would also like to express my appreciation to William S. Living-
ston and The University of Texas Research Institute for their partial 
financial support of the project over the last four years. Chuck Cnudde 
and the Government Department have also been supportive. Eliza-
beth Manning helped expedite the completion of the manuscript and 
Betty McEuen did a fine job of typing the final copy. James Pinedo 
created the computer graphics. I'd also like to express my apprecia-
tion to Barbara Sarles, who helped with some of the preliminary 
editing, assisted with the graphs, and provided the moral support 
which has meant so much. 
Some parts of this study have previously appeared in print else-
where. I would like to thank Sage Publications for granting their 
permission to reprint parts of my "Historical Trends in Great Power 
War, 1495-1975" from International Studies Quarterly 26 (June 
1982): 278-300, and "World System Analysis: A Great Power Frame-
work" from World System Analysis: Competing Perspectives edited by 
William R. Thompson, 1983. I would also like to thank the University 
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of Texas Press for their permission to reprint parts of "The Contagion 
of Great Power War Behavior, 1495-1975" from the American Jour-
nal of Political Science 26 (August 1982): 562-84. I would also like 
to acknowledge the fact that the conception of this study was strongly 
influenced by the work of Singer and his colleagues on the Correlates 
of War Project, and the fact that some of the data for this study have 
been taken from The Wages of War by Singer and Melvin Small 
(Wiley, 1972). 
While I have benefited from the insights and suggestions of others, 
it is hardly necessary to say that this advice was not always consistent 
and not always heeded. No one will agree with everything I have 
written, and I alone should be held accountable for any errors of 




Study of War 
War has been a pervasive and persistent phenomenon throughout 
history. It is a major distinguishing characteristic of international 
politics and probably the most destructive form of human behavior. 
War is often perceived as a useful and sometimes necessary instru-
ment of policy for the achievement of state political objectives, yet the 
avoidance of war without the sacrifice of other core values is a primary 
foreign policy objective of nearly all states. The buildup of national 
military capabilities is a constant preoccupation of statesmen but one 
that diverts significant resources from more constructive social pur-
suits, often contributes little to the security toward which it is di-
rected, and may be a leading cause of the war it aims to avoid. For 
these and other reasons, the study of war has been a central concern 
of philosophers, historians, and social scientists since the beginning of 
recorded history. 
In spite of the importance of war and the enormous human and 
economic resources devoted to its many aspects, our understanding 
of war remains at an elementary level. No widely accepted theory of 
the causes of war exists and little agreement has emerged on the 
methodology through which these causes might be discovered. In-
stead, the literature is characterized by a proliferation of competing 
and often contradictory theories. There have been relatively few 
efforts to subject these theories to rigorous and systematic empirical 
testing in an attempt to resolve their contradictions and contribute to 
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the accumulation of scientific knowledge about international war. 
More emphasis has been placed on generating plausible theoretical 
arguments concerning why certain relationships ought to be true than 
on verifying empirically whether in fact they are true. An assumption 
underlying this study is that further progress toward understanding 
international conflict requires not only the careful specification of 
theoretical relationships but also the rigorous and systematic testing 
of these theories to ascertain their validity. 
In the last two decades, however, there has been a proliferation of 
empirically based studies of international conflict. 1 Among the most 
rigorous and systematic are those based on the war data compiled by 
Quincy Wright, Lewis F. Richardson, and J. David Singer and Melvin 
Small.2 The Singer-Small data and the associated Correlates of War 
Project have had an especially profound impact on recent conflict 
research. The data set published in The Wages of War, 1816-1965, is 
unparalleled and has served as the foundation for the statistical analy-
sis of a wide range of important hypotheses regarding international 
conflict. 3 The studies by Singer and Small as well as those based on 
Richardson's data, however, are limited in that most of them focus 
on war behavior in general and fail to differentiate the Great Powers 
from the hundred or so other states in the international system. 4 
Consequently, their findings are not necessarily applicable to the 
Great Powers. 
Few would doubt the importance of war involving the Great Pow-
ers. The Great Powers have traditionally been distinguished from 
other states and viewed as the dominant actors in international poli-
tics, particularly with respect to security-related issues. Statesmen 
have always been most concerned with security threats deriving from 
the Powers and have devoted disproportionate attention and re-
sources to dealing with these threats. The uniqueness of the Great 
Powers has also been recognized in international law. They were 
differentiated from the lesser powers at the Congress of Vienna, for 
example, and were given a distinct set of rights and responsibilities. 5 
Scholars also have recognized the leading role of the great powers. 
Leopold Von Ranke conceived of the international history of Europe 
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as a history of Great Power relations, and A. J. P. Taylor argues that 
"the relations of the Great Powers have determined the history of 
Europe."6 Many of our theories of international politics are essen-
tially theories of Great Power behavior. Balance-of-power theory, for 
example, was for years the dominant paradigm in international rela-
tions. Its central assumptions of anarchy, the absence of an external 
authority, and self-help are less valid when applied to lesser states 
living in the shadows of the Powers. Its concern with balances, the 
avoidance of war, and the independence of states clearly refers to the 
Great Powers rather than to states in generaP Kenneth N. Waltz 
argues that any general theory of international politics must neces-
sarily be based on the Great Powers, for in any system the leading 
actors essentially define the context for others as well as for them-
selves.8 
Most important for the purposes of this study is the fact that the 
Great Powers have participated in a disproportionately high percent-
age of history's wars. Quincy Wright finds that during the last five 
centuries four states have each participated in over 20 percent of 
European wars and that France alone participated in about 47 percent 
of the 2,600 battles involving European states.9 Even more compelling 
is the fact that approximately 70 percent of the wars Wright examines 
involve at least one of the Great Powers. Moreover, these states had 
a higher rate of war involvement during the years when they were 
Great Powers than when they were not. 10 Similarly, Frederick Adams 
Woods and Alexander Baltzly, focusing on the proportion of years 
states have been at war since 1700, find that the strongest nations have 
devoted the most time to warY The same pattern is true for more 
recent times, though to a slightly lesser extent. In Singer and Small's 
compilation of all wars since 1816, 60 percent of the interstate wars 
and 75 percent of the "extra-systemic" wars involve a Great Power. 12 
The wars of the Great Powers also account for most of the losses of 
life from war, with a significant fraction of these losses occurring in 
a small number of "general wars," defined by the participation of 
nearly all of the Great Powers. These general wars have been major 
turning points in international history, marking the rise and fall of 
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hegemonial powers and serving as the primary vehicle for fundamen-
tal transformations of the international system. Perhaps George Mod-
elski exaggerates when he concludes that "war is primarily a Great 
Power activity," that war occurs "because there are Great Powers," 
and that "the Great Power system exists because there is war,"13 but 
the importance of the Great Powers for war and war for the Great 
Powers is undeniable. 
Wars in which the Great Powers participate should be analyzed 
apart from wars in general because of the importance of the Great 
Powers and the distinctiveness of their behavior, including their war 
behavior. If Great Power wars are not analyzed separately, significant 
patterns of Great Power behavior may be obscured by noise generated 
by smaller states operating in more restricted regional systems. But 
analyses of the Great Power wars selected from the Singer-Small 
compilation would fail to produce meaningful statistical results be-
cause the compilation includes fewer than thirty interstate wars in-
volving the Great Powers and fewer than ten wars between the 
Powers. To test hypotheses of Great Power war behavior by a meth-
odology of aggregate data analysis, it is necessary to consider a longer 
time span. 
Extension of the temporal domain is necessary for other reasons as 
well. Although the 1816-1980 period is adequate for the testing of 
many important hypotheses, its utility is limited for application to 
other theoretical questions. Some important variables-including 
structural characteristics of the international system that are central 
to balance-of-power theory and theories of systemic transformation-
have changed little over the last century and a half; a meaningful 
analysis of the impact of these variables on war requires an examina-
tion of historical periods in which they fluctuated more widely. The 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries alone do not provide the variety 
and richness of data that can be obtained from a more extended 
period. For example, an analysis of the relative stability of bipolar and 
multipolar systems should not be restricted to an era characterized by 
only one period of bipolarity, especially when that period coincides 
with the development of nuclear technology, the confounding effects 
of which preclude the generation of any causal inferences. Similarly, 
Introduction 5 
an analysis of the impact of technology on the incidence of warfare 
is best served by incorporating preindustrial periods characterized by 
less advanced technology and lower rates of change. In addition to 
increasing both the number of cases and the range of the variables, 
the extension of the time span facilitates scientific analysis by incor-
porating additional control variables and by increasing the random-
ization of extraneous variables and hence minimizing their impact on 
the relationship under consideration. 
Two other sets of questions also call for study of a more extended 
period. One is the question oflong-term trends in war. Not only is the 
last century and a halftoo short for effective analysis, but the fact that 
the nineteenth century was the most peaceful of modem history intro-
duces an upward bias into the secular trends. A more important set 
of theoretical questions is raised by the recent world system para-
digms. Both the capitalist world economy paradigm of Immanuel 
Wallerstein and Christopher Chase-Dunn and the global political 
economy of George Modelski and William R. Thompson challenge 
the traditional realist theories based on power politics. 14 These hy-
potheses involve processes spanning the entire five centuries of the 
modem period and can only be tested against realist propositions by 
using a more extended temporal domain than that employed by Singer 
and Small. 
War data covering a broader historical scope have been compiled 
by Wright, Pitirim A. Sorokin, and Woods and Baltzly. 15 Each of 
these compilations has serious limitations. None is specifically a study 
of the Great Powers, for all include some lesser states. Nor are any 
of their data bases alone sufficient for the purposes of this study. 
Neither Sorokin nor Woods and Baltzly provides explicit and rigorous 
criteria for the inclusion and exclusion of wars, and Wright's criteria 
are excessively legalistic. These problems, which will be further dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, preclude a truly systematic study of the nature, 
causes, and consequences of war. 
This brief survey of existing compilations of war data is not meant 
to detract from the enormous intellectual accomplishments that these 
works represent. The studies by Sorokin, Wright, Richardson, and 
Singer and Small are all critical landmarks in the evolution of modem 
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scientific analysis of war. Each has made a significant contribution to 
our understanding of international conflict and the methodology by 
which we analyze it, and each has generated sophisticated theoretical 
and methodological approaches. But none of these studies deals ade-
quately with the specific question of Great Power war behavior. For 
this purpose a separate analysis, based on a new set of data and 
drawing upon the efforts of these earlier scholars, is needed. 
Such an analysis cannot be undertaken in the absence of a concep-
tual and historical examination of the Great Powers. Although the 
central role of the Great Powers has been widely recognized in the 
traditional literature, the concept has never been refined for system-
atic empirical research. As we shall see in Chapter 2, there have been 
several thorough analytical treatments of the Great Power concept 
and a few attempts to determine the identity of the Powers in histori-
cal systems.16 The latter, however, are seldom related to the former. 
Attempts to identify the Powers historically are generally conducted 
in the absence of any nominal or operational definition of the Great 
Power concept, which raises serious questions about the validity of 
these systems of Powers and their utility for systematic empirical 
research. In addition, there have been few attempts to specify the 
theoretical assumptions underlying the concept of a Great Power 
system. These tasks must be completed if theoretical generalizations 
about the Great Powers and their wars are to be possible. 
The basic aims of this study, then, are to define and identify the 
modem Great Powers; to define, identify, and measure their wars; and 
to analyze the characteristics, patterns, and historical trends in these 
wars. In Chapter 2 the assumptions underlying the concept of the 
modem Great Power system are specified. After an extensive review 
of previous analytical treatments of the Great Powers, that concept 
is defined and the relevant empirical referents of Great Power rank 
are suggested. The origins of the Great Power system are established, 
and a historical analysis to determine the identity ofthe Great Powers 
over time is undertaken. In Chapter 3 we tum to the definition and 
identification of war. Considerable attention is given to the problem 
of inclusion and exclusion-the criteria used either to include specific 
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wars or exclude them from the compilation. On the basis of these 
criteria, a list of interstate wars involving the Great Powers is gener-
ated and then compared with previous compilations. After conceptu-
alizing war on a variety of levels, dimensions, and units of analysis, 
wars are measured in Chapter 4. The war data are presented graph-
ically and analyzed statistically beginning in Chapter 5. The charac-
teristics of the individual wars and of the yearly amount of war are 
examined. Empirical relationships among the various dimensions of 
war are determined and interpreted in light of a number of hypotheses 
in the literature. In Chapter 6 linear and cyclical trends in war are 
examined and a comparison of different historical eras is undertaken. 
Finally, the relationship between the amounts of war in successive 
periods is considered in Chapter 6 in order to deal with the question 
of whether war is "contagious." Finally, a summary and conclusions 
are presented. 
This is a univariate study of war in the modern Great Power 
system, and for this reason no effort will be made to analyze the causes 
of war or its consequences (other than its impact on subsequent war). 
The premise is that the Great Powers and their wars must be defined, 
identified, and measured before causes and consequences can be sys-
tematically analyzed. This study is designed to lay the groundwork for 
subsequent testing of key theoretical propositions relating to the 





Before the Great Powers can be defined and identified it is necessary 
to specify the assumptions underlying the concept of a Great Power 
system. The Great Power framework and the realist paradigm from 
which it derives is only one of several possible approaches to the study 
of international relations. Other frameworks are based on a different 
set of assumptions and concepts, identify another set ofleading actors, 
and offer alternative explanations for war, change, and other phenom-
ena in world politics. 1 If these competing paradigms are to be com-
pared and their constrasting propositions subjected to a critical test, 
the assumptions upon which they are based must be clearly specified. 
Assumptions of the Great Power Framework 
The Great Power framework shares the basic assumptions of the 
realist paradigm of international politics but focuses explicitly on the 
small number of leading actors in the system. 2 It is assumed that in 
any anarchic international system there exists a hierarchy of actors 
determined on the basis of power. In the modem system since 1500 
the dominant actors have been dynastic/territorial states and nation-
states; in the international system of ancient Greece and Renaissance 
Italy the dominant actors were city-states. The more powerful states 
-the Great Powers--determine the structure, major processes, and 
general evolution of the system. 3 Therefore, the actions and interac-
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tions of the Great Powers are of primary interest. Secondary states 
and other actors have an impact on the system largely to the extent 
that they affect the behavior of the Great Powers. This hierarchy of 
actors is intimately related to a hierarchy of issues dominated by 
military security. It is assumed that issues overlap and that the cur-
rency of military power is applicable to and effective in the resolution 
of other issues. The concept of a Great Power system is based on the 
traditional assumption, shared by realists since Thucydides, that 
world politics is dominated by security issues and the struggle for 
power.4 
The priority of military security derives from the perception of a 
high-threat environment, which in tum derives primarily from the 
anarchic structure of the international system. 5 In this context, it is 
the Great Powers, because of their military capability and ability to 
project it, that generally can do most to affect the national interests 
of others and are therefore perceived as the most serious security 
threats. Consequently, the Powers direct their primary attention to-
ward each other. A relatively high proportion of their alliance com-
mitments and war behavior is with each other, and they tend to 
perceive much of international relations as dependent upon and re-
volving around their own interrelationships. The general level of in-
teractions among the Great Powers tends to be higher than for other 
states, whose interests are narrower and who interact primarily in 
more restricted regional settings. Thus the Great Powers constitute an 
interdependent system of power and security relations, which will be 
called here the Great Power system. 6 
This is an open rather than a closed system, for it is affected to some 
extent by the larger world system of which it is a part. The primary 
influences on the Great Powers, however, derive from within the 
Great Power system, and their patterns of interaction can be ex-
plained largely by the internal dynamics of that system. Because they 
recognize the interdependence of security relations, the Great Powers 
play a major role in the management and order maintenance of the 
larger international system. 7 They participate in a high proportion of 
the wars in the international system and largely determine the out-
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come of the peace settlements that follow. In this way the Great 
Powers play the major role in the transformation of the international 
system and the structuring of international order. The Great Power 
system may be a subsystem of the larger international system, but in 
fundamental respects it is a dominant subsystem. 8 
The basic argument is that any anarchic international system is 
dominated by a few Great Powers. Great Power systems operated 
within the international systems of ancient Greece, ancient China, and 
Renaissance Italy, as well as modem Europe.9 The concern of this 
study is with the modem Great Power system, which originated in 
Europe about five centuries ago and gradually expanded into the 
contemporary global system. The Eurocentric bias of this study is 
deliberate. The system centered in Europe is of greatest historical 
interest to most Western scholars, and most theories of international 
behavior and war have been derived from it. Most of the wars of the 
last five centuries have involved European powers and have centered 
in Europe. Finally, the contemporary world represents a continuing 
evolution of the Western state system, so the most valid lessons for 
the future presumably can be learned from this system. 
Definition of the Great Power Concept 
The widespread recognition of the importance of the Great Powers is 
not matched by analytical precision in the use of the concept. Scholars 
have either not attempted to define the concept or made no effort to 
translate vague definitions into meaningful operational criteria. As we 
shall see, many historians identify specific dates or events as marking 
a state's rise to or decline from Great Power status, but they take for 
granted the meaning of the concept. This is true of modem social 
scientists as well. Singer and Small, for example, resort to "intercoder 
agreement" as the sole criterion for the identification of their major 
power system. 10 Robert L. Rothstein suggests that this absence of 
definitional precision may be traced to the fairly widespread belief that 
the distinction between Great Powers and other states is self-evident, 
particularly for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for which the 
indicators of military power are said to be unambiguous. 11 It is true 
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that for any historical period the identity of some of the Great Powers 
is self-evident, but frequently the status of one or two states is uncer-
tain (for example, eighteenth-century Spain or nineteenth-century 
Italy). Consequently, the precise identity of all of the Great Powers 
has never been as self-evident as many scholars have presumed, even 
for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This ambiguity is demon-
strated by the numerous contradictions in the literature. In addition, 
historical developments since World War II have further blurred the 
distinction between Great Powers and others. It is this very difficulty 
of defining the Great Power concept and devising operational indica-
tors valid over a range of diverse historical conditions that has inhib-
ited many scholars from undertaking such a systematic analysis. 
Nearly all definitions of Great Powers focus primarily on military 
might. Taylor, for example, asserts that "the test of a Great Power 
is then the test of strength for war." Modelski claims that a Great 
Power "must be capable of fighting a major war." Singer and Thomas 
Cusack insist that the most obvious attribute of a major power is the 
"ability to wage war frequently and to win most of those wars." The 
classic definition from which many others are clearly derived was 
provided by Ranke: a Great Power "must be able to maintain itself 
against all others, even when they are united." It is not clear what 
Ranke meant by "maintain itself against all others," but the criterion 
of self-sufficiency would appear to be far too demanding. Few states 
in history have possessed capabilities sufficient to defend against a 
combination of all others. As Taylor notes in his study of several 
decades of diplomacy before World War I, "Even the greatest of 
Powers shrank from fighting alone against a coalition." 12 Revisionist 
Powers seeking hegemony have invariably been defeated by opposing 
coalitions. Ranke's definition would exclude too many states from 
Great Power rank, though it might serve as a useful definition of a 
more restricted class of Superpowers. 13 
Modifications of Ranke's general conception of the self-sufficiency 
of a Great Power are provided by Michael Haas, Hedley Bull, Robert 
L. Rothstein, and Stanley Hoffmann. Haas states that a major power 
"can be totally defeated in battle by no other single power, but instead 
by a combination of members (usually including another major 
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power)."14 By not insisting that a Great Power be able to withstand 
a coalition of Powers, Haas comes much closer to the conventional 
but unstated notion of what it means to be a Great Power. Haas, 
however, fails to provide empirical indicators for his concepts, and it 
is far from clear how he arrives at his list of major powers in a 
succession of international subsystems since 1649. In addition, al-
though the notion of avoiding total defeat may be useful conceptually 
as a minimum standard for Great Power rank, it raises the questions 
of what constitutes total defeat and whether it is a necessary or 
sufficient condition for major power status. 
It would be too demanding to define total defeat only as permanent 
extinction as a political entity, for this is relatively rare historically 
and would leave too many Great Powers. Yet relaxing the standard 
to include military occupation and temporary loss of sovereign inde-
pendence would also create problems. The German defeat and occu-
pation of France in 1940 would presumably lead to the exclusion of 
France (for she regained her sovereignty only with the help of her 
allies), yet Haas includes Vichy France as a major power during this 
period. Nor should France be eliminated from Great Power status on 
the eve of World War II because she was capable of being totally 
defeated. This example suggests that military occupation is not a 
sufficient condition for the loss of Great Power rank. In addition, the 
Ranke and Haas conceptualizations are inappropriate in the nuclear 
age because all states are potentially vulnerable to nearly total de-
struction. 
Other definitions based on the general notion of self-sufficiency are 
less restrictive than the notion of total defeat. Martin Wight argues 
that "a Great Power is one that can afford to take on any other Power 
whatever in single combat." Similarly, Taylor suggests that even the 
weakest of the Powers "could make a respectable showing in a general 
conflict among the Great Powers." Rothstein argues that a Great 
Power is a state that can rely on its own capabilities to provide for 
its security. Small powers, on the other hand, must rely on external 
alliances, aid, or international institutions and therefore do not have 
direct or primary control over their own destinies. This definition is 
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similar to one criterion suggested by Hoffmann: Great Powers can 
provide for their security without significantly undermining their in-
dependence, whereas smaller states must often make a choice between 
security and independence. 15 This definition allows for a more reason-
able conception of security than avoidance of total defeat and can 
incorporate the concept of deterrence as well as defense. One weak-
ness, however, is that it tends to underestimate the security threats 
posed by other Great Powers and the interdependence of nearly all 
states in maintaining security. Before the nuclear age, at least, in only 
a few instances was one state self-sufficient against a coalition of 
others. 
The persistent danger posed by Great Powers to each other is 
recognized in Bull's conceptualization: "Great Powers have been se-
cure against the attacks of small Powers; and have had to fear only 
other Great Powers, and hostile combinations of Powers."16 Al-
though an improvement over the definitions considered above, this 
one shares a common limitation with them. By relying on the Rankian 
concept of self-sufficiency, these formulations define Great Power 
interests negatively, as passive security. They minimize the impor-
tance of the Great Powers' capabilities and willingness to project their 
military power beyond their borders to advance their interests and 
structure the environment. Self-sufficiency with respect to security is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for Great Power rank. The 
Powers have always been concerned not only with minimizing their 
losses but also with maximizing their gains, and they are willing to 
take risks in order to do so. 17 A state that cannot be conquered but 
lacks the capability to threaten others or influence security affairs in 
the system as a whole (for example, seventeenth-century Russia and 
perhaps the United States in the nineteenth century) would not nor-
mally be considered a Great Power. This idea is recognized in several 
conceptualizations. Michael Howard states, "A Great Power, almost 
by definition, is one which has the capacity to control events beyond 
its own borders; and that is usually based on the ability to use military 
force." Haas, in an alternative formulation to that expressed earlier, 
defines major powers as "elite or dominant members of a system 
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whose behavior is capable of upsetting an existing power distribution 
or placing a power equilibrium in jeopardy."18 
Thus a Great Power must possess both relative self-sufficiency with 
respect to security, including invulnerability against secondary states, 
and the ability to project military power beyond its borders in pursuit 
of its interests. This formulation does not imply that non-Powers 
cannot project military power beyond their borders but only that 
qualitative differences exist between them and the Great Powers. 
These differences include the total amount of power projected, the 
logistical ability to sustain it over an extended period, and the ability 
to affect the overall distribution of power at the systemic level. Of 
course, not all Great Powers have enormous projection capabilities. 
In this respect as well as others, however, the differences between the 
Great Powers and nonpowers are far greater than the differences 
among the Powers. 
The few attempts to provide operational criteria for the identifica-
tion of the Powers have generally relied on indicators of military 
capabilities alone. This is clearly the basis for the "self-evident" classi-
fication of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century states. As Rothstein 
notes, "counting the number of available infantrymen sufficed" to 
differentiate the Great Powers. Modelski suggests the more general 
formulation that a Great Power is one that holds at least 5 percent 
of the available military power in the global system. He also uses this 
criterion in his later conceptualization of global powers in a global 
system, and Thompson has measured the naval capabilities of the 
leading global powers. But in the Great Power system as defined here, 
land armies carry greater weight than naval forces. 19 
Several problems arise in establishing a criterion based on a per-
centage of available power in the Great Power system. One is deter-
mining the appropriate percentage to use. Another is determining the 
relative weights of different elements of military power, including 
land-based power versus naval or air power, personnel versus arma-
ments, quantity versus quality of armaments, and combat strength 
versus logistical support. In addition, many elements are resistant to 
quantitative measurement, including training, morale, leadership, 
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military intelligence, and other intangibles. The relative importance 
to be given to existing as compared to potential military capabilities 
also has to be decided. Potential capabilities include such important 
nonmilitary factors as the administrative skill that determines the 
efficiency with which given societal resources are used for military 
purposes; the political foundations of military power, which deter-
mine the availability of a society's resources to the military sector; the 
diplomatic skill that helps shape the political atmosphere in which 
military power may have to be exerted; and other factors ranging from 
military reputation or prestige to national morale. 20 Indicators of 
state power capabilities that are valid over the variety of political, 
economic, and technological conditions of the last few centuries must 
be devised. Different indicators could be used for different historical 
periods, but it is not clear that any measures would be of sufficient 
validity to permit an interval-level measurement of power capabilities 
that this approach would require. The most impressive attempt thus 
far to measure aggregate power capabilities-that of Singer and his 
colleagues for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries-recognizes 
these problems and provides ordinal-level rankings of the most power-
ful states rather than actual numerical levels and differences.21 Quan-
titative measurements from earlier historical periods would present 
even greater problems of validity. 
These analytical and methodological problems might be dismissed 
if the use of objective indicators met the minimum test offace validity, 
but there is good reason to believe that they do not. First, since the 
ability to prevail in war is the ultimate test of military power, we 
would expect states ranked higher in military capabilities to emerge 
victorious in any military confrontation. The Arab-Israeli wars are 
only the most obvious counterexamples. 22 Second, and more impor-
tant for our purposes, the Singer rank orderings of power capabilities 
generated by objective indicators of military capabilities deviate from 
conventional wisdom regarding the Great Powers. Singer's Correlates 
of War Project uses six equally weighted indices of power capabilities: 
total population, urban population, iron and steel production, fuel 
consumption, military personnel, and military expenditures. These 
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indicators appear to reflect adequately the important dimensions of 
existing military capabilities and both military and industrial poten-
tial, yet the resulting rank ordering of states is often counterintuitive. 
In 1845, for example, both Turkey and the United States rank higher 
than Prussia on this scale, but most scholars (including Singer and 
Small) identify only Prussia as a Great Power during this period. In 
1913 China outranks France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Japan, but 
the latter four are generally considered Great Powers, and China is 
not. 23 Military power may be the primary defining characteristics of 
Great Powers, but alone it is not sufficient and must be supplemented 
with other criteria. 
A Great Power is defined here as a state that plays a major role in 
international politics with respect to security-related issues. The 
Great Powers can be differentiated from other states by their military 
power, their interests, their behavior in general and interactions with 
other Powers, other Powers' perception of them, and some formal 
criteria. 
Most important, a Great Power possesses a high level of military 
capabilities relative to other states. At a minimum, it has relative 
self-sufficiency with respect to military security. Great Powers are 
basically invulnerable to military threats by non-Powers and need 
only fear other Great Powers. In addition, Great Powers have the 
capability to project military power beyond their borders to conduct 
offensive as well as defensive military operations. They can actively 
come to the defense of allies, wage an aggressive war against other 
states (including most of the Powers), and generally use force or the 
threat of force to help shape their external environment. A state whose 
security rests on a broad territorial expanse or natural barriers to 
invasion but that is unable to threaten the security of other states is 
not a Great Power. 
Second, the interests and objectives of Great Powers are different 
from those of other states. They think of their interests as continental 
or global rather than local or regional. Their conception of security 
goes beyond territorial defense or even extended defense to include 
maintenance of a continental or global balance of power. Great Pow-
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ers generally define their national interests to include systemic inter-
ests and are therefore concerned with order maintenance in the 
international system. 24 Symbolic interests of national honor and pres-
tige are also given high priority by the Great Powers, for these are 
perceived as being essential components of national power and neces-
sary for Great Power status. 
Third, the Great Powers are distinguished from other states by 
their general behavior. They defend their interests more aggressively 
and with a wider range of instrumentalities, including the frequent 
threat or use of military force. They also interact frequently with other 
Powers. The Great Powers account for a disproportionate number of 
alliances and wars in the international system (often fought against 
each other), particularly those designed to maintain the balance of 
power and prevent the dominance of any single state. They are also 
involved in major territorial partitions and compensations (the parti-
tions of Poland in the eighteenth century), guarantees (the Barrier 
Treaty guaranteeing the Utrecht settlement), and informal interna-
tional organizations (the Concert of Europe). 
Great Powers are further differentiated from other states by others' 
images and perceptions of them. The Powers are perceived as such by 
other Powers and treated as relative equals with respect to general 
attention, respect, protocol, negotiations, alliance agreements, and so 
forth. Equal perception and treatment of one another are among the 
most important criteria of Great Power rank, for perceptions deter-
mine behavior. This perceptual criterion involves an element of circu-
larity, but is useful operationally, particularly in the absence of a rigid 
set of objective criteria establishing both necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for Great Power rank. At any given time there always exist 
one or two states whose rank is unquestionable by virtue of their 
military strength. These states can be used as definitional anchors to 
help identify other Great Powers. 
Finally, Great Powers are differentiated from others by formal 
criteria, including identification as a Great Power by an international 
conference, congress, organization, or treaty, or the granting of such 
privileges as permanent membership or veto power by an interna-
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tiona} organization or treaty. The Treaty of Westphalia, for example, 
named France and Sweden as the guarantors of the peace settlement, 
and the Congress of Vienna explicitly identified certain states as Great 
Powers. These formal criteria are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
Great Power rank and are the least important of any of the character-
istics of the Powers, though they are useful as indicators of other 
states' perceptions of the Powers. The Great Powers are important 
because of their military power and potential and the interests and 
behavior that flow from that power. Great Power systems existed long 
before the Great Power role was institutionalized at the Congress of 
Vienna and before international law was formally codified at the 
Peace of Westphalia. 
The definition of Great Power outlined above is based on the as-
sumed dominance of security-related issues, and security is defined 
primarily as military security. Other issue areas and linkages across 
them exist, but it is possible to make some distinctions. A major role 
in international trade or finance does not automatically ensure Great 
Power status. Wealth does not necessarily indicate military strength 
or generate influence on security issues. The Netherlands, for exam-
ple, was a commercial power but not a Great Power throughout most 
of the eighteenth century. Nor is status as a colonial power alone 
sufficient to qualify as a Great Power. Many Great Powers have 
sought colonial empires as a means of enhancing their power and 
wealth but some colonial powers have been effectively isolated from 
the Great Power security system, participating little if at all in its 
alliances and wars (sixteenth-century Portugal). 
These criteria provide the basis for an analytical historical study to 
determine the membership of the modem Great Power system. These 
are admittedly not perfectly objective criteria that can be mechan-
ically applied to identify the Great Powers in any particular historical 
era. The aim is to minimize rather than eliminate subjectivity by 
providing theoretical criteria that are operationally useful yet suffi-
ciently flexible to guide an interpretation of a rich body of historical 
evidence in identifying the Great Powers. The validity of these criteria 
can be tested in part by ensuring that the results do not deviate 
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significantly from certain well-established conventional wisdoms. For 
example, the set of Powers must not exclude England, France, 
Austria, Prussia, and Russia for the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries. Before the Great Powers can be identified, however, it is first 
necessary to determine the origins of the modem Great Power system. 
Origins of the Modern Great Power System 
The fundamental assumption upon which the concept of a Great 
Power system is based is the existence of a collection of sovereign 
territorial states interacting with considerable frequency in an 
anarchic international environment. A state here means a political 
organization commanding a predominance of political power within 
a given territory and characterized by independence from external 
hierarchical authority. This concept of the territorial state includes 
dynastic as well as nation-states; it refers merely to independent terri-
torial aggregates of political power. In determining the origin of the 
modem Great Power system, the first question is when such a system 
was first established on a permanent basis. 
There is, of course, considerable debate concerning the origins of 
the modem state system. One extreme view is that of F. H. Hinsley, 
who dates the beginning of the modem state system in the mid-
eighteenth century.25 The more conventional opinion, shared by most 
political scientists, is that the state system originated in 1648 with the 
Treaty of Westphalia. This view is excessively legalistic, however, for 
Westphalia merely provided formal legal backing for the idea of terri-
torial sovereignty and recognition of a state system that had been in 
existence for more than a century. For similar reasons we cannot 
accept the view of Frederick L. Schuman, who characterizes the 
Western state system by the concept of state sovereignty, principles 
of international law, and the politics of the balance of power and 
argues that it originated at the end of the sixteenth century with Jean 
Bodin, Hugo Grotius, and the development of modem international 
law.26 Formal sovereignty appears to have made little obvious differ-
ence in actual behavior of the major territorial states of Europe. These 
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states existed, interacted, and practiced Realpolitik and "balance-of-
power politics" long before Westphalia and the formal development 
of the concept of territorial sovereignty and modem international law. 
The wars for supremacy in Italy and in Europe in the early sixteenth 
century, for example, are in many fundamental respects comparable 
to the struggle for supremacy in the Balkans and in central Europe 
nearly four centuries later. 
There are limits, however, to how far back the system can be 
extended. The concept of a Great Power system cannot be applied to 
medieval Europe. Sovereign states had not yet fully developed, in that 
states were lacking in both internal centralization of power and exter-
nal autonomy. Medieval kings did not exert effective political control 
over semisovereign walled cities, duchies, and feudal lords within 
their domains and did not possess full independence from the author-
ity of the pope and Holy Roman emperor on political as well as 
ecclesiastical and moral issues. If France and England can perhaps be 
considered major territorial states by the end of the Hundred Years' 
War, the same cannot be said of the Hapsburgs until the union of the 
Austrian and Burgundian lands with the marriage of Mary of Bur-
gundy to Maximilian of Austria in 14 77, or of Spain until the union 
of Castile and Aragon in 1479 (or even until the expulsion of the 
Moors in 1492). 
In addition, the relationships among the major territorial conglom-
erates of medieval Europe did not involve the high degree of interac-
tion characterizing those of modem European states. There was no 
permanent diplomatic machinery (that is, permanent diplomatic resi-
dents or ambassadors) outside of Italy until the sixteenth century. 
More important, there was little sense of an interdependent European 
security system before the late fifteenth century. Instead, there existed 
several distinct regional systems that seldom interacted. The Italian 
city-state system is the most familiar. This system had its own major 
powers, balance-of-power politics, and permanent diplomatic mis-
sions (at least by the fifteenth century), 27 and in many respects serves 
as a precursor of the modem European system. There were also 
regional systems in Germany, the Iberian Peninsula, and Scandinavia, 
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as well as rivalries between the English and the French, the English 
and the Scots, and the Turks and their Christian neighbors. Each of 
these systems had its wars, but they were generally isolated affairs. 
Charles Oman has described fifteenth-century warfare as "shut up in 
many watertight compartments ... separate stories, having few and 
infrequent cross-relations with each other."28 These wars, and the 
regional dynastic and power political struggles that generated them, 
were not perceived as threats by monarchs in distant parts of Europe. 
In addition, there was little concern with the Continental balance 
of power that has been central to the modem system for the last five 
centuries. The Hundred Years' War, for example, was basically a 
bilateral conflict between the English and French kings. It did not 
generate external involvement comparable to that arising from similar 
conflicts in later years. It was not until the very end of the fifteenth 
century that war became pan-European in its impact, that the major 
states first began to concert their behavior to prevent the territorial 
expansion and political domination of any one state. Not until this 
time can we begin to speak of a single interdependent system of Great 
Powers and other states. 
Although the modem Great Power system was the product of a 
gradual process of historical development, its primary characteristics 
emerged during a narrow period of time. A Great Power system has 
been defined as consisting of states characterized by the centralization 
of political power within a given territory, independent from any 
higher secular authority and interacting in an interdependent system 
of security relations. The very end of the fifteenth century marked the 
fusion of these three separate elements and therefore the emergence 
of the modem Great Power system. 
By the middle of the fifteenth century several territorial states were 
well on their way toward consolidation into centralized organizations 
with stable frontiers. 29 These new territorial states had become virtu-
ally independent of the authority of both the pope and the emperor. 
The decline of papal power was demonstrated in the diplomacy of the 
Hundred Years' War, and by the end of the century his claims to 
temporal authority carried little weight among the major states of 
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Europe. Sir Charles Petrie argues that in the last decade of the 
fifteenth century the medieval conception of a universal church under 
pope and emperor had little basis in fact, and Oman writes that the 
moral supremacy of the papacy and the legal supremacy of the Holy 
Roman Empire "reached their lowest pitch of degradation about the 
year 1492-3." Rene Albrecht-Carrie writes that "the end of the 
fifteenth century roughly marks the transition of Europe from a con-
geries of petty feudal interests under the theoretical rule of the Holy 
Roman emperor and the pope into a system of competing sovereign 
nation-states. . . . The medieval concept of a united and stratified 
Christian Europe ruled from on high by the pope and the Holy 
Roman emperor gave way to the idea of equal rights."30 The Franco-
Turkish alliances beginning in the 1520s symbolized the end of the 
idea of a unified Christendom many decades before the end of the 
Reformation. 
To be even more precise, the French invasion of Italy at the end 
of 1494 and the Treaty of Venice in March of 1495 mark the coales-
cence of the major European states into a truly interdependent system 
of behavior. This interpretation draws considerable support from the 
historical literature. Ludwig Dehio notes that the new state system 
represented a gradual erosion of the medieval structure but argues 
that "nevertheless, the new structure came into existence at a quite 
definite moment, the beginning of the struggle among the Great Pow-
ers over Italy in 1494." David J. Hill speaks of "a new Europe" and 
a "new order of things" and argues that "the expedition of Charles 
VIII may justly be regarded as the last great medieval adventure and 
the first military campaign of modem times ... it may be taken to 
mark the birth of international politics." Arnold Toynbee argues that 
"modem Western wars" began in 1494, when "the original constella-
tion of Modem Western Great Powers had crystallized out of a Late 
Medieval nebula." Finally, Garrett Mattingly argues that the Treaty 
of Venice marks "the first decisive drawing together of the major 
states of Europe into a single power system" and "the beginning of 
modem European diplomacy."31 
On the military as well as political level the Italian wars are de-
scribed as initiating the modem era. Charles's Italian campaign is 
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described by Richard A. Preston and Sydney F. Wise as the "begin-
ning of a new military era." Theodore Ropp describes the French and 
other leading European armies as modem because of three distin-
guishing characteristics: "(1) They were the political instruments of 
dynastic monarchies and not of feudal barons, private mercenary 
captains, or city states. (2) They were armed, at least partially, with 
gunpowder weapons. (3) They were organized around a permanent 
(or 'standing') body of professional infantry." Similarly, Howard de-
scribes Charles VIII's force as the "first 'modem' army" and argues 
that it was "not fundamentally different in composition from that 
which Napoleon was to lead to the same battlefields three centuries 
later."32 
There are other considerations as well. In 1513 Machiavelli wrote 
The Prince and introduced the concept of "raison d'etat" into West-
em international theory.33 A truly European and even global econ-
omy was emerging, in contrast to the distinct economies in the 
Mediterranean and in the Baltic/North Sea area in medieval Eu-
rope. 34 For Wallerstein this time denotes the emergence of a capitalist 
world economy and for Modelski and William R. Thompson the 
emergence of a global political system sustained by sea power.35 
Nearly all historians date the beginnings of the modem world from 
the end of the fifteenth century. Finally, a fundamental revolution in 
military technology was occurring. Gunpowder and artillery were 
becoming decisive in warfare, and even the best of the medieval castles 
were vulnerable. The new technology in general and mobility of artil-
lery in particular led to major changes in the strategy and tactics of 
warfare. 36 
Sixteenth-century warfare was fought by armies composed largely 
of condottieri or mercenaries of various nationalities, but this is not 
sufficient reason to exclude this period from the modem system. 37 
Mercenary armies had major limitations, as Machiavelli emphasized. 
But these armies were paid by a central treasury controlled by the 
monarch and used for the advancement of his dynastic and territorial 
interests. The wars for the personal honor, vengeance, and enrichment 
of kings and nobles in the Middle Ages were increasingly replaced by 
a "Clausewitzian" conception of the "rational" use of force as a 
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political instrument of dynastic-territorial states. 38 The Italian wars 
or the Hapsburg/Valois wars of the early sixteenth century, for exam-
ple, were as concerned with state interests and the balance of power 
as many of the wars of the last two centuries. 
For all these reasons the origins of the modern Great Power system 
can be traced to the late fifteenth century in general and to the 1494-95 
invasion of Italy in particular. That system extends to the present time 
and for the purposes of this analysis ends in 1975.39 
Composition of the System 
Before examining each of the major states individually in an attempt 
to identify the Great Powers on the basis of the criteria given above, 
some general problems that repeatedly occur should be considered. 
First, even though the attainment or loss of Great Power status is 
rarely a specific event but rather a general process, it is necessary in 
an empirical analysis such as this one to identify to the year each 
state's points of entry into and departure from the system. Other 
studies of this scope have not been particularly concerned with this 
problem. Wright refers only to one century or another, while Haas 
limits his points of entry or departure to the ten or so dates of "system 
transformation" over the last three centuries. 40 Because the primary 
criteria of Great Power status include military capabilities and reputa-
tion, the end of a decisive war is the most obvious symbol marking 
the rise of a new Power or decline of an old one and is used as a 
primary indicator of change in Great Power status. 41 Although in 
some cases a single battle may be the truly decisive point and more 
definitive than the final termination of hostilities (for example, the 
Battle of Poltava between Sweden and Russia in 1709), the real 
change in a state's role in international politics and the recognition by 
other states of the change in Great Power status generally does not 
occur until after a peace has been concluded. A very limited number 
of exceptions have been made, and these are explicitly noted. 42 
Another problem is whether to exclude a Great Power from the 
system during a temporary period of weakness or relative interna-
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tiona! impotence, after which that state makes a full recovery and 
once again qualifies as a Great Power. Such a condition of weakness 
may derive from general political, economic, and social conditions, as 
with France during the Wars of Religion in the late sixteenth century, 
Spain in the late seventeenth century, or Prussia during the early 
nineteenth century. It may result from a major defeat in war, as with 
Prussia and possibly Austria during the Napoleonic period, Russia 
after the Crimean War, and the Soviet Union and Germany after 
World War I. It may also be imposed by the occupation of foreign 
armies, as with France from 1815 to 1818 and 1940 to 1945 and 
Germany from 1945 to 1952. In such cases, I have not excluded from 
the Great Power system any state that is temporarily incapacitated, 
as long as that state once again qualifies for Great Power status within 
a reasonable period of time. This is a difficult choice and needs some 
justification. 
On theoretical grounds, the international political impact of these 
relatively short and transient periods of social, economic, or military 
weakness is usually relatively insignificant. My definition of Great 
Power status includes not only objective capabilities but also subjec-
tive perceptions of these capabilities. There is a historical tendency for 
states to overestimate the military power of an adversary and to 
underestimate a decline in that power. Consequently, there is a certain 
lag time in policy makers' perceptions of the decline of an adversary. 
In addition, a temporary condition of weakness may be perceived as 
less important than a state's power potential for the future. After the 
Napoleonic Wars, for example, a defeated France was perceived as the 
primary threat to European security, even when she was occupied. 
And although Singer and Small exclude defeated Germany from their 
major power system during the half decade after World War I, Ger-
many survived the war as the leading continental Power and was 
generally perceived as the central threat to European security. It is 
impossible to understand the nature of Great Power relationships 
regarding security matters in the early 1920s if Germany is excluded 
from the Great Power system (or in 1815-18 if France is excluded). 
Similar questions may be raised concerning Singer and Small's exclu-
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sion of the Soviet Union from the system for three years after World 
War I. Soviet power capabilities ranked ahead of those of Italy and 
Japan and the Soviets were certainly perceived as a major threat by 
the West. In none of these cases does it appear that temporary periods 
of weakness or decline had sufficient impact on international security 
policy to exclude these states from the Great Power system. 
This procedure can be justified on methodological grounds as well. 
Systematic empirical analysis requires that if any of these cases are 
excluded all comparable cases must be excluded. To do so would 
require an explicit definition of the criteria for inclusion or exclusion 
and their rigorous and systematic application to all cases over the last 
five centuries that might conceivably qualify. To exclude only a few 
of the more well-known cases is to risk the introduction of a nonran-
dom bias into the analysis. Why exclude Russia in 1918-21 but not 
during the period after the Crimean War? Why not exclude France 
during her occupation after Vienna? 
The problem, of course, is that the specification of explicit criteria 
and their application on a case-by-case basis would be prohibitive in 
time and resources, and in the end it might make very little difference. 
It is historically rare that a major state in such a weakened condition 
is involved quickly in another war, so the compilation of war data 
would not be affected greatly. Moreover, the time spans involved are 
short, and in a study of this historical scope the exclusion (or inclu-
sion) of a few states for a few extra years would make little difference 
in the results of the analysis. For all of these reasons it is better to 
ignore cases of temporary weakness and to assume continuity in the 
Great Power system. 
Another set of problems has been generated by revolutionary 
changes in military technology since 1945, particularly the develop-
ment of nuclear warheads and long-range delivery systems. These 
technological developments have not only been a primary source of 
the widening power differentials between the two leading nuclear 
powers and the other major industrial states, clouding the categories 
of powers by creating a new class of "Superpowers," but they have 
also profoundly altered the concept of security in international poli-
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tics. Has the emergence of the Superpowers effectively eliminated the 
traditional category of Great Power, leaving only two Powers in the 
world? Or should a stratification of the international system conceive 
of the Superpowers as simply an elite within a broader class of Great 
Powers, leaving the possibility of including such states as Britain, 
France, West Germany, China, and Japan in the Great Power system? 
This latter conceptualization is preferable. 43 There are significant 
power differentials between the Superpowers and these other states, 
but the gap between these major industrial states and others is signifi-
cant. Comparable cases of significant power differentials have existed 
in the past, when the military capabilities of one or two Powers rose 
far above the rest (for example, France under Louis XIV and Napo-
leon or the Hapsburgs and Valois in the early sixteenth century), yet 
their rivals were still recognized as Great Powers. Moreover, there are 
other dimensions of Great Power rank besides military capabilities, 
though the latter are clearly the most important. The perceptions of 
the Superpowers are particularly significant. There is little doubt that 
for a quarter century Russia has perceived a grave security threat 
from West Germany and China and the United States from China. 
Britain, France, and China not only have a veto power in the U.N. 
Security Council, but they also have the capability for nuclear strikes 
against major Soviet cities. Britain and France have interests beyond 
Europe and are no more confined to being regional powers than was 
Prussia until late in the nineteenth century. An attempt to understand 
Soviet and American behavior and the security system of which they 
are a part without including certain other Powers would be as futile 
as an analysis of the early sixteenth-century Hapsburg-Valois rivalry 
without considering the Turks and England. 
For these reasons, the non-Superpowers should not be automati-
cally excluded from Great Power status. The definition of Great 
Power and the operational criteria developed earlier can be used to 
determine which of the major industrial states qualify for inclusion in 
the system. 
Admittedly, the revolutionary changes in the world system since 
1945 raise new and serious questions regarding the concept of a Great 
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Power system and its assumptions of the dominance of military secu-
rity issues. The questions of the continued validity of the Great Power 
system and the meaning of the Great Power concept are of enormous 
theoretical significance, but their implications for this study are too 
limited to justify a major new theoretical analysis. The period in 
question covers only 30 years of a 480-year system and involves so few 
wars that its overall impact is limited. Different conceptualizations, 
including ones that exclude all but the Superpowers from the system 
or exclude the entire post-1945 period, would have only a marginal 
impact on the analysis of war during the last five centuries of the 
modem Great Power system. Hence the continued existence of the 
modem Great Power system is adopted as a working hypothesis, 
derived from the assumption that any anarchic political system con-
tains a Great Power system. 
Another problem concerns the identity and continuity of a given 
Great Power over time. Shall Germany be considered a continuation 
of Prussia in 1871, or shall that date mark the end of one Great Power 
and the emergence of another? This kind of problem arises, for exam-
ple, concerning the Hapsburgs in 1519 and Russia in 1917. In this 
analysis the continuity of a Great Power's identity over time is gener-
ally assumed for a number of reasons. First, the primary focus here 
is on the war behavior of the system as a whole, rather than the 
behavior of individual states, and for a systemic-level analysis a Great 
Power role is of greater concern than the identity of the particular 
Powers. The enormous conceptual and methodological problems in-
volved in the definition and operational identification of any funda-
mental discontinuities in national political systems would render such 
an effort more costly in time and resources than can be justified. In 
most cases the new regime occupied the same core territory as the old, 
commanded the same basic power capabilities, and was characterized 
by a continuity of the military establishment. Finally, the data gener-
ated in this analysis are presented in such a way that they can easily 
be disaggregated and reconstructed should another analyst wish to 
emphasize these fundamental discontinuities. 
Having considered these general problems, let us now apply the 
general criteria developed earlier to a historical analysis in order to 
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determine the membership of the modern Great Power system at each 
point over the last five centuries. An effort will be made to indicate 
the degree of confidence in each entry and exit point. In the process, 
other attempts in the historical literature to classify the Great Power 
status of particular states will be noted. It should be emphasized, 
however, that most of these previous efforts were unguided by explicit 
analytical criteria and are therefore less important than the historical 
evidence fitting the theoretical criteria developed here. In the follow-
ing analysis the most difficult cases receive the greatest attention, and 
less controversial cases are dealt with only briefly. 
France (1495-1975). The status of France as a member of the Great 
Power system from its inception in 1495 until the German occupation 
in 1940 is unquestioned. She was one of the two leading European 
powers at the end of the fifteenth century and the leading power for 
the half century after 1659 and during her revolutionary period at the 
turn of the nineteenth century. France's status becomes questionable 
only in the period after World War II. On the basis of the criteria 
developed earlier, it can be argued that France should be included as 
a Great Power though clearly subordinate to the Superpowers. She 
played a central role in NATO until the mid-1960s and in the Conti-
nental military calculations of both Superpowers after that. She has 
a veto power in the United Nations Security Council and has security 
interests that extend beyond Europe to Indochina, the Middle East, 
and Africa. France has ranked around sixth on the Singer scale of 
military capabilities44 and possesses an independent nuclear capabil-
ity. For these reasons, France is included as a continuous member of 
the modern Great Power system from its inception until the present 
time.45 
England/Great Britain (1495-1975). There has been considerable 
debate about the status of England during the early years of the 
modern Great Power system. One view is that England did not 
become a Great Power until the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 
1588. Petrie argues that given her declining international prestige 
after the failure of her bid for European supremacy during the Hun-
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dred Years' War and her inferiority to France and Spain in population 
and material resources, England should not be considered a Great 
Power at the end of the sixteenth century. 46 A careful examination 
of the first century of the system reveals that England satisfied most 
of the criteria for Great Power rank. She lagged behind France, Spain, 
and the Hapsburg Empire in wealth and population, but her insular 
position provided considerable freedom of diplomatic maneuver as 
well as security, both of which England exploited in the pursuit of her 
interests on the Continent. She played a significant role in early Great 
Power diplomacy, being much sought after as an ally by the enemies 
of France in the Italian wars. Though not a part of the League of 
Venice in 1495, England did join the Holy League in 1511. She played 
a key balancing role in the bipolar struggle between Charles V and 
Francis I until mid-century and was later described by Montesquieu 
as "Ia puissance mediatrice de /'Europe" during this period. 47 She had 
treaties of alliance with both sovereigns, participated in the wars of 
the 1520s to limit the hegemony of Charles V, fought two wars with 
France in the 1540s, and was one of three signatories (with Spain and 
France) to the Treaty ofCateau-Cambresis in 1559, ending the Italian 
wars. As the leading Protestant state, England intervened in the Wars 
of Religion in France in support of the Huguenots beginning in 1562 
and in support of the rebellion against Spain in the Netherlands. 
Furthermore, England was an important maritime power located 
along one of Europe's most important sea routes. For these reasons 
England should be considered a Great Power from the beginning of 
the modem system. This view is supported by several prominent 
authorities. Hill, Mattingly, and Dehio all identify England as one of 
four major powers at the end of the fifteenth century.48 There is no 
doubt that England's Great Power status continued until the mid-
twentieth century. 
Like France, Britain must also be considered a Great Power in the 
post-1945 period in spite of the gap separating her from the Super-
powers. Her military capabilities are not insignificant, ranking fourth 
on Singer's scale (for 1960), and she has an independent nuclear 
deterrent force. Britain is an important member of NATO, particu-
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larly as a naval power, and has actively defended her security inter-
ests in the Middle East and South Atlantic. Her formal status is en-
hanced by her U.N. veto power. For these reasons she qualifies as 
a Great Power during the last three decades in spite of her dis-
engagement from her overseas empire and her internal economic 
problems. 49 
The Hapsburg Dynasty (1495-1519; 1519-1556; 1556-1918). Few 
would argue against including the Hapsburg dynasty from the very 
beginning of the modern Great Power system. 50 Its position was 
firmly established with the passing of the bulk of the Burgundian 
inheritance to Maximilian of Austria in 1477. The imperial crown of 
the Holy Roman Empire, elective in principle, was the continuous 
possession of the House of Hapsburg from 1438 to 1740 and from 
1745 to the dissolution of the empire in 1806. The personal power of 
the emperor, however, derived not from the resources within the 
Germanic empire but from the Hapsburg family possessions in central 
Europe, including Upper and Lower Austria, Syria, Carinthia and 
Tyrol, Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Hungary. References to the 
emperor in this study are to his role as the head of the Hapsburg 
dynasty. 
The emperor was deeply involved in the international politics of 
early sixteenth-century Europe. He participated in the Italian wars as 
a member of the League of Venice, the League of Cambrai, and the 
Holy League and was also involved in the continuous struggle against 
the Turks. The territorial and material resources of the Hapsburgs 
were enormously increased in the early sixteenth century, first with 
the inheritance of the Spanish dominions under Charles V in 1519 and 
then with the permanent annexation of Bohemia, Transylvania, and 
Hungary in 1526. With the death of Charles V in 1556, the dynasty 
was divided into Austrian and Spanish branches. 
The accession of Charles V presents a serious conceptual problem. 
The election of Emperor Charles V in 1519 brought the territories and 
resources of two Great Powers, the eastern Hapsburgs and Spain, 
under the rule of a single sovereign. The question is whether these 
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Hapsburg domains should be treated as a single Great Power or two 
distinct Powers for the purposes of this analysis. 
In many respects the eastern and western Hapsburg lands contin-
ued as distinct political entities. Their economic systems remained 
separate, and the ties between the two domains derived more from the 
personal authority of Charles V than from any institutionalized link-
ages. In international politics, however, which is the central consider-
ation here, the Hapsburgs under Charles V constituted a single actor 
with a highly centralized foreign policy. 5 1 For the first decade he had 
a single foreign minister in Gattinara, and thereafter Charles assumed 
personal control of the external affairs of all of his lands. He delegated 
some power to governors and viceroys but reserved the ultimate 
control over policy and administration to himself. 
Distinctive Spanish and Austrian-Burgundian dimensions of the 
foreign policy of Charles V can be identified. His policies regarding 
Italy, North Africa, and the Mediterranean area clearly derived from 
traditional Aragonese interests and policies, while his relations with 
the German princes were associated with the traditional concerns of 
the emperor. The point is, however, that these policies were pursued 
by a single sovereign and were backed by the entire resources at his 
disposal. The Austrian-Burgundian lands cannot be treated as an 
independent Power in the diplomacy of the period, for Charles ac-
quired much of his wealth, resources, and military manpower from 
Spain. Yet Spain cannot realistically be treated as an independent 
Great Power during this period because her territory and resources 
were considerably different from those of Ferdinand or Philip II, and 
Charles's preoccupation with central Europe was a considerable de-
parture from traditional Spanish policies focusing on the New World 
and the Mediterranean. For these reasons the Hapsburg lands under 
Charles V have generally been treated as a single Power in many of 
the diplomatic histories of the period 5 2 and are so treated here. They 
were unquestionably one of the two leading Great Powers until mid-
century, at which point Spain emerged as the dominant European 
power for a century. 
To avoid any semantic confusion, the Hapsburg Powers are labeled 
as follows: the reign of Charles V, from 1519 to 1556, is referred to 
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as the United Hapsburgs; the Spanish Hapsburgs are referred to as 
Spain after 1556. The eastern branch of the Hapsburgs, from 1495 to 
1519 and 1556 to 1918, is referred to as the Austrian Hapsburgs. This 
delineation is partially for practical reasons, to distinguish this politi-
cal unit from both the United Hapsburgs and the Hapsburg line in 
Spain after 1556. It also reflects the fact that although Austria was 
only one of the many eastern Hapsburg dominions, it was the most 
important. These territories are commonly referred to as Austria in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, up to the Ausgleich of 
Austria-Hungary in 1867. 
The Spanish and Austrian states had dynastic ties after 1556, but 
this alone is not sufficient to deny them independent status as Great 
Powers. They were distinct not only in their territory, power base, and 
economic systems but also in their foreign policies. 53 In most signifi-
cant respects the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs after Charles were 
no less independent than Germany and Austria-Hungary at the tum 
of the twentieth century or the United States and Britain after World 
War II. Consequently, the separate Hapsburg lines must be treated as 
independent Great Powers after 1556. Both continued to be important 
for several centuries. Few scholars would dispute the exit from the 
Great Power system of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after its col-
lapse in 1918. 
Spain (1495-1519; 1556-1808). There is no question regarding the 
inclusion of Spain in the modem Great Power system from its begin-
ning. 54 The emergence of Spain as a major force in Europe began with 
the union of Aragon and Castile in 1479 under King Ferdinand and 
Queen Isabella and was completed by the conquest of Granada and 
the expulsion of the Moors in 1492. The lands of the Catholic Kings 
included Sardinia and Sicily, with the rights to the Kingdom of Na-
ples, and their power base in Europe was greatly strengthened by a 
thriving overseas empire. Spain intervened to block French expansion 
in Italy and successfully competed with France for supremacy in 
Italy. 
With the union of the Spanish and Burgundian-Austrian Haps-
burgs under Charles V in 1519 Spain is treated as part of a single 
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United Hapsburg entity until the death of Charles V and the 
breakup of the Hapsburgs in 1556. At that point Spain is considered 
a separate Great Power under Philip II. She was the leading European 
(and world) power until supplanted by France a century later. 
Much more difficult is the question of when Spain ceased to be a 
Great Power. The fluctuations in Spanish military power, economic 
strength, and diplomatic influence in the century and a half after the 
Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659 were as dramatic as those for any Power 
during the five-century span of the modern system. Spain had main-
tained her supremacy in Europe until 1659 and was the greatest 
imperial power for years after that. Although Spanish economic and 
military power suffered an abrupt decline in the half century after the 
Peace of the Pyrenees, Spain was a major participant in the European 
coalitions against Louis XIV and in the peace congresses of Nymwe-
gen (1678-79) and Ryswick (1697). Spain was humiliated and her 
empire dismembered after the War of the Spanish Succession, but 
political successions and the dynastic inheritances associated with 
them were perfectly legitimate in the political theory of the time, so 
the loss of much of Spain's empire cannot be attributed solely to the 
limitations of her power.55 In fact, the war resulted in a unified 
Spanish state, and there was a marked resurgence in Spanish power 
in the next two decades. Spain pursued an expansionist policy under 
Alberoni after Utrecht and regained her position of dominance in 
southern Italy. The other Great Powers felt sufficient fear of Spain 
after Utrecht that they formed a Quadruple Alliance against her to 
guarantee the peace settlement, and it took a European Congress at 
Cambrai in 1724 to settle her dispute with Austria. Spain attended the 
Congress of Soissons in 1728 and was involved in the diplomacy of 
the Polish Succession a half decade later. She put up a good fight 
against Britain in the War of Jenkins' Ear, and her position in Italy 
was strengthened at Aix-la-Chapelle (1748). Thus many authorities 
consider Spain a Great Power during the first half of the eighteenth 
century. 5 6 
Spanish strength continued to decline, however. She played a mini-
mal role in the Seven Years' War and made many concessions at the 
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Peace of Paris (although she did gain Louisiana from France). She 
made a major economic recovery in the last half of the eighteenth 
century and was allied against England in the American Revolution. 
Spain was also important in the French Revolutionary and Napo-
leonic Wars until her major naval defeat at Trafalgar. At this point 
the Spanish people revolted against the disastrous Francophile poli-
cies and were helpless against the French invasions of 1808. Spain 
contributed little to the defeat of Napoleonic France, was not a major 
participant at the Congress of Vienna, and was not a part of the 
Quadruple Alliance. In the next decade Spain lost her American 
empire. For these reasons Spain departed from the modem Great 
Power system in 1808. For at least the last half century of her mem-
bership, however, Spain's role was subordinate to that of the other 
Powers. 
Ottoman Empire (1 495-1699). No treatment of European diplomacy 
and war in the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is com-
plete without the inclusion of the Ottoman Empire, which reached the 
peak of its strength in the century after the capture of Constantinople 
in 1453.57 The sultan had a larger standing army than most European 
monarchs. It was permanent, well-trained, disciplined, and thor-
oughly professional. 58 It was also respected and envied by the Eu-
ropeans. Paolo Giovio wrote in 1530 that "their military discipline 
has such justice and severity as easily to surpass the ancient Greeks 
and Romans .... The Turks surpass our own soldiers. " 59 Although 
the Turks were outside the formal diplomatic community of Europe, 
their impact on European military affairs, alliances, and the balance 
of power was considerable, particularly after their wars with Venice 
and the Persians in the late fifteenth and very early sixteenth centu-
ries. The Turkish invasions of Europe and the Franco-Turkish alli-
ances beginning in 1526 were vital in preventing the further hegemony 
of Charles V. The alliance between Francis I and Suleyman I is 
described by Petrie as initiating "one of the most continuous threads 
in the fabric of European diplomacy for more than three hundred 
years." Dehio compares the role of Turkey as "balancer" of the 
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European security system with the classic English role in subsequent 
balance-of-power systems. 60 The Turks conquered much of southeast-
em Europe, held most of Hungary, and twice were at the gates of 
Vienna. By the middle of the sixteenth century the Turkish navy had 
gained supremacy over the Mediterranean and controlled two-thirds 
of its shores.61 
The exit of the Ottoman Empire from the Great Power system is 
difficult to pinpoint. The Turks suffered a major naval defeat at 
Lepanto in 1571 but recovered rapidly and continued to ravage the 
western Mediterranean coasts. Despite growing internal decay and 
the gradual decline of the Janissary corps (the elite infantry), the 
Ottoman Empire continued to expand, extending its frontiers to the 
Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, and by 1683 into the Ukraine and as 
far north as Vienna. A series of wars with Persia, Venice, Austria, 
Poland, and finally Russia eroded Turkish power, and by the late 
seventeenth century they had lost nearly half of their former territory 
in Europe, including Transylvania, Hungary, and most of Croatia and 
Slavonia. Their navy had long been weak, 62 and their army was 
declining in effectiveness. Their weapons and techniques were techni-
cally inferior to those of Europe, and the Janissaries prevented mod-
ernization of the army. The Turks' traditional logistical problems in 
supporting a distant war (they always had trouble fighting a two-front 
war) were becoming more serious. Economically, the Ottoman Em-
pire was declining relative to Europe. Its industries were primitive, its 
population and political unity were declining further, and its adminis-
trative system was weak and decentralized. 63 
This decline was symbolized by the Peace of Carlowitz (1699) after 
the defeat of the Turks by the Austrians and other European Powers. 
The Ottoman Empire was forced to make enormous territorial conces-
sions that left it in a vulnerable strategic position. Carlowitz marked 
the Turks' "transition from the offensive to the defensive" and the 
beginning of their withdrawal from Europe. Hill argues that "the 
Peace of Carlowitz disclosed an immense decline in the force of the 
Ottoman Empire .... It marked the end of the period during which 
the Turkish power seriously threatened Christendom." Petrie asserts 
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that "for the future the Eastern Problem was to be changed, and the 
question was no longer how to protect Christendom from the Turk, 
but who was to take his place as the dominant Power in the Near 
East."64 
The Ottoman Empire continued to battle the Austrians and Rus-
sians in southeastern Europe but in the eighteenth century was no 
longer taking a major role in Great Power politics. It participated in 
none of the major multilateral wars or peace congresses of that period 
and was no longer considered as a major factor in the military calcula-
tions of the Powers. For these reasons, Ottoman membership in the 
Great Power system ceased with Carlowitz in 1699.65 
The Netherlands (1609-1713). Although the Union of Utrecht, in-
corporating the seven northern provinces, was formed in 1579, the 
United Provinces did not achieve effective independence from Spain 
for another thirty years. The Twelve Years' Truce of 1609 marks the 
entry of the Dutch into the Great Power system. The independence 
of the Republic of the United Provinces (as distinct from the Spanish 
Netherlands) was not formally recognized until Westphalia in 1648, 
but the diplomatic and military role of the Dutch in the Thirty Years' 
War is evidence that they had achieved Great Power rank at an earlier 
date. Although decentralized politically and small in size and popula-
tion, the Netherlands drew strength from her wealth, central role in 
European finance and commerce, colonial empire, and naval power. 66 
On these grounds, both Wallerstein and Modelski identify the Nether-
lands as the hegemonic global power in the world system in the 
seventeenth century. 67 In addition, the Netherlands was deeply in-
volved in the alliance system of late seventeenth-century Europe and 
participated in most of the major wars of that period, including the 
three general wars involving Louis XIV. 
Although in 1689 William became a sovereign of both England and 
the Netherlands, the two states are treated as independent powers 
during this period, as is done in the literature. Their foreign policies 
were distinct and were supported by distinct political, economic, and 
military resources, and they signed separate peace treaties (for exam-
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ple, Ryswick in 1697). Dutch power began to wane with the death of 
William III in 1702 and the costly War of the Spanish Succession. 
After the Treaty of Utrecht, the Netherlands "ceased to have a great 
sea power" according to Alfred T. Mahan, 68 and this loss of her major 
strength began a general Dutch decline in international influence over 
European security matters. The Dutch were of some importance at 
Utrecht and in the Quadruple Alliance, but they were involved only 
minimally in the great wars of the middle of the eighteenth century, 
which involved nearly all the Powers. They abstained from the War 
of the Polish Succession and Seven Years' War and played no role in 
the major postwar conferences at Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) and Paris 
(1763). The Dutch continued to be important in international trade 
and finance, but this is not sufficient to qualify them for Great Power 
status. Thus the Netherlands cannot be considered a Great Power 
after 1713.69 
Sweden (1617-1721). No list of Great Powers in the seventeenth 
century would be complete without Sweden. After a miserable perfor-
mance in the War of Kalmar (1611-13) against Denmark, Sweden 
made a remarkable recovery. She defeated Russia in a decade-long 
war and emerged as the dominant power in the Baltic. At the Treaty 
of Stolbova in 1617, she forced the tsar to make concessions that cut 
Russia off from the Baltic and delayed her rise to Great Power rank 
for a century. Stolbova marks Sweden's entry into the Great Power 
system.7° Four years later, when she captured the great trading city 
and fortress of Riga from the Poles, Sweden's strength further im-
pressed the Powers of Europe. 
Under Gustavus Adolphus Sweden was a leading participant in the 
Thirty Years' War and was largely responsible for checking the ex-
pansion of the Hapsburgs and effectively deciding the fate of northern 
Europe. 71 In spite of her economic and demographic weakness, Swe-
den had a first-rate army under brilliant military leadership and was 
respected throughout Europe. Sweden reached the peak of her power 
by mid-century. She was formally recognized as a Great Power at 
Westphalia and together with France was named as guarantor of the 
peace settlement. Sweden was important in the first coalition against 
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Louis XIV, profitably rewarded by Louis for her abstention from the 
second, and sought as an ally by both sides during the War of the 
Spanish Succession. In the Second Northern War Sweden attempted 
to defend her dominant position in the Baltic against a coalition 
consisting of Russia, Poland, Saxony, Denmark, England, and 
Prussia. The Russian victory over Sweden at the Battle of Poltava in 
1709 marked the beginning of the end of Swedish military greatness. 
As a result of the war and major Swedish concessions at the treaties 
of Stockholm and Nystadt in 1721, Russia replaced Sweden as the 
dominant influence in the Baltic and ended Sweden's role as a Great 
Power.72 Sweden was relatively insignificant in the power politics and 
wars of the eighteenth century. 
Russia/Soviet Union (1721-1975). The precise point at which 
Russia entered the Great Power system is a matter of debate. During 
the seventeenth century, she counted for little in the power calcula-
tions of the great European states. She was noted more for her military 
and administrative weaknesses than for her military potential. 73 She 
played no role in the general wars to maintain the balance of power 
against Louis XIV and was slaughtered by a Swedish army no more 
than one-fifth her size at Narva in 1700. She was poor, under-
developed, and lacking in capital, skilled labor, and a good communi-
cation system. By the turn of the eighteenth century, however, Peter 
the Great had begun his opening toward the West. He was highly 
impressed with Western technology, expertise, and organizational 
efficiency during his diplomatic tour (the "great embassy") of 1697 
and returned determined to initiate revolutionary reforms in Russia. 7 4 
Peter's Westernization included reorganization of the army and a 
major shipbuilding program as well as social and administrative 
changes and the centralization of the bureaucracy. 75 The effectiveness 
of these changes was demonstrated by Russia's crushing defeat of the 
Swedes at Poltava, yet two years later she was humiliated by the 
Turks, then a second-rate Power, at the Pruth River. 
With the Treaty of Nystadt in 1721, which gained Russia major 
territorial concessions from Sweden and a "window" on the Baltic, 
she replaced Sweden as the dominant state in the north and gradually 
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became involved in European politics. Following Nystadt Russia can 
be considered a Great Power. 76 By this time she had also established 
permanent diplomatic relations with West European states. Russia 
played an important role in the diplomacy and wars of the eighteenth 
century, including the Wars of the Polish and Austrian Successions 
and the Seven Years' War. There is no question regarding the continu-
ation of her Great Power status until the present day. 77 
Prussia/Germany/West Germany (1740-1975). Despite Prussia's 
diplomatic and military involvement in European politics in the early 
eighteenth century, she cannot be considered a Great Power until her 
occupation ofSilesia in 1740. At the time of Utrecht (1713), Branden-
burg-Prussia had not yet risen to predominance among the states 
within Germany. Her scattered possessions were a main source of 
weakness. And Saxony was the wealthiest and perceived as the most 
important politically ofthe German states.78 In the decades following 
Utrecht Frederick William I laid the foundations of power for the 
Prussian state and, some argue, German militarism. 79 He imposed 
rigid economizing measures and Spartan discipline and built a formi-
dable army consisting of 3 percent of the population and consuming 
80 percent of Prussian revenues. 80 The occupation of Silesia in 17 40 
solidified Frederick II's military reputation and Prussia's position as 
a leading Continental Power. This date marks the entry of Prussia into 
the Great Power system. 81 The continuation of Great Power status 
for Prussia and then Germany is not in doubt until Hitler's defeat in 
1945. 
In spite of her present non-nuclear status and her lack of a U.N. 
veto, the Federal Republic of Germany cannot be excluded from the 
Great Power system in the post-World War II period. 82 Even during 
the period of foreign occupation and economic recovery, Germany 
was a central focus of Great Power diplomacy. Germany's future was 
the central issue of contention between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, and their failure to resolve it was a primary reason for 
the origins and escalation of the Cold War.83 A primary Soviet diplo-
matic objective has been to prevent the rise of an independent and 
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unified Germany and the resurgence of German military power (and 
particularly nuclear power). 84 Some argue that French policy has 
been motivated as much by a fear of Germany as by a fear of the 
Soviets. The West German army is the core of NATO's conventional 
defense in Europe and her industrial strength has made her the eco-
nomic leader of Europe. For the above reasons, Prussia (1740-1871), 
Germany (1871-1945), and the Federal Republic of Germany are 
treated as a continuous member of the Great Power system from 1740 
to 1975.85 
Italy (1861-1943). The case of Italy is a difficult one. Certainly she 
cannot be considered a Great Power before her unification; her mili-
tary weaknesses were evident in the failure of the 1848-49 revolution. 
Even after her unification, Italy never equaled the other Powers and 
at no time ranks higher than eighth on Singer's scale of power 
capabilities. Yet because of her strong navy and strategic position in 
the Mediterranean, Italy was important in Great Power diplomacy 
during the half century before World War I. She was allied with 
Prussia in the Austro-Prussian War and received Venetia in compen-
sation for her efforts. She was deeply involved in the Bismarckian 
system of alliances and was actively sought as an ally by both the 
Alliance and Entente in the diplomacy leading up to World War I. 
Moreover, Italy was formally treated as a Great Power by the other 
Powers, as evidenced by her role at the Congress of Berlin and other 
diplomatic protocol. For these reasons, Italy is traditionally treated 
as a Great Power during this period, 86 and she is similarly treated 
here. Italian membership in the Great Power system began in 1861 
with the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy after the Italo-Roman 
and Halo-Sicilian Wars of 1860-61, which effectively completed the 
unification ofltaly.87 Italy left the Great Power system in 1943, when 
she was defeated by the allies. 
United States (1898-1975). Though ranking ahead of Austria-Hun-
gary and Italy in power capabilities by the late nineteenth century, the 
United States was neither active in international politics nor impor-
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tant in the calculations of the Great Powers. She was not part of 
Bismarck's complex system of security alliances and was not involved 
at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Not until after the defeat of Spain 
in December 1898 and the acquisition of Guam and the Philippines 
can the United States be called a Great Power and a world power.88 
The United States ranked first in power capabilities by World War I, 
and there is no doubt regarding her Great Power rank throughout the 
twentieth century. 
Japan (1905-1945). The timing but not the fact of Japan's entry into 
the Great Power system is open to question. After being isolated from 
Great Power politics throughout most of the nineteenth century, 
Japan initiated a program of rapid industrialization under the Meiji 
regime beginning in 1868. Her military power was sufficient to defeat 
China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Singer and Small identify 
that victory in 1895 as the beginning of Japan's role as a major power, 
but it can be argued that this placement is premature. It was not until 
her defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 that Japan 
was recognized as an important military power. At the beginning of 
that war she was treated with contempt by all of Europe as well as 
by Russia, for a European Power had not been defeated by a non-
European state in two hundred years. Thus the victory over Russia 
in 1905 marks Japan's entry into the Great Power system.89 
The status of Japan after 1945 is more difficult. In spite of her 
impressive industrial power and leading role in international com-
merce, Japan has lacked the military power that might provide 
the basis for a significant role in international security issues. 
She is constitutionally limited to "self-defense" forces and spends 
very little money on the military. She ranks eighth, behind India, 
(for 1960) on Singer's scale of power capabilities, has no power pro-
jection capabilities, poses no significant military threat even to me-
dium powers, and is basically dependent upon the United States 
for her security. Nor does Japan have a veto at the United Nations. 
Japan could once again join the Great Power system if she builds 
up her military forces and particularly if she develops a nuclear 
capability. At the present time, however, her strength as a world 
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economic power is not sufficient to qualify for membership in 
the Great Power security system, from which she departed in 
1945.90 
China (1949-1975). The People's Republic of China admittedly 
presents another difficult case, but on the basis of the criteria devel-
oped earlier, must be considered a Great Power after the completion 
of her revolution in 1949. Although China does not match either the 
United States or the USSR in military capabilities, she does rank third 
behind them on the Singer scale of power capabilities. Her perfor-
mance in the Korean War against the American Superpower and in 
the Sino-Indian War of 1962 demonstrated both her military power 
and her capability for limited offensive as well as defensive operations. 
Chinese military power and prestige were enhanced further by her 
development of nuclear weapons in the mid-1960s. Although in some 
respects China has pursued a policy of diplomatic isolation, she has 
played an important role in Great Power politics. She entered into a 
formal military alliance with the Soviet Union in 1950, but within a 
decade and a half was competing with her for a position of leadership 
among international communist movements. She came to be suffi-
ciently perceived by the Soviets as the primary threat to their security 
interests to justify the deployment of nearly a million Soviet troops 
along their common border. China was also perceived for two decades 
as a major threat by the United States. Some U.S. decision makers, 
for example, gave greater emphasis to the threat of Chinese expansion 
than to Soviet expansion in the deliberation of American Indochina 
policy.91 A decade later China was perceived by the Nixon adminis-
tration as an integral part of the world balance of power against the 
Soviet Union. Although China's foreign policy is primarily regional 
in focus, she has been involved with communist revolutionary move-
ments in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East as well as Asia. 
In any case, the importance of China's regionalism must not be exag-
gerated; Germany and Japan were basically regional powers during 
the periods of their greatest influence. For all of these reasons the 
People's Republic of China is a member of the Great Power system 
from 1949 to 1975.92 
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Exclusions from the System 
Other states and political entities have played important roles in 
international politics over the last five centuries but are excluded from 
the modem Great Power system. In this section, I shall examine the 
most significant of these and explain why they do not satisfy my 
theoretical criteria for Great Power rank. 
Holy Roman Empire. It was noted earlier that the emperor's influ-
ence in the Great Power system derived from his control of the 
Hapsburg family possessions rather than his reign over the Holy 
Roman Empire and that by the late fifteenth century the emperor's 
influence in Europe had declined markedly from its peak in the Mid-
dle Ages. By then he did not even possess true sovereignty within the 
empire. Sovereign German princes formed leagues among themselves 
and made informal alliances with external Powers. Henry II of 
France, for example, assumed the title of Protector of the German 
Liberties. Because of the absence of centralized political power and 
sovereignty within its territorial boundaries, as well as its lack of 
influence within Europe, the Holy Roman Empire does not qualify for 
Great Power status. 
Venice. The Venetian city-state was a regional power in the Italian 
state system and a commercial power in the Mediterranean but did 
not qualify for membership in the European Great Power security 
system. Venice was little more than first among the Italian city-states, 
none of which were comparable in strength with the Great Powers of 
Europe, as demonstrated by the course of the Italian wars beginning 
in 1494. Venice had a minimal involvement in European security 
affairs. She did not participate in any of the four major wars between 
the Hapsburgs and Valois for supremacy in Europe or in any of the 
Ottoman wars between 1503 and 1560. Venice had reached the peak 
of her power by the end of the fifteenth century and entered into a 
period of decline in the sixteenth century when Spanish influence 
increased in Italy and the Mediterranean. 93 Because of her limited 
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military capabilities relative to the European Powers and her limited 
influence in European diplomatic and strategic issues (as distinct from 
commercial relations), Venice does not meet the criteria for inclusion 
in the modern Great Power system. 94 
Swiss Confederation. The Swiss played an important role in Eu-
ropean military affairs in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centu-
ries. They revolutionized military tactics during that period and 
probably had the best infantry in Europe, as evidenced by their defeat 
of Charles the Bold of Burgundy in 1476-77.95 Swiss mercenaries were 
the most widely sought after in Europe and formed an important part 
of both the French and Italian armies during the Italian wars. The 
Swiss Confederation had a limited demographic and territorial base, 
however, and was not the equal of the five Great Powers of the time. 
It was further constrained by a highly decentralized political system 
consisting of a loose union of nearly independent cantons. These were 
bound by a common hatred of the Hapsburgs, and they fought effec-
tively to defend their integrity against external threats. Beyond this, 
however, Swiss military power was not used in the pursuit of any 
coherent national policy. In the words of Lynn Montross, "After their 
triumph over Burgundy (1477) the Swiss could have challenged any 
army on the continent. Yet barring a few minor annexations they 
showed a curious indifference to political or territorial aggrandize-
ment."96 This behavior stands in sharp contrast to that of nearly all 
other Great Powers (past and present). The Swiss were driven more 
by profit than patriotism and were content to sell their services to 
others rather than join in the pursuit of any distinctive Swiss interests. 
Thus the Swiss Confederation cannot be considered an independent 
Great Power. 
Portugal. Portugal was a major colonial power in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries and is even identified by Modelski, with some 
exaggeration, as the leading global power of the sixteenth century.97 
In spite of her global achievements, however, Portugal does not qual-
ify for membership in the modern Great Power system. The wealth 
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from her colonial empire gave her a role in European commerce, but 
this did not extend to security affairs. Portugal lacked the military 
capability to exert political influence on the Continent and was not a 
major factor in the power calculations of the Great Powers. She did 
not participate in the Italian wars or in the Hapsburg-Valois wars for 
supremacy in Europe and in fact fought no war with any European 
state in the century before her absorption by Spain in 1580. Nor did 
she participate in any of the alliances or peace conferences. Hence 
Portugal must be excluded from the modem Great Power system. 98 
Poland. Poland was for a time a Baltic power but never a Great 
Power. She reached the peak of her strength by the late fifteenth 
century, just before the emergence of the modem system. Poland 
fought wars with Sweden and Russia for supremacy in the Baltic, 
from which she was excluded in 1660, but played no role in the 
security affairs of the Great Powers. She participated in none of their 
alliances or wars until her wars against the Turks beginning early in 
the seventeenth century. By this time Polish decline was well under 
way, primarily because of internal political weaknesses and the lack 
of a strong central authority. This process culminated in the partitions 
of the late eighteenth century and the elimination of Poland as a 
sovereign state. Poland is rarely identified as a Great Power and is not 
considered as one here. 99 
Denmark. Denmark, like Poland, was for a time a regional power 
in the Baltic but never a Great Power. She participated in none of the 
alliances or wars of the Great Powers until the Thirty Years' War, and 
by that time she had lost her supremacy in the Baltic to Sweden and 
had begun to decline in strength. Denmark is rarely identified as a 
Great Power in the histories of the period and is not included here. 
The Modern Great Power System 
The membership of the modem Great Power system and the periods 
of membership for each of the Powers have now been established: 
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France 
England/Great Britain 



























The composition of the Great Power system during various time 
periods is shown in Table 2.1; it should be noted here that the time 
periods used are not of equal lengths. 
The identity of the Great Powers and their points of entry into and 
departure from the system have been justified by applying my theoret-
ical criteria to the historical evidence. I believe that these are the best 
decisions, but there is admittedly some margin of error. In the previ-
ous sections I have noted uncertainty in categorization of certain 
Powers and the different decisions of other observers. Now I will 
summarize these confidence intervals and consider the sensitivity of 
this study to possible "measurement error" in the identity of the 
Powers. 
First, I am confident that no state has been improperly excluded 
from the modem Great Power system. Given the theoretical criteria 
established earlier, none of the exclusions discussed in the previous 
section present a difficult choice. I am also reasonably confident that 
no state has been improperly included in the study, though the status 
of China and perhaps Italy may be questioned by some.100 
Table 2.1. The Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975 
1495- 1519- 1556- 1609- 1617- 1699- 1713- 1721- 1740- 1808- 1861- 1898- 1905- 1918- 1943- 1945- 1949-
Power 1519 1556 1609 1617 1699 1713 1721 1740 1808 1861 1898 1905 1918 1943 1945 1949 1975 
France (Fr) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
England/Great Britain 
(Eng) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Austrian Hapsburgs/ 
Austria (AH) • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Spain 
(Sp) • • • • • • • • 
Ottoman Empire 




(Net) • • • 
Sweden 
(Sw) • • • 
Russia/Soviet Union 
(Rus) • • • • • • • • • • 
Prussia/Germany I 
FRG (Ger) • • • • • • • • • 
Italy 
(It) • • • • 
United States 
(US) • • • • • • 
Japan 
(Jap) • • • 
China 
(Ch) • 
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More open to debate are the points of entry into and departure from 
the system of particular Powers. Some will question the continued 
membership of France, England, and West Germany and the exclu-
sion of Japan after 1945. These decisions have a minimal impact on 
the study, however; at most they add two wars. The other most 
significant cases concern the entry of England and the termination of 
Spain and the Ottoman Empire. Some might argue that England's 
entry should be delayed nearly a century (until 1588), that Spain 
should leave the system up to a century earlier, and that the departure 
of the Ottoman Empire could be changed several decades in either 
direction. The latter would have the largest impact on this study 
because of the existence of several bilateral wars involving Turkey and 
the other Powers. Changes for any of the other Great Powers would 
have much less impact, affecting the number of Powers involved in 
particular wars more than the inclusion or exclusion of the wars 
themselves. Sweden's entry could be delayed (beginning no later than 
1625 or 1630), and Japan's could be moved up to 1895. Russia's entry 
could conceivably come twelve years earlier (Poltava) or later (begin-
ning of the War of the Polish Succession). The Netherlands could 
conceivably leave the system seven years later (after the War of the 
Quadruple Alliance). In all other cases, I believe that the margin of 
error is negligible. The impact of potential measurement error on my 
compilation of war data is further discussed in the following two 
chapters. Now that the Great Powers have been defined and identi-




of the Wars 
In previous chapters I established the need for a systematic empirical 
study of war among the Great Powers over an extended temporal span 
and suggested that existing compilations of war data are not adequate 
for this purpose. The aim in this chapter is to define war and suggest 
operational criteria for the identification of all wars involving the 
Great Powers in the modem system. A detailed treatment of these 
criteria of inclusion and exclusion is necessary because in their ab-
sence no empirical study of war can be truly systematic. Problems 
involving the initiation and termination dates of war and the question 
of the aggregation or disaggregation of multiple wars are also exam-
ined. Because no study of this nature can be perfectly objective, it is 
necessary to acknowledge some of the biases inherent in these data-
generation procedures. 
Definition of War 
Before operational criteria for the identification of wars can be estab-
lished it is necessary to define war conceptually. One of the most 
useful definitions is that suggested by Bronislaw Malinowski: war is 
an "armed contest between two independent political units, by means 
of organized military force, in the pursuit of a tribal or national 
policy." 1 This definition avoids the serious problems that arise from 
legalistic definitions of war such as Wright's.2 It recognizes that the 
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essence of war is armed conflict involving the organized military 
forces of well-defined politiCal entities. Malinowski's definition, how-
ever, does not take into account a minimum threshold of conflict or 
violence as a prerequisite for war and hence fails to differentiate 
between wars and uses of force short of war such as border incidents 
or limited punitive strikes. In addition, the inclusion of the Clausewit-
zian concept of the pursuit of national policy, unless defined very 
broadly, would exclude conflicts initiated primarily for domestic po-
litical or even personal reasons. War must be defined independently 
of its motivations or other causes (or consequences), for otherwise 
hypotheses regarding the causes or consequences of war would be 
reduced to tautologies and made untestable. Therefore, this study 
defines war as a substantial armed conflict between the organized 
military forces of independent political units. 3 
Using this final definition, one criterion for the classification of wars 
is the nature of the participating actors. The Great Powers constitute 
a distinctive set of states in the international system; therefore, a 
distinct set of wars involving the Great Powers can be defined and 
identified. These wars are a subset of a larger set of interstate wars 
between sovereign states in the international system. For reasons 
suggested earlier, the focus in this study is on interstate wars involving 
the Great Powers. Excluded from this study are the following: (1) any 
war that does not involve a Great Power (as identified in Chapter 2); 
(2) civil wars, unless they become internationalized through the inter-
vention of an external state; and (3) imperial or colonial wars, unless 
they expand through the intervention of another state. Operational 
criteria to differentiate civil wars and imperial or colonial wars from 
others will be provided in a later section. 
An important subset of the interstate wars involving the Great 
Powers consists of wars with at least one Great Power on each side 
of the conflict. These wars, labeled Great Power wars, generally in-
volve a greater level of violence and have a greater impact on the 
international system than do wars involving only one Power. 
Throughout this study I will differentiate between wars involving the 
Great Powers and Great Power wars. Another subset consists of wars 
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involving nearly all the Great Powers and particularly high levels of 
destruction. These general wars will be operationally defined at the 
end of this chapter. 
To be useful in empirical research, the definition of war suggested 
above needs further refinement. War has been defined as "substantial" 
armed conflict in order to distinguish it from border incidents and 
other lesser forms of conflict; this minimum threshold must now be 
operationalized. 
Wright suggests a minimum of fifty thousand troops involved in the 
war, but it is unclear whether he means that these troops must be 
engaged in actual fighting. If not, two armies engaged in a "war" of 
maneuver and position with little actual contact or fighting would 
qualify as a war even if the level of violence was relatively low. This 
minimum troop level criterion is also of questionable relevance for 
naval wars, strategic nuclear exchanges, or space wars. 
A preferable alternative to the use of troop levels is the number of 
casualties resulting from the war, a criterion used in a number of 
studies. Richardson, for example, classifies all "deadly quarrels" ac-
cording to their magnitude (defined as the logarithmic transformation 
ofthe number of battle deaths) and includes all conflicts exceeding 2.5 
in magnitude (or 317 casualties). Gaston Bodart defines an "impor-
tant engagement" as "one in which the combined loss by both antago-
nists amounted to at least 2,000 men killed, wounded, missing, and 
prisoners." Singer and Small require a minimum of 1,000 battle fatali-
ties (for all participants combined) before the conflict is considered an 
interstate war.4 Thus there is ample precedence for the use of a 
battle-death criterion to distinguish wars from lesser forms of military 
conflict. The Singer-Small criterion is used here because it is the most 
refined and precise and because it results in reasonable decisions on 
what wars to include and exclude. 
In addition to requiring a 1,000 battle-death minimum, Singer and 
Small include supplementary criteria. To deal with protracted wars 
with intermittent fighting, they require an annual average of 1,000 
battle deaths for a war to qualify. To determine which states should 
be considered as participants in a given war, they use a minimum 
threshold of 100 battle deaths. But to avoid excluding a few theoreti-
Definition and Identification of the Wars 53 
cally important cases in which the combat troops of a given state were 
involved extensively but did not sustain this minimum number of 
casualties, Singer and Small provide the alternative criterion of a 
"minimum of 1,000 armed personnel engaged in active combat within 
the war theater."5 
The application of the Singer-Small battle-death criterion to this 
study raises the question of whether to require 1,000 battle deaths of 
all participants or only of the Great Powers. For the purposes of 
replicability and comparability for the post-1815 period, I prefer that 
this compilation deviate as little as possible from the Singer-Small 
compilation. Consequently, the 1,000 battle-death minimum is not 
restricted to the Great Powers but includes all states, even though 
these other states are not included in the actual measurements of the 
parameters of the war. In practice, however, the casualty figures for 
the Great Powers are the primary criterion for the pre-1815 period 
because usually no figures are available for most of the other states. 
Use of this criterion might introduce a slight bias against the inclusion 
of very small wars in the earlier period. 
Another problem is whether to apply this constant criterion of 
1,000 battle deaths over the entire temporal span of this study, given 
the increases over time in population, size of armies, and killing power 
of weapons and the consequent increase in battle casualties. This 
problem becomes circular, however, for the trends in war over time 
cannot be determined unless the wars themselves are first identified. 
Although casualties have increased over time, this trend is not as 
strong as might be expected. Furthermore, any relation between casu-
alties and army size is an empirical question. For the sake of consis-
tency, therefore, the same criterion is applied to earlier wars because 
otherwise the upward trend in casualties over time might be elimi-
nated by definition. For similar reasons, the criteria of an annual 
average of 1,000 battle deaths and 100 battle casualties for a state to 
qualify is constant over time. 
Existing Compilations of Wars 
If any of the existing compilations of wars were adequate, the problem 
of identifying the wars would be solved. What is needed is a list of 
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wars determined by criteria at least as broad as those used here, from 
which to exclude wars that do not meet these criteria. Unfortunately, 
no such compilation exists. The most recent compilation of interna-
tional wars is Singer and Small's The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A 
Statistical Handbook This is a superb piece of social science research 
and has had a profound impact on the study of international conflict. 
It is characterized by a precision of operational definition and mea-
surement and the rigorous application of definitional criteria to the 
selection of data. Its emphasis on the explicit specification of the 
empirical system under study and the meticulous concern with the 
problem of inclusion and exclusion is a model to be emulated. Singer 
and Small first define the international system and apply strict criteria 
to determine the membership of that system. On the basis of these 
criteria Singer and Small identify fifty interstate wars and forty-three 
extrasystemic wars over the period 1816-1965. They then define a 
number of dimensions of war, including duration, magnitude, sever-
ity, and intensity. Empirical indicators for each are operationally 
defined, and data are collected describing these various parameters for 
each war. Thus they end up with a list of wars and a quantitative 
description of the dimensions of each war. The remainder of their 
study involves various statistical analyses of the nature of war over 
time, including linear and cyclical trends, seasonal concentrations, 
and the amount of war categorized by nation, dyad, and region. 
Unfortunately, the Singer-Small war data are not fully adequate for 
my purposes, for their time span is too restrictive. The period 1816-
1965 covers only about one-third of the span of the modern Great 
Power system. Consequently, if the Singer-Small compilation of wars 
is to be used here it must be supplemented with other sources. 
For the same reasons, the data set compiled by Richardson in 
Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, which covers the period 1820-1949, is 
not useful for my purposes. In addition to the limited temporal span 
of the study, Richardson is not as concerned as Singer and Small with 
the problem of inclusion and exclusion, and consequently there is 
considerable uncertainty as to whether the biases in the data have 
been reduced to a minimum. His operational criteria are not as refined 
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as those of Singer and Small and his estimates of battle casualties 
probably not as accurate. 6 Furthermore, Richardson's conceptual 
categories are slightly different from those used here. For these rea-
sons, Singer and Small's data set rather than Richardson's is used for 
the most recent 150-year period. 
One compilation that extends further back in time is Pitirim Sora-
kin's Social and Cultural Dynamics, volume 3: Fluctuation of Social 
Relationships, War, and Revolution. Sorokin's list includes "almost 
all the known wars" of the most important states of Europe from 
antiquity to 1925.7 The states treated include ancient Greece, ancient 
Rome, France, Russia, England, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Holland, and Poland and Lithuania. The basic data are listed 
by state, and the duration and estimates of army strength and battle 
casualties for each war are given. On the basis of these data, Sorokin 
analyzes the fluctuation of war over time for Europe as a whole and 
for each state. 
Sorokin's set of war data covers an exhaustive time period, and its 
restriction to only the diplomatically most active states is satisfactory 
for the purposes of this study. Unfortunately, Sorokin's list of most 
important states is not precisely congruent with mine. He includes the 
wars for the Ottoman Empire and Sweden only when Sweden or 
Turkey was the enemy of one of his key states, leaving their wars 
against minor states unaccounted for. But this problem is not major. 
The most serious problem with the Sorokin data is the absence of 
explicit criteria for inclusion and exclusion. "Almost all the known 
wars" is not a sufficient criterion. Although Sorokin's intent to pursue 
scientifically acceptable procedures cannot be questioned (his discus-
sion of methodological difficulties involved in the quantitative study 
of war is excellent), this particular limitation hinders replication of the 
study and leaves the reader uncertain regarding the nature and magni-
tude of the biases in the basic data set. Thus once again the question 
arises of precisely to what set of empirical phenomena any resulting 
generalizations can be applied. There are other problems, of course, 
but these are not unique to Sorokin and shall be treated later in the 
proper context. 
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Another compilation of war data which covers the temporal span 
of the Great Power system is contained in Quincy Wright's classic 
Study of War. Wright lists more than three hundred wars for the 
period 1480-1964. For each war he includes the dates of initiation and 
termination, a list of participants and their dates of entry, the number 
of important battles, and the type of war. Wright demonstrates a 
greater concern than Sorokin with the inclusion/exclusion problem, 
though his criteria are not as sophisticated as Singer and Small's. He 
aims to include "all hostilities involving members of the family of 
nations, whether international, civil, colonial, or imperial, which were 
recognized as states of war in the legal sense or which involved over 
50,000 troops." He includes additional hostilities of lesser magnitude 
and of nonlegal standing which led to "important legal results."8 As 
argued earlier in this chapter, these criteria are ambiguous, and they 
are not entirely congruent with those listed in this study. They do 
provide, however, a satisfactory set of standards by which a given 
conflict can be accepted into or rejected from a compilation of wars. 
Still another list of wars can be found in Woods and Baltzly's Is 
War Diminishing? They construct lists of wars from 1450 to 1900 for 
the following states: Austria, Denmark, England, France, Holland, 
Poland, Prussia, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey. They also at-
tempt to analyze trends in war over time on the basis of the duration 
of wars. Woods and Baltzly include the Great Powers as defined in 
this study, but they fail to provide the specific operational criteria by 
which the wars are identified. For this reason their compilation alone 
is not sufficient as a basic source of data. 
Two other attempts at a more scientific study of war are Gaston 
Bodart's Losses of Life in Modern Wars and Samuel Dumas and K. 
0. Vedel-Peterson's Losses of Life Caused by War. Both are more 
concerned with accurately determining the army strength and battle 
casualties for the major wars of a few key states than with systemat-
ically identifying the basic set of wars. Bodart examines the wars of 
Austria-Hungary from 1618 to 1913 and France from 1614 to 1913. 
Dumas and Vedel-Peterson look at "important" (but otherwise un-
defined) wars from 1756 to 1918. These studies provide useful battle 
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casualty data but cannot be used for the systematic identification of 
the wars themselves. 
The unreliability of the selection criteria used in these various 
studies, and therefore the inadequacy of any one of them for my 
purposes, is further demonstrated by a brief comparison of the list of 
wars generated by each. We find considerable disagreement concern-
ing the identity of the wars and even greater variation in their dates 
of initiation and termination. A comparison of the Wright and Soro-
kin lists, for example, shows that of the roughly 125 wars included in 
one set or the other, only about two-thirds appear in both. Nor are 
these inconsistencies restricted to minor wars. The Wright, Sorokin, 
and Woods-Baltzly data sets disagree on the existence of a number of 
Great Power wars, including the Austro-Turkish War of 1576-83, 
English-Spanish War of 1656-59, and the British-Spanish War of 
1726-29. There are also significant disagreements on dates and the 
combination of simultaneous or sequential wars, which will be dis-
cussed later. Because of the discrepancies, it is impossible to rely on 
any single compilation of wars, but they can be combined to help 
generate a more complete set and to serve as mutual validity checks. 
Criteria for Inclusion and Exclusion 
Since the Singer-Small criteria are nearly congruent with those estab-
lished here, their set of wars (excluding the wars not involving the 
Great Powers) are used, with minor modifications, for the post-
Vienna period. The Singer-Small criteria can easily be applied to the 
wars since 1965 in order to extend the data set. 
For the 1495-1815 period, the Wright, Sorokin, and Woods-Baltzly 
compilations have been combined to generate a complete set of wars 
satisfying my criteria. The simple union of the three sets (including 
any war identified at least once) is unsatisfactory, however, for it fails 
to eliminate wars erroneously identified by only one source. 9 Nor 
would the intersection of the three sets (taking only those wars ap-
pearing in all three sets) be satisfacory, for a number of important 
wars erroneously excluded by one source (for example, the British-
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Spanish War of 1726-29) would therefore be excluded. Given the 
observed discrepancies and the ambiguous or unknown selection cri-
teria of each of these sources, it is best not to rely on the inclusion or 
exclusion of any war by one source without the concurrence of at least 
one other source. Wars are included in this compilation, therefore, 
only if they are identified in any two of the Wright, Sorokin, or 
Woods-Baltzly sets. 10 
This tentative list of wars must be further refined, however. Any 
war not involving at least one Great Power is excluded from the final 
compilation. Furthermore, any war not satisfying the battle-death 
criterion is excluded. The latter condition is simple in most cases, for 
Sorokin provides a reasonably reliable set of data on war casualties. 
Missing, however, are casualty data for Turkey and Sweden and for 
any war not included by Sorokin, so that some other procedures must 
be followed to determine whether the 1,000 battle-death minimum is 
satisfied. This material is available in Bodart's Losses of Life in Mod-
ern Wars, Dumas and Vedel-Peterson's Losses of Life Caused by War, 
and (since any battle exceeding 1,000 casualties is sufficient to qualify 
the conflict as a war) Thomas Harbottle's Dictionary of Battles .11 For 
the few remaining cases, reasonable approximations must be made 
based on informed judgments from diplomatic histories. 12 
The other classes of conflicts that must be excluded from my war 
set are civil and imperial or colonial wars. Although Wright attempts 
to distinguish civil and imperial wars from balance-of-power wars his 
criteria are not adequate for my purposes. (Imperial wars, for exam-
ple, are defined as those attempting to "expand modem civilization 
at the expense of another culture."13 and therefore all wars involving 
the Ottoman Empire are classified as imperial.) Nor is Sorokin's 
classification of "internal disturbances" fully adequate. Since the dis-
tinction between interstate wars (which are the focus of this study) 
and noninterstate wars is sometimes unclear, it is necessary to con-
sider the question in greater detail. 
If interstate wars are defined literally as war between states, the 
problem concerns the ambiguity of what constitutes a state and its 
defining characteristic of sovereign independence. For example, were 
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the wars within the Holy Roman Empire civil wars or interstate wars? 
Were the Russo-Persian wars interstate or imperial? 
Singer and Small have developed criteria to resolve similar ques-
tions for the more recent period. They independently define member-
ship in the international system as requiring a population of 500,000 
and diplomatic recognition by Britain and France (after 1920 this 
legitimizing role of Britain and France is replaced by diplomatic 
recognition by any two Great Powers or membership in the League 
of Nations or United Nations). All wars with system members on both 
sides are classified as interstate; all others are either civil or extrasys-
temic (imperial). 14 These criteria cannot be applied to the pre-1815 
period, however. Population data are not available, and the historical 
research to determine diplomatic recognition (or its functional equiv-
alent because diplomatic practice has changed over time) would be 
too time-consuming to consider here. Since the number of ambiguous 
cases is not great, it is better to make the most reasonable decisions 
possible on a case-by-case basis. 
Regarding the Holy Roman Empire, the main consideration is that 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Germany was a decentralized col-
lection of principalities and other small political units which cannot 
realistically be treated as sovereign states, for the emperor exerted a 
considerable degree of moral and political influence within Germany. 
Given this absence of true sovereignty, wars between the emperor and 
smaller German polities are classified as civil rather than interstate. 
(Wars between the smaller polities are of no interest here because no 
Great Powers were involved.) Another set of cases involves several 
conflicts between England and Scotland. The political relationship 
between these two changed in 1707 with the Union of England and 
Scotland. For the purposes of this study all armed conflicts before that 
date are treated as interstate wars (the last such war occurred in 
1650-51), and all subsequent conflicts are classified as civil wars. On 
the other hand, all armed conflicts between England and Ireland are 
treated as civil wars. Most of the other cases are less ambiguous. 
Civil wars that became internationalized through the military inter-
vention of an outside state are of interest for this study. Here we can 
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distinguish between those cases in which the outside state intervenes 
on the side of the insurgents against the existing regime and those in 
which the external state provides active military support to the regime 
against the insurgents. Only the former constitutes an interstate war 
(provided it meets the battle-death criterion) and is included here. 
Interventions in behalf of an existing regime against insurgents are 
excluded because the latter cannot qualify as sovereign territorial 
states. These wars are included, however, if they generate a coun-
terintervention against the existing regime or its supporter. 15 
Some internationalized civil wars are easily identified. The six-
teenth- and seventeenth-century Huguenot wars frequently generated 
English intervention against the French regime and thus became in-
ternationalized civil wars. In the War of the Three Henries (1589-98) 
Spain intervened in France as part of the succession struggle. Other 
cases are more difficult, especially with regard to the question of when 
a civil war becomes internationalized. The recent case of the Indo-
chinese wars provides a good example. The French intervention is 
excluded for that can be classified as a continuation of a colonial war. 
Also excluded are the Cambodian and two Laotian phases of the war, 
for there the United States intervened on behalf of the existing regime 
against the insurgents. It was not an internationalized civil war until 
a state (North Vietnam) intervened on the side of the insurgents 
against an existing regime and its Great Power supporter. This was 
a gradual process, but a definite time must be established for the 
purposes of analysis. Here I follow Singer and Small and accept 
February 7, 1965 (the beginning of sustained U.S. bombardment of 
North Vietnam) as the beginning of the interstate phase. 
The two cases that present the most serious problems are the Rus-
sian and Spanish Civil Wars. Singer and Small exclude both, and in 
the case of the former it is questionable whether they rigorously 
adhere to their own well-defined criteria of inclusion and exclusion. 
They admit that most of their criteria are satisfied yet claim that the 
Russian civil war is "something very different."16 But this is not a 
sufficient basis for exclusion, given their basic methodological as-
sumptions and their concern for a systematic and unbiased population 
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of wars. The interstate dimension of the war involved five Great 
Powers (Russia, Japan, Britain, France, and the United States), lasted 
at least two years (Singer and Small say three), and resulted in more 
than 2,000 allied fatalities and presumably at least as many Russians 
(the total Russian fatalities from the civil war were about a half 
million). 17 This case must be identified as an internationalized civil 
war and included in this study. 18 
The Spanish case, excluded by both Singer and Small and Richard-
son, is even more difficult, largely because of the enormous measure-
ment and coding problems and the absence of data to determine 
whether the battle-death criterion has been satisfied and for which 
participants. The military involvement of the Great Powers was very 
limited: the Russian contingents were small, the Germans contributed 
mainly an aerial squadron, and the Italians were involved primarily 
in the air and submarine war, all of which tend to limit their casual-
ties. Several of the unofficial and volunteer international brigades were 
financed, organized, and commanded by Communists, but it is ques-
tionable whether they ought to be considered Russian troops. Thus 
it is questionable whether there were sufficient battle deaths to qualify. 
Furthermore, on the substantive level, it would be misleading to 
represent this as a war in which Spain and Russia were arrayed 
against Germany, Italy, and Portugal. For these reasons, this conflict 
has been excluded from my population of interstate wars. 19 
Imperial and colonial wars present an even more complex set of 
conceptual and operational problems. Part of the difficulty in identify-
ing imperial wars is the ambiguity of the concept, which has been 
ideologically contaminated and has assumed a diversity of meanings. 
The concept of colonial war is more easily defined and more manage-
able, but it is too restrictive for my theoretical purposes. Colonies can 
be defined legally and identified by the presence of formal charters. 
Colonial wars could then be defined as all wars involving a colony and 
meeting certain other criteria (for example, battle deaths). But this 
process would exclude the phenomenon of "informal imperialism,"20 
in which conflicts arise because of economic, political, or military 
expansion into areas where a formal administrative system is not 
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established and a colonial charter not formally granted (for example 
Russian expansion in Asia). 
Singer and Small appear to avoid this problem by operationally 
defining imperial and colonial wars (which they fail to distinguish 
theoretically) as extrasystemic wars (those involving a system member 
against a nonmember). But this concept incorporates a variety of 
wars, including those arraying system members against small Eu-
ropean states (for example, Polish wars of 1831 and 1863-64 and the 
Hungarian war of 1848-49) as well as those in which European Pow-
ers fought against weaker non-European political entities (Franco-
Indochinese wars of 1882-84 and 1945-54). But these wars are 
sufficiently different that they should not be classified together as 
imperial wars. It is preferable to adopt the more traditional concep-
tion and consider imperial wars to be those in which a major Eu-
ropean state (not necessarily a Great Power) fought a relatively weak 
non-European entity. In applying these criteria to the post-1815 pe-
riod, therefore, the Singer-Small extrasystemic wars involving weaker 
European states are not classified as imperial wars. (Instead, most can 
be classified as civil wars, for they involved semisovereign dependen-
cies of the Powers. In any case, they are excluded from this compila-
tion.) Wars involving non-European entities who qualify as members 
of the international system are classified as interstate wars. 
The Singer-Small system membership criteria can also be applied 
to the pre-1815 period. No non-European state (other than Turkey 
and the United States) qualified as an international system member 
as early as 1816, however, so all wars between the Great Powers and 
non-European states (except for the War of 1812 and the wars with 
Turkey) are classified as imperial wars. 
This decision reveals the Eurocentric bias in my procedures. 
Whereas expansionist wars of the Great Powers in Europe are classi-
fied as interstate, those involving Russia or the Ottoman Empire in 
Asia are classified as imperial (for example, Russo-Persian wars), even 
though these wars may be comparable in many respects and may have 
served similar purposes for the Powers involved. The classification of 
some Asian wars (for example, the Persian wars) as interstate wars 
would create serious problems for this analysis. First, to be systematic 
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it would be necessary to consider other Asian wars besides those 
involving Persia and to develop general criteria to determine which 
were interstate and which were imperial. Even more critical is the 
absence of war data for these states. Wright includes Persia only after 
1750 and (along with Woods and Baltzly) identifies only two Russo-
Persian wars before 1815 (1795-96 and 1804-13) and none of the 
Ottoman-Persian wars. Sorokin excludes Turkey as well as Persia. In 
the absence of an ambitious and systematic effort to generate new and 
original data, it would be impossible to know what wars to include 
in the study (other than the two mentioned above). Therefore, I have 
followed the Singer-Small membership criteria and the Europe/non-
Europe distinction (which are equivalent for the pre-1815 period), 
recognizing the resulting bias. 
To summarize, the operational criteria by which wars are included 
in or excluded from this compilation are as follows. First, a tentative 
list of wars is generated. For the 1495-1815 period, the Wright, Sora-
kin, and Woods-Baltzly compilations were consulted and any war 
included in at least two of these sources is included here.21 For the 
1816-1965 period the Singer-Small list of wars is used, and the Singer-
Small criteria are applied to the 1965-75 period to generate a list of 
wars. From this tentative set of wars I have excluded wars not includ-
ing a Great Power, imperial wars, civil wars, internationalized civil 
wars in which the outside states intervene militarily on the side of the 
existing regime (but include those in which the intervention is against 
the government), and wars that do not satisfy the battle-death criteria 
of a minimum of 1,000 battle deaths and a minimum annual average 
of 1,000 battle deaths for protracted wars. Participation in a war by 
an individual Power is determined by use of a minimum of 100 battle 
fatalities or the involvement of 1,000 armed personnel actively en-
gaged in combat. 
Initiation, Termination, and Aggregation of War 
Adding to the difficulties discussed above are problems in the defini-
tion of the beginning and end of a war and in the aggregation or 
disaggregation of sequential or simultaneous wars. The seriousness of 
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these problems is indicated by the number of discrepancies in the 
literature. Wright, Sorokin, and Woods and Baltzly often disagree 
about the dates of initiation and termination of hostilities, if only by 
a few years. This problem is important because the duration of war 
is one of its dimensions which is measured and used in the analysis. 
Wright recognizes this problem and notes that "wars have seldom 
been separated from peace by a clearly marked line."22 
One solution is to use the date ofthe formal declaration of war, but 
these have been rare and often preceded by serious fighting, as Wright 
notes. He therefore defines the beginning of a war as the "first impor-
tant hostilities," which he fails to define explicitly. Wright defines the 
end of a war as the effective date of the peace treaty, if there was one. 
Otherwise, he refers to the date of "armistice, capitulation, or actual 
ending of active hostilities."23 Richardson also notes the deficiencies 
in a purely legalistic definition of the temporal bounds of a given war. 
He refers to "provocative incidents prior to the main outbreak," the 
outbreak of hostilities without any declaration of war, armistices and 
other pauses, continuation of guerrilla warfare after the main defeat, 
and the informal cessation of hostilities without a formal treaty. He 
ultimately accepts the "conventional date" if authorities are agreed. 
In the absence of consensus, he prefers "common sense to legalism ... 
I have been guided by actual warlike alertness rather than by formal 
declarations of war or peace. " 24 Singer and Small define the beginning 
of a war to coincide with the formal declaration (if there was one) but 
"only if it is followed immediately by sustained military combat." If 
there is no formal declaration or if hostilities precede any such decla-
ration, the first day of combat is used. In dating the termination of 
war, Singer and Small follow Richardson rather than Wright and give 
priority to military rather than legal criteria. When the date of the 
peace treaty differs from that of the actual cessation of military activ-
ity, the end of the war is defined as "the day which most clearly 
demarcates the close of sustained military conflict."25 Sorokin gives 
little attention to this problem. 
For the 1816-1975 period, the Singer-Small criteria are used. For 
the earlier period, however, the absence of complete data precludes 
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the direct application of these criteria and approximations must be 
made. The Wright, Sorokin, and Woods and Baltzly dates are used 
if they agree. Wright is given slightly more weight if there are minor 
discrepancies because of his specification of operational criteria. In the 
case of major disagreements, Langer, R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. 
Dupuy, 26 and other secondary sources are consulted. Given the na-
ture of my theoretical purposes, the years of initiation and termination 
(rather than the month and day, as in Singer and Small) are of 
sufficient precision. 
A related but considerably more difficult question concerns the 
aggregation of wars. The basic problem is how to draw a line around 
a single war, both temporally and spatially. When are a series of wars 
over time to be aggregated or compounded into one larger war? 
Should there be a single War ofthe Austrian Succession, for example, 
or ofthe First, Second, and Third Silesian Wars? Similarly, was there 
a single Italian War of 1495-1504 or (as Sorokin suggests) distinct 
Italian War (1495-97), First War of Louis XII for Milan (1499-1500), 
and Second War of Louis XII for Naples (1501-4)? This problem of 
temporal aggregation is particularly difficult for the wars involving 
the Ottoman Empire (or contemporary wars of national liberation), 
which were fought continuously but intermittently over long periods 
of time. (Wright, for example, identifies distinct Ottoman Wars of 
1521-31, 1532-34, 1537-47, and 1551-68, all involving the Hapsburgs.) 
With regard to the spatial dimension, when are a number of simul-
taneous bilateral wars to be aggregated into a larger multilateral war? 
Should the Sino-Japanese, Japanese-American, Russo-Finnish, and 
central European wars of the late 1930s and 1940s be identified as 
distinct wars or aggregated into a single World War II? Should the 
War of Jenkins' Ear be defined as distinct from the War of the Aus-
trian Succession? For some wars both temporal and spatial aggrega-
tion must be considered (for example, the Thirty Years' War). This 
problem of the aggregation of wars is of considerable importance for 
this study because a number of the parameters by which wars are to 
be measured (including frequency and duration) are highly sensitive 
to the procedures by which wars are aggregated or disaggregated. 
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Unfortunately, there is little guidance in the literature on this prob-
lem. Neither Sorokin nor Woods and Baltzly appears to give it much 
thought, though their procedure of organizing the wars by states 
rather than chronologically for the system imposes a strong bias 
toward disaggregation. Wright prefers to "group compound wars 
under a single name, as has usually been done by historians." Wright 
notes, however, that "makers oflists of wars have often treated hostili-
ties between each pair of states as a distinct war."27 Singer and Small 
do not appear to be concerned with this problem. They note a "wide 
divergence as to whether a given sequence of hostilities is best treated 
as a single war or as a number of separate ones"28 but fail to develop 
any line of argument. It is not clear why some of their wars are 
considered distinct (for example, the Italian Unification, Halo-
Roman, and Halo-Sicilian wars, all falling within the period 1859-61) 
and others as part of a whole (for example, the Japanese-American 
war as part of World War II). 
One approach would be the legalistic one of distinguishing wars 
on the basis of the peace treaty (or treaties) terminating the hostilities. 
For a series of wars over time, each conflict ending in a separate peace 
treaty would be defined as a distinct war. For wars that end with a 
formal treaty of peace (and not just a temporary truce or cease-fire), 
this is a satisfactory means of defining the temporal boundaries of the 
conflict. But, not all wars end with formal settlements. Many are 
relatively continuous over time and consist of a series of distinct 
battles separated by periods of minimal combat-for example, the 
protracted sieges of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, particu-
larly those involving the Ottoman Empire. For these cases, criteria for 
defining the end of war might include the existence of a significant 
period of peace (and not simply a temporary cease-fire or tractical 
withdrawal) separating intense military conflicts, or a reversal in the 
military alliances that generate a new conflict (for example, the 
change in alliances after the War of the Cambrian League that led to 
the War of the Holy League). These criteria are not absolute but 
should serve as a guide for judgment in particular cases. 
Reliance on formal peace settlements is less satisfactory, however, 
for dealing with multilateral wars that often are formally ended by 
Definition and Identification of the Wars 67 
series of bilateral treaties rather than a single multilateral treaty. The 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, for example, were 
ended by at least ten separate treaties and World War I by five distinct 
treaties. To disaggregate wars of this nature and treat them all as 
bilateral wars would not be very useful. It would eliminate the distinc-
tion between bilateral and multilateral wars and conceal some of the 
major differences between them, including the processes of escalation 
and termination and the nature of wartime diplomacy. It would fail 
to give appropriate emphasis to the critical regional and international 
context within which the war is conducted and would preclude the 
testing of numerous important hypotheses, particularly at the sys-
temic level. Thus it is important to differentiate between a genuine 
bilateral war restricted to a pair of states and a multilateral war 
involving several states. 
Not all simultaneous wars are interrelated. Conflicts with different 
participants (for example the Hungarian and Suez wars of 1956) or 
totally unrelated issues (for example the Napoleonic Wars and the 
Russo-Turkish War of 1806-12) should not be compounded. Wars 
involving coordinated military planning (for example, the European 
and Asian theaters of World War II) should be aggregated. In this 
compilation, ambiguous cases are compounded into a single war un-
less there are compelling reasons to do otherwise. Let us now examine 
some of the more important cases involving the question of aggrega-
tion. 
For the Italian wars of 1495-1504, I have followed Sorokin and 
Woods and Baltzly (rather than Wright) and identified three distinct 
wars (1495-97, 1499-1500, 1501-4) because well-defined periods of 
peace occurred between the conflicts in Naples, Milan, and Naples 
again. Similarly, the War of the Cambrian League, War of the Holy 
League, and Second Milanese War are considered separately here 
because of the defection of the other Powers from the French in 1511 
and the settlements in 1514-15. 
One of the more difficult problems of aggregation involves the 
Thirty Years' War, 1618-48. To consider it a single war would be 
misleading because it was not continuous over time. Only two Great 
Powers (Spain and the Austrian Hapsburgs) were involved over the 
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full span of the war. Nor was there a single set of issues for the entire 
thirty years. At first it was merely a revolt of the Bohemians against 
the Austrian Hapsburgs. Within two years it had been transformed 
into a German war, but it did not become a general European war 
until later. Before 1630 religious issues predominated, whereas after 
that time power considerations were the primary motivating force; 
France and Sweden were dominant in this latter period but partic-
ipated little in the earlier phases of the struggle. On the other hand, 
it would be equally misleading to follow Wright and identify thirteen 
"distinct but overlapping wars."29 
Historians usually divide the Thirty Years' War into four distinct 
periods or phases: (1) Bohemian Period, 1618-25; (2) Danish Period, 
1625-30; (3) Swedish Period, 1630-35; and (4) Swedish-French Pe-
riod, 1635-48.30 There is little disagreement among historians on this 
periodization, for these four phases were separated by periods of 
relatively little fighting. Rather than choose either complete aggrega-
tion or disaggregation, I have decided to consider each of the four 
periods as a distinct war. 
A similar case is that of the wars of the French revolutionary and 
Napoleonic periods. These should not be considered a single war 
because they were broken up by at least ten distinct peace treaties, 
involving different states and providing a temporary settlement for 
various phases of the war. Thus Wright identifies thirteen distinct 
wars (five French Revolutionary Wars and eight Napoleonic Wars). 
Sorokin also lists thirteen wars, although these are not congruent with 
Wright's. 31 The basic issues changed very little over the course ofthe 
war(s), however, and the fighting was relatively continuous over time. 
It is conventional to make a distinction between the French Revolu-
tionary Wars (1792-1802) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803-15). Be-
tween these two wars all states except France and Britain experienced 
nearly three years of peace. Furthermore, the issues during these two 
periods were in many respects fundamentally different. The French 
Revolutionary Wars were concerned primarily with the consolidation 
of the revolution and the new regime in France, whereas the Napo-
leonic Wars were more concerned with European expansion and 
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hegemony. Only the latter period, furthermore, is characterized by 
the "French Imperial System" and the "Continental System." For 
these reasons the French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic 
Wars are considered as distinct in this study. 
Potential Biases in the Selection Procedures 
There may be some concern that the use of two different selection 
procedures for the generation of the war data (a combination of the 
Wright, Sorokin, and Woods-Baltzly compilations for the pre-Vienna 
period and the Singer-Small data for the post-Vienna period) might 
introduce bias into the resulting data set. The list of wars generated 
by the Singer-Small criteria can be compared to a list that would have 
been generated by the application of the pre-1815 selection procedures 
to the 1816-1915 period (the end of the Woods-Baltzly set). Of the 
twenty Singer-Small wars, only one (the Anglo-Persian War of 1856-
57) would have been excluded from the combined Wright/Sorokin/ 
Woods-Baltzly list. Nor would this combined list have added a single 
war to the Singer-Small compilation, with the possible exception of 
the Mexican Revolution (an internationalized civil war involving the 
United States, which probably would have been excluded on the basis 
of the battle-death criterion). These results are encouraging because 
they suggest that the method of combining the Wright, Sorokin, and 
Woods-Baltzly compilations results in a very close approximation to 
the more refined Singer-Small inclusion-exclusion criteria and that 
therefore any bias deriving from the use of these two different methods 
is relatively unimportant. 
Another potential source of bias concerns the application of the 
battle-death criterion. Since for small wars Sorokin's casualty figures 
are sometimes slightly higher than those of Singer and Small, 32 there 
may be a slight tendency to include a few additional wars on the basis 
of the 1,000 battle-death criterion. This effect would seem to be bal-
anced, however, by the fact that Sorokin's casualty figures might be 
slightly lower because the fatalities of lesser states are not included. 
Still another source of measurement error in the identification of the 
Table 3.1. Interstate Wars Involving the Great Powers, 1495-1975 
War *Denotes Great Power war. Dates Fr Eng Sp AH Tur UH Net Sw Rus Ger It us Jap Ch 
1 *War of the League of Venice 1495-1497 • • • 
2 Polish-Turkish War 1497-1498 • 
3 Venetian-Turkish War 1499-1503 • 
4 First Milanese War 1499-1500 • 
5 *Neapolitan War 1501-1504 • • 
6 War of the Cambrian League 1508-1509 • • • 
7 *War of the Holy League 1511-1514 • • • • 
8 *Austro-Turkish War 1512-1519 • • 
9 Scottish War 1513-1515 • 
10 *Second Milanese War 1515-1515 • • • 
11 *First War of Charles V 1521-1526 • • • 
12 *Ottoman War 1521-1531 • • 
13 Scottish War 1522-1523 • 
14 *Second War of Charles V 1526-1529 • • • 
15 *Ottoman War 1532-1535 • • 
16 Scottish War 1532-1534 • 
17 *Third War of Charles V 1536-1538 • • 
18 *Ottoman War 1537-1547 • • 
19 Scottish War 1542-1550 • 
20 *Fourth War of Charles V 1542-1544 • • 
21 *Siege of Boulogne 1544-1546 • • 
22 *Arundel's Rebellion 1549-1550 • • 
23 *Ottoman War 1551-1556 • • 
24 *Fifth War of Charles V 1552-1556 • • 
25 *Austro-Turkish War 1556-1562 • • 
26 *Franco-Spanish War 1556-1559 • • • 
27 *Scottish War 1559-1560 • • 
28 *Spanish-Turkish War 1559-1564 • • 
29 *First Huguenot War 1562-1564 • • 
War Dates Fr Eng Sp AH Tur UH Net Sw Rus Ger It us Jap Ch 
30 * Austro-Turkish War 1565-1568 • • 
31 *Spanish-Turkish War 1569-1580 • • 
32 *Austro-Turkish War 1576-1583 • • 
33 Spanish-Portuguese War 1579-1581 • 
34 Polish-Turkish War 1583-1590 • 
35 *War of the Armada 1585-1604 • • 
36 Austro-Polish War 1587-1588 • 
37 *War of the Three Henries 1589-1598 • • 
38 * Austro-Turkish War 1593-1606 • • 
39 Franco-Savoian War 1600-1601 • 
40 *Spanish-Turkish War 1610-1614 • • 
41 Austro-Venetian War 1615-1618 • 
42 Spanish-Savoian War 1615-1617 • 
43 Spanish-Venetian War 1617-1621 • 
44 *Spanish-Turkish War 1618-1619 • • 
45 Polish-Turkish War 1618-1621 • 
46 *Thirty Years' War-Bohemian 1618-1625 • • • • 
47 *Thirty Years' War-Danish 1625-1630 • • • • • • 
48 *Thirty Years' War-Swedish 1630-1635 • • • • 
49 *Thirty Years' War-Swedish-French 1635-1648 • • • • • 
50 Spanish-Portuguese War 1642-1668 • 
51 Turkish-Venetian War 1645-1664 • 
52 *Franco-Spanish War 1648-1659 • • 
53 Scottish War 1650-1651 • 
54 *Anglo-Dutch Naval War 1652-1655 • • 
55 *Great Northern War 1654-1660 • • • 
56 *English-Spanish War 1656-1659 • • 
57 Dutch-Portuguese War 1657-1661 • 
58 *Ottoman War 1657-1664 • • • 
59 Sweden-Bremen War 1665-1666 • 
60 *Anglo-Dutch Naval War 1665-1667 • • • 
Table 3 .1. Continued 
War *Denotes Great Power war. Dates Fr Eng Sp AH Tur UH Net Sw Rus Ger It us Jap Ch 
61 *Devolutionary War 1667-1668 • • 
62 *Dutch War of Louis XIV 1672-1678 • • • • • • 
63 Turkish-Polish War 1672-1676 • 
64 Russo-Turkish War 1677-1681 • 
65 *Ottoman War 1682-1699 • • 
66 *Franco-Spanish War 1683-1684 • • 
67 *War of the League of Augsburg 1688-1697 • • • • • 
68 *Second Northern War 1700-1721 • • 
69 *War of the Spanish Succession 1701-1713 • • • • • 
70 Ottoman War 1716-1718 • 
71 *War of the Quadruple Alliance 1718-1720 • • • • 
72 *British-Spanish War 1726-1729 • • 
7 3 *War of the Polish Succession 1733-1738 • • • • 
74 Ottoman War 1736-1739 • • 
75 *War of the Austrian Succession 1739-1748 • • • • • • 
76 Russo-Swedish War 1741-1743 • 
77 *Seven Years' War 1755-1763 • • • • • • 
78 Russo-Turkish War 1768-1774 • 
79 Confederation of Bar 1768-1772 • 
80 *War of the Bavarian Succession 1778-1779 • • 
81 *War of the American Revolution 1778-1784 • • • 
82 Ottoman War 1787-1792 • • 
83 Russo-Swedish War 1788-1790 • 
84 *French Revolutionary Wars 1792-1802 • • • • • • 
85 *Napoleonic Wars 1803-1815 • • • • • • 
86 Russo-Turkish War 1806-1812 • • 
87 Russo-Swedish War 1808-1809 • 
88 War of 1812 1812-1814 • 
89 Neapolitan War 1815-1815 • 
War Dates Fr Eng Sp AH Tur UH Net Sw Rus Ger It us Jap Ch 
90 Franco-Spanish War 1823-1823 • 
91 Navarino Bay 1827-1827 • • • 
92 Russo-Turkish War 1828-1829 • 
93 Austro-Sardinian War 1848-1849 • 
94 First Schleswig-Holstein War 1849-1849 • 
95 Roman Republic War 1849-1849 • • 
96 *Crimean War 1853-1856 • • • 
97 Anglo-Persian War 1856-1857 • 
98 *War of Italian Unification 1859-1859 • • 
99 Franco-Mexican War 1862-1867 • 
100 Second Schleswig-Holstein War 1864-1864 • • 
101 *Austro-Prussian War 1866-1866 • • • 
102 *Franco-Prussian War 1870-1871 • • 
103 Russo-Turkish War 1877-1878 • 
104 Sino-French War 1884-1885 • 
105 Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 • 
106 Halo-Turkish War 1911-1912 • 
107 *World War I 1914-1918 • • • • • • • • 
108 *Russian Civil War 1918-1921 • • • • • 
109 Manchurian War 1931-1933 • 
110 ltalo-Ethiopian War 1935-1936 • 
111 Sino-Japanese War 1937-1941 • 
112 *Russo-Japanese War 1939-1939 • • 
113 *World War II 1939-1945 • • • • • • • 
114 Russo-Finnish War 1939-1940 • 
115 *Korean War 1950-1953 • • • • 
116 Russo-Hungarian War 1956-1956 • 
117 Sinai War 1956-1956 • • 
118 Sino-Indian War 1962-1962 • 
119 Vietnam War 1965-1973 • 
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wars derives from the uncertainty in identifying the Great Powers; but 
since that uncertainty is relatively small, the potential error in the 
identity of their wars would be small also. The problem is minimized 
by the fact that the uncertainty in the number of wars is generally 
inversely proportional to the uncertainty in the points of entry into 
and exit from the system. The existence of many wars outside the 
established dates of entry and exit would have been a reason to extend 
those dates, since wars with other Powers are one key indicator of 
participation in the Great Power security system. Changes in Great 
Power status that would generate the largest changes in the frequency 
of wars are those that are least likely to occur, and those most likely 
to occur would have the smallest impact. Moreover, most of the 
changes would not add or subtract a war but would change its classifi-
cation from a Great Power war to a war involving a Power, or vice 
versa. Exceptions might be a lengthy delay in England's entry (be-
cause of the Scottish wars) and a combined change in Turkish exit and 
Russian entry (because of their bilateral wars). It was noted earlier 
that a change regarding the identity of the Great Powers in the 
post-1945 period could result in a change of at most two wars, as 
would the exclusion of Italy for the eighty years after her unification. 
Overall, there is a high degree of accuracy in this list of interstate 
wars involving the Great Powers and even more in the compilation 
of Great Power wars. The most significant uncertainties lie not in the 
identification of the Powers or of their wars but in the procedures for 
the aggregation and disaggregation of these wars. 
Wars in the Modern Great Power System 
Table 3.1 lists all interstate wars involving at least one Great Power 
for the period 149 5-197 5 and identifies the Great Powers participating 
in them. Participation is defined as a minimum of 100 battle deaths 
or a minimum of 1,000 armed personnel engaged in active combat. 
The abbreviations for the Powers are those shown in Table 2.1. Great 
Power wars, which involve at least one Great Power on each side of 
the conflict, are denoted by asterisks. 
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Table 3.2. General Wars 
Ratio 
Powers 
War Dates Involved 
Thirty Years' War 1618-1648 6/7 
Dutch War of Louis XIV 1672-1678 6/7 
War of the League of Augsburg 1688-1697 5/7 
War of the Spanish Succession 1701-1713 5/6 
War of the Austrian Succession 1739-1748 6/6 
Seven Years' War 1755-1763 6/6 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars 1792-1815 6/6 
World War I 1914-1918 8/8 
World War II 1939-1945 7/7 
A class of "general wars" was earlier defined as those involving 
nearly all the Great Powers and resulting in high levels of destruction. 
Although the primary defining characteristic of general war is that it 
involve nearly all the Great Powers, 33 a war in which most of the 
Powers participate but only to a limited degree is not usually consid-
ered a general war (the Russian Civil War, for example). The addition 
of a criterion based on relative human destructiveness ensures exclu-
sion of wars that involve most of the Powers but are serious in no 
other respect. Relative human destructiveness is defined in the next 
chapter as "intensity" and measured in battle deaths per million 
European population. General wars are therefore operationally de-
fined as wars involving at least two-thirds of the Great Powers34 and 
an intensity exceeding 1,000 battle deaths per million population. The 
nine general wars of the modem system are listed in Table 3.2. The 
four phases of the Thirty Years' War have been merged, as have the 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The table includes the 
ratio of the number of participating Powers to the number of Powers 
in the system. 35 This class of general wars will be used in the analysis 
of war contagion in Chapter 7. 
In this study the Great Power system is the unit of analysis. For 
some theoretical purposes, however, it is preferable to shift to the 
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national level of analysis and analyze the war behavior of individual 
Great Powers or the differences between Powers. A separate set of 
wars for each Great Power can be derived directly from Table 3.1. 
Having now generated a compilation of interstate wars involving 
the Great Powers over the period 1495-1975, we will tum in the next 
chapter to the task of the measurement of the wars. 
4 
Measurement 
of the Wars 
It is widely recognized that war is a multidimensional concept. Some 
wars are longer or more destructive than others, and some countries 
or historical eras are more warlike than others. If general statements 
like these are to be meaningful, they must be made more pre-
cise, which requires a refined conceptualization of war. The aim 
of this chapter is to define various dimensions of war, devise cor-
responding operational indicators and measurement procedures, and 
measure the values of these indicators for each of the 119 wars 
since 1495. 
Conceptualization of War 
War can be conceptualized on a multiplicity oflevels, dimensions, and 
units of analysis. The level of war is defined by the type of participat-
ing political entities. International war can be distinguished from 
internal war, which includes civil war, revolutionary war, and other 
forms of domestic violence. 1 International war includes conflicts be-
tween political units transcending national boundaries. A subset of 
this general class of international war is interstate war, in which at 
least one sovereign state participates on each side of the conflict. 
Within this category is the set of interstate wars involving the Great 
Powers, which may be subdivided further into the set of Great Power 
wars with Powers on each side of the conflict. This study is concerned 
only with interstate wars involving the Great Powers and with Great 
Power wars. 
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War also has several dimensions. Singer and Small, identify magni-
tude, severity, and intensity as the primary dimensions.2 I have gener-
ally followed their conceptualization but with a few refinements at 
both the conceptual and operational levels. 
Whereas Singer and Small use the single concept of magnitude to 
represent a joint spatial-temporal dimension, I have included indepen-
dent spatial and temporal elements. The spatial dimension, which 
Singer and Small ignore, is defined here as the number of Great 
Powers participating in the war and is called the extent of war. The 
number of Great Powers is an indicator of both the geographic scope 
of the war and the overall importance of war. The key concept of a 
"general war," for example, is defined according to the number or 
proportion of participating Great Powers. 3 For these reasons, the 
extent of war must be included as an analytically distinct dimension. 4 
The temporal dimension is reflected by war's length or duration, 
defined as the elapsed time from beginning to end. Magnitude, defined 
as the nation-years of war, 5 incorporates both spatial and temporal 
dimensions. It includes more information than either the extent or 
duration indicators and is useful as a compound measure of the seri-
ousness of war. 6 For some theoretical purposes, it may be necessary 
to refer independently to either the extent or duration of war, and for 
this reason they have been defined independently. 
The severity of war, based on the number of lives lost, reflects its 
human destructiveness. In many respects this dimension is the most 
important, for it is the best measure of the violence of the conflict. 7 
But because of the nearly exponential growth in population over the 
five centuries encompassed by this study, battle-death figures are not 
truly comparable. Therefore, I have used an additional dimension 
reflecting the number of battle deaths compared to the population as 
a whole. 
Singer and Small define such a dimension but create confusion by 
identifying it as one of three separate measures of the intensity of war. 
These three measures are the ratio of battle fatalities to (1) the magni-
tude of war, (2) the total size of the prewar armed forces of all 
participant system members, and (3) the total prewar population of 
all participant system members. 8 These three indicators, however, are 
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not simply different measures of the same theoretical concept. The 
first reflects the concentration of war in space and time; the second 
reflects the relative costs of the war to the respective military estab-
lishments; and the third reflects the relative human costs of the war 
to the society as a whole. Singer and Small minimize the confusion 
only by essentially ignoring the first two measures and focusing on the 
third. This relative human destructiveness is defined here as the inten-
sity of war. 9 The second Singer-Small intensity measure is not suffi-
ciently distinct from the third to be included as a separate dimension, 
for long-term increases in population have been accompanied by com-
parable increases in the size of military establishments. The first Sing-
er-Small intensity indicator, the ratio of battle deaths to the 
magnitude of war, is analytically distinct from the others (for it is 
unaffected by population size). It reflects the concentration of war in 
space and time, and is identified here as a separate dimension. 
Whereas the preceding dimensions are conceptualized as character-
istics of the wars themselves, the frequency of war, or number of wars 
in a given period, is based on time. Thus the dimensions considered 
here deal with two different units of analysis-the individual war and 
time. Each of the dimensions except frequency can be measured using 
either time or war as the unit of analysis. For example, we can speak 
not only of the number of battle deaths in a particular war but also 
of the number of battle deaths in a given period of time or of the 
average yearly number of battle deaths. Similarly, each of the other 
war indicators defined above can be aggregated over time to generate 
a measure of the amount of war (along each dimension) per unit of 
time. None of these units of analysis or sets of indicators is inherently 
less meaningful than the other. Their relative utility depends on the 
particular theoretical question under investigation. 
Because of the change in units of analysis these aggregated war 
indicators may have slightly different theoretical interpretations. Fre-
quency and severity are straightforward. Extent is used to refer to 
the total number of Great Powers involved in war in a given period, 
each weighted by its number of wars. Similarly, duration refers to the 
total number of years of war in a given period, with separate wars 
counted separately. Magnitude refers to the total number of nation-
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years of war (with separate wars counted separately). The intensity 
and concentration indicators cannot be simply summed over time 
because their base measures change. The intensity of war in a given 
period can be figured as the ratio of the total number of battle deaths 
to the average population during that period. Similarly, the concen-
tration of war in a given period refers to the ratio of the total num-
ber of battle deaths to the total magnitude of war during that pe-
riod. 
The aggregation of war indicators over time introduces another 
set of categories. As Singer and Small note, the amount of war per per-
iod of time (along each dimension) can be conceived as the amount 
of war beginning, under way, or terminating in that period. 10 The 
amount of war in these three stages will be equal only if all wars end 
in the same period in which they begin, which rarely occurs. Which 
of these three indicators is most appropriate is determined by the 
question under investigation. If the focus is the causes of war, the 
primary concern will be with the amount of war beginning at a given 
time. To measure this dimension, the values of each war indicator for 
the entire period are aggregated into the year in which the war begins. 
On the other hand, if we wish to view war as an independent rather 
than a dependent variable and examine its social, political, or eco-
nomic consequences, the amount of war terminating at a particular 
time might be a more relevant measure. For other questions, the 
amount of war under way may be more appropriate. 
If the amount of war underway is considered, frequency refers to 
the number of wars under way in a given period, regardless of when 
they were initiated. Extent refers to the number of Powers involved 
in war during that period, regardless of the total number of wars each 
was fighting concurrently. Duration refers to the number of years war 
occurred in a given period, not counting simultaneous wars sepa-
rately. If a one-year period of aggregation is used, the duration vari-
able is reduced to a dichotomy of zero or one. Magnitude refers to 
nation-years of war, counting simultaneous wars separately. Severity 
refers to the total number of battle deaths during the period. Intensity 
is the ratio of battle deaths to the average population, and concentra-
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tion is the ratio of the total number of fatalities to the total nation-
years of war. 
Difficult methodological problems arise in determining the severity, 
intensity, and concentration of war under way. Yearly battle-death 
data are usually unavailable. In the absence of more precise data, I 
have computed yearly averages by assuming a homogeneous distribu-
tion of battle fatalities over the course of a war. This linear model is 
used for the sake of simplicity, given the absence of alternative models 
empirically confirmed to be superior. Over the entire five-century span 
of the modern system, most errors will in all probability cancel out. 
To summarize, at each level of war there are several dimensions, 
and each dimension can be interpreted by using two separate units of 
analysis. This conceptualization allows for greater theoretical 
differentiation than do most other frameworks. The failure to make 
some of these analytical distinctions results in considerable confusion 
in the literature. Empirical measures for each of these dimensions will 
now be provided. 
Operational Indicators and Measurement Procedures 
The extent of war is defined as the number of Great Powers participat-
ing. This is easily measured, for participation was defined earlier as 
military involvement requiring at least 100 battle deaths or 1,000 
armed forces personnel actively engaged in combat. The Great Pow-
ers participating in each war can be read directly from Table 3.1. 
Determining the duration of war is somewhat more complex than 
one might expect. In the previous chapter the criteria for establishing 
the opening and closing dates of the war were discussed. Because the 
precise dates of the initiation and termination of a war are sometimes 
difficult to determine, only the year (rather than the month and day) 
is identified. Thus the duration is measured in years and is calculated 
by subtracting the beginning date from the ending date. If a war 
begins and ends in the same year, but the month and day dates cannot 
be determined, the average length is estimated to be one-half year. For 
the last 150 years the more precise Singer-Small dates for the begin-
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ning and end of hostilities are used, but in no case does the degree of 
precision exceed .1 year. 
Temporary interruptions in war, including formal truces and cease-
fires and more informal lapses in the fighting, present an additional 
problem. Should these temporary interruptions be subtracted from 
the total duration of the war? If so, precisely how should they be 
defined and measured? Singer and Small subtract from the total dura-
tion of war a time equal to that of all temporary interruptions, which 
they define as follows: "A cessation of hostilities which endured for 
less than 30 days is not treated as an interruption of the war, whereas 
a longer break is so treated." 11 
The duration of actual fighting may be a useful measure for some 
purposes, but with respect to the diplomatic and perhaps domestic 
impact of the war the elapsed time is probably more important. If the 
concern is with the degree of violence, battle casualties are a better 
measure. In addition, the nature of war has changed over time. Wars 
in the post-Vienna period have been characterized by relatively con-
tinuous fighting, but earlier wars were often characterized by distinct 
battles separated by lengthy periods of minimal contact. This disconti-
nuity complicates the measurement of duration as well as the identifi-
cation and demarcation of the war. A measure based on the duration 
of actual fighting would not reflect the protracted nature of earlier 
wars and would minimize their real lengths. Furthermore, the hy-
pothesis that wars have been getting shorter over the last several 
centuries can best be tested by using elapsed time to measure duration. 
There are also important methodological reasons for using the 
elapsed-time measure. Serious problems would arise in attempting to 
identify and measure all interruptions in the 119 wars since 1495. 
Historians have not tended to view temporary interruptions in war as 
particularly salient, so the relevant information is often not available. 
Nor would a historical search to generate such data be worth the 
enormous investment in time and resources that would be required. 
Therefore, the duration of war is defined as the elapsed time between 
beginning and end, regardless of any temporary interruptions, and is 
not identical to the duration of actual fighting. Thus for the later 
period my measurements may differ from those of Singer and Small. 
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The magnitude of war is a joint spatial-temporal dimension, com-
bining the extent and duration indicators. It is operationally defined 
as the sum of the years of war for each participating Great Power and 
is measured in nation-years. Mathematically, the magnitude of war 
M can be expressed as 
n 
M = ~ d; 
i 
where n = extent of war and d; = the duration of war for Power 
i. 12 
The severity of war, or its human destructiveness on the battlefield, 
is operationally defined as the number of battle-connected deaths of 
military personnel. Civilian casualties are not included. This concep-
tualization follows Singer and Small's use of battle-connected fatali-
ties rather than Richardson's use of all military and civilian deaths 
resulting from actual combat, disease, or exposure. Richardson in-
cludes the latter because they are "accepted as a risk contingent to 
planned operations."13 Civilian casualties are excluded here for both 
conceptual and methodological reasons. Singer and Small's concern 
to maximize the comparability of the severity indicator over time by 
minimizing the effects of technological (and other) changes14 is even 
more compelling here, for those changes are more dramatic over a 
five-century span. The exclusion of civilian casualties removes the bias 
introduced by (1) changes in military technology that make it easier 
to kill civilians, (2) changes in the nature of power and the economic 
system that increase the incentive to kill civilians because of their 
increased contribution to the war effort, and (3) changes in medical 
technology that have the opposite effect of reducing the proportion of 
civilian casualties. The exclusion of civilian casualties would be more 
problematical in a study that focuses on civil or guerrilla war. 
There are also methodological considerations. As Singer and Small 
note, the variety of situations in which civilians might be killed 
from wars precludes the construction of reasonable operational 
criteria, particularly for a study covering a long time span. Ad-
ditionally, the original fatality estimates were generated by historians 
on the basis of battle-connected deaths. 15 So many methodological 
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problems arise in estimating these that it is best to avoid the 
enormous additional problems of attempting to determine civilian 
casualties. This orientation, however, biases any attempt to use 
these data to test hypotheses about the changing destructiveness of 
war. 
Richardson attempts to deal with the problem of the unreliability 
of war estimates by using a logarithmic transformation to collapse the 
scale and also using accepted scientific notation to indicate the ac-
curacy of the last digit.16 Minor errors in the original figures are 
relatively insignificant in the transformed variables. Richardson's 
data for the last century and a half are inferior to Singer-Small's, 
however, because the latter employ a more rigorous set of procedures 
in their data search, although their data are based essentially on 
estimates. Their final figure was affected by "army size, weapons and 
medical technology available, number of major battles, other's esti-
mates of the wounded-to-killed ratio ... , and the historians' appraisal 
of the war's intensity."17 In general, however, the Singer-Small casu-
alty data are quite satisfactory and I have used them for all wars since 
1815. 
Unfortunately, the data on battle casualties for the pre-1815 period 
are not as good as those for the post-Napoleonic period. Wright does 
not provide casualty data for individual wars, and other sources (in-
cluding Bodart and Dumas and Vedel-Peterson) cover only a limited 
number of the wars identified here. The main source for this study is 
Sorokin's compilation of war data. Like Singer and Small, he provides 
estimates rather than hard data. Given the methodological problems 
involved in determining battle fatalities in all wars over the last five 
hundred years, Sorokin's estimates cannot be expected to be as accu-
rate as those of Singer-Small for the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries, for which data are more accessible. His estimation procedures are 
reasonable, however, and Sorokin recognizes the limitations in his 
data: "The figures given for each period are aimed not so much to lay 
down the actual number of the mobilized or killed and wounded as 
to obtain a rough measure of the comparative increase or decrease of 
war from period to period."18 Given the lengthy historical scope of 
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this study some degree of measurement error is tolerable, and Sora-
kin's estimates should be adequate. 
Sorokin's estimation procedures are as follows. First, the average 
size of the army for a given war is determined. In some cases relatively 
hard data are available. Generally, however, the figures are estimated 
from known army strengths in particular battles, taking into account 
the average number of fronts in the war (multifront wars were rela-
tively uncommon before the seventeenth century). Then the average 
casualty rate is estimated on the basis of well-studied battles of that 
war or of similar wars during the general period. These estimates are 
calculated by year, and then the approximate number of casualties for 
the entire duration of the war can be estimated. In some cases, casu-
alty figures are estimated directly from the information available in 
historical sources. Sorokin's data are given for each state, and the 
totals for the war as a whole can then be computed. Adjustments must 
be made in those cases for which Sorokin's temporal boundaries of the 
war do not correspond with mine, but these are easily estimated from 
the casualty data by a linear interpolation. 
The Sorokin data contain several imperfections. Most serious for 
my purposes is inclusion of the wounded as well as the dead in his 
casualty figures. 19 Furthermore, he is not explicit about what classes 
of casualties he includes (that is, combat-related casualties only, death 
caused by exposure or disease, and so forth). The resulting expected 
upward bias in his casualty estimates appears to be confirmed by 
comparing the Sorokin and Singer-Small data for the 1816-1925 pe-
riod. The two sets of estimates are not dissimilar for the low-severity 
wars, but Sorokin's are generally higher for the larger wars. This 
pattern is not consistent, however, for Sorokin's figures for World 
War I are less than one-third those of Singer and Small. It is not 
obvious, therefore, that the overall bias is necessarily serious. Further-
more, because advances in medical technology have occurred rela-
tively recently, a considerably higher percentage of casualties in 
the earlier wars resulted in death, so that the discrepancy between 
casualties and battle deaths was smaller than in more recent 
times. 
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Another problem concerns exactly who to include in the casualty 
figures for a given Great Power. One aspect of this problem is the 
differing definitions of the spatial boundaries of a given state. For ex-
ample, Sorokin includes the Holy Roman Empire as part of Austira-
Hungary before the seventeenth century. In Germany he includes 
all territory (and hence the armies and casualties) that eventually 
became part of the German Empire. Consequently, some casualty 
figures may not technically belong to the Great Powers. This prob-
lem is further compounded because before the nineteenth century 
it was common for relatively large numbers of an army to be merce-
nary troops from other lands. Should foreign mercenary troops 
fighting for state A be included in the casualty figures for A? Their 
inclusion would be reasonable, but unfortunately the data are not 
sufficiently discriminating to allow precision. The number of foreign 
mercenaries was generally not well known to the statesmen of the time 
or to the historians. Sorokin does not deal with this problem explicitly, 
but his focus on army strength indicates that mercenaries are included 
in the casualty figures. 20 
Another limitation of the Sorokin war data is that they do not 
provide a complete set of estimates. Not all of the wars in my compila-
tion are included, and casualty estimates are not provided for either 
the Ottoman Empire or Sweden. Data are missing for only about 36 
out of 263 cases (the total number of Great Powers in all 119 wars). 
But since the missing data are for wars and states that clearly do not 
constitute a random sample, they cannot be replaced by a simple 
statistical average of all wars or temporally proximate wars. Instead, 
each case or classes of cases is dealt with separately in an attempt to 
generate the most reasonable estimate possible based on information 
derived from other cases judged to be similar in nature. The general 
procedures and specific estimates for missing data are given in the 
Appendix. 
The error in these fatality estimates may be as great as 20-25 
percent in some cases. Nevertheless, they are adequate for the present 
purpose, given the five-century span of this study. A slight system-
atic bias tending to exaggerate the battle fatalities for the earlier 
periods is marginal compared to the differences between centuries 
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and the changes over time, two of the important questions of in-
terest here. Similarly, the measurement error is large (25-30 per-
cent) but tolerable in the other fatality-based indicators discussed 
below. 
The intensity dimension is designed to reflect the relative human 
costs of war compared to the population as a whole. Singer and Small 
operationalize the concept by using the ratio of battle fatalities to 
prewar population for each state. This indicator cannot be used here, 
however, because of the absence of accurate population data for each 
of the Great Powers over the last five centuries. An alternative mea-
sure that reflects the casualties from war relative to changing popula-
tion over time is needed. One such measure is the population of 
Europe as a whole. The Great Power system has historically been 
European-based, and for most of the Powers and for most of the 
temporal span of the system national population growth rates have 
not deviated significantly from that of Europe as a whole. 21 Thus 
although the ratio of battle deaths to European population is not 
equivalent to the intensity of war as defined by Singer and Small, it 
does provide a means of comparing the relative human costs of war 
over time. 
Of the various estimates of European populations, among the more 
highly regarded are those generated by Walter F. Wilcox and Alexan-
der M. Carr-Saunders. The estimates used here are based on these and 
on the more recent United Nations estimates for this century. For the 
1450-1900 period, these data at fifty year intervals were compiled by 
R. R. Kuczynski. For the 1900-1960 period, population data at ten-
year intervals are taken from the 1966 United Nations estimates 
compiled by John V. Grauman. 22 For the purposes of computing the 
European population for intervening years linear interpolation is 
used, and extrapolation is used for the 1960-75 period. The value of 
the battle-death/population indicator for a given year is based on the 
population for the year in which the war begins and is measured in 
battle deaths per million population. 
The spatial and temporal concentration of war is operationally 
defined as the ratio of the battle fatalities to the nation-years of war, 
or the ratio of severity to magnitude. 
Table 4.1. The War Data 
War Dates Duration Extent Magnitude Severity Intensity Concentration 
1 *War of the League of Venice 1495-1497 2.0 3 6.0 8000 119 1333 
2 Polish-Turkish War 1497-1498 1.0 1 1.0 3000 45 3000 
3 Venetian-Turkish War 1499-1503 4.0 1 4.0 4000 60 1000 
4 First Milanese War 1499-1500 1.0 1 1.0 2000 29 2000 
5 *Neapolitan War 1501-1504 3.0 2 5.0 18000 269 3600 
6 War of the Cambrian League 1508-1509 1.0 3 3.0 10000 145 3333 
7 *War of the Holy League 1511-1514 3.0 4 12.0 18000 261 1500 
8 * Austro-Turkish War 1512-1519 7.0 2 14.0 24000 343 1714 
9 Scottish War 1513-1515 2.0 1 2.0 4000 57 2000 
10 *Second Milanese War 1515-1515 .5 3 1.5 3000 43 2000 
11 *First War of Charles V 1521-1526 5.0 3 15.0 30000 420 2000 
12 *Ottoman War 1521-1531 10.0 2 20.0 68000 958 3400 
13 Scottish War 1522-1523 1.0 1 1.0 3000 41 3000 
14 *Second War of Charles V 1526-1529 3.0 3 8.0 18000 249 2250 
15 *Ottoman War 1532-1535 3.0 2 6.0 28000 384 4667 
16 Scottish War 1532-1534 2.0 1 2.0 4000 55 2000 
17 *Third War of Charles V 1536-1538 2.0 2 4.0 32000 438 8000 
18 *Ottoman War 1537-1547 10.0 2 20.0 97000 1329 4850 
19 Scottish War 1542-1550 8.0 1 8.0 13000 176 1625 
20 *Fourth War of Charles V 1542-1544 2.0 2 4.0 47000 629 11750 
21 *Siege of Boulogne 1544-1546 2.0 2 4.0 8000 107 2000 
22 *Arundel's Rebellion 1549-1550 1.0 2 2.0 6000 79 3000 
23 *Ottoman War 1551-1556 5.0 2 10.0 44000 578 4400 
24 *Fifth War of Charles V 1552-1556 4.0 2 8.0 51000 668 6375 
25 *Austro-Turkish War 1556-1562 6.0 2 12.0 52000 676 4333 
26 *Franco-Spanish War 1556-1559 3.0 3 8.0 24000 316 3000 
27 *Scottish War 1559-1560 1.0 2 1.5 6000 78 4000 
28 *Spanish-Turkish War 1559-1564 5.0 2 10.0 24000 310 2400 
29 *First Huguenot War 1562-1564 2.0 2 4.0 6000 77 1500 
30 * Austro-Turkish War 1565-1568 3.0 2 6.0 24000 306 4000 
31 *Spanish Turkish War 1569-1580 11.0 2 22.0 48000 608 2182 
32 *Austro-Turkish War 1576-1583 7.0 2 14.0 48000 600 3429 
33 Spanish-Portuguese War 1579-1581 2.0 1 2.0 4000 50 2000 
34 Polish-Turkish War 1583-1590 7.0 1 7.0 17000 210 2429 
35 *War of the Armada 1585-1604 19.0 2 38.0 48000 588 1263 
36 Austro-Polish War 1587-1588 l.O 1 l.O 4000 49 4000 
37 *War of the Three Henries 1589-1598 9.0 2 18.0 16000 195 889 
38 *Austro-Turkish War 1593-1606 13.0 2 26.0 90000 1086 3462 
39 Franco-Savoian War 1600-1601 l.O 1 l.O 2000 24 2000 
40 *Spanish-Turkish War 1610-1614 4.0 2 8.0 15000 175 1875 
41 Austro-Venetian War 1615-1618 3.0 1 3.0 6000 70 2000 
42 Spanish-Savoian War 1615-1617 2.0 1 2.0 2000 23 1000 
43 Spanish-Venetian War 1617-1621 4.0 1 4.0 5000 58 1250 
44 *Spanish-Turkish War 1618-1619 1.0 2 2.0 6000 69 3000 
45 Polish-Turkish War 1618-1621 3.0 1 3.0 1500.0 173 5000 
46 *Thirty Years' War-Bohemian 1618-1625 7.0 4 15.0 304000 3535 20267 
47 *Thirty Years' War-Danish 1625-1630 5.0 6 26.0 302000 3432 11615 
48 *Thirty Years' War-Swedish 1630-1635 5.0 4 20.0 314000 3568 15700 
49 *Thirty Years' War-Swedish-French 1635-1648 13.0 5 65.0 1151000 12933 17708 
50 Spanish-Protuguese War 1642-1668 26.0 1 26.0 80000 882. 3077 
51 Turkish-Venetian War 1645-1664 19.0 1 19.0 72000 791 3790 
52 *Franco-Spanish War 1648-1659 11.0 2 22.0 108000 1187 4909 
53 Scottish War 1650-1651 1.0 1 1.0 1000 22 2000 
54 *Anglo-Dutch Naval War 1652-1655 3.0 2 6.0 26000 282 4333 
55 *Great Northern War 1654-1660 6.0 3 12.0 22000 238 1833 
56 *English-Spanish War 1656-1659 3.0 2 6.0 15000 161 2500 
57 Dutch-Portuguese War 1657-1661 4.0 1 4.0 4000 43 1000 
58 *Ottoman War 1657-1664 7.0 3 13.0 109000 1170 8385 
59 Sweden-Bremen War 1665-1666 l.O 1 l.O 2000 11 1000 
60 *Anglo-Dutch Naval War 1665-1667 2.0 3 6.0 37000 392 6167 
Notes: *Denotes Great Power war. The units of measurement are as follows: duration-years; extent-number of Powers; 
magnitude-nation-years; severity-battle deaths; intensity-battle deaths per million European population; concentration-battle 
deaths per nation-year. 
Table 4.1. Continued 
War Dates Duration Extent Magnitude Severity Intensity Concentration 
61 *Devolutionary War 1667-1668 1.0 2 2.0 4000 42 2000 
62 *Dutch War of Louis XIV 1672-1678 6.0 6 33.0 342000 3580 10364 
63 Turkish-Polish War 1672-1676 4.0 1 4.0 5000 52 1250 
64 Russo-Turkish War 1677-1681 4.0 1 4.0 12000 125 3000 
65 *Ottoman War 1682-1699 17.0 2 34.0 384000 3954 11294 
66 *Franco-Spanish War 1683-1684 1.0 2 2.0 5000 51 2500 
67 *War of the League of Augsburg 1688-1697 9.0 5 45.0 680000 6939 15111 
68 *Second Northern War 1700-1721 21.0 2 27.0 64000 640 2370 
69 *War of the Spanish Succession 1701-1713 12.0 5 60.0 1251000 12490 20850 
70 Ottoman War 1716-1718 2.0 1 2.0 10000 98 5000 
71 *War of the Quadruple Alliance 1718-1720 2.0 4 8.0 25000 245 3125 
72 *British-Spanish War 1726-1729 3.0 2 6.0 15000 144 2500 
73 *War of the Polish Succession 1733-1738 5.0 4 20.0 88000 836 4400 
74 Ottoman War 1736-1739 3.0 2 6.0 38000 359 6333 
75 *War of the Austrian Succession 1739-1748 9.0 6 44.0 359000 3379 8159 
76 Russo-Swedish War 1741-1743 2.0 1 2.0 10000 94 5000 
77 *Seven Years' War 1755-1763 8.0 6 38.0 992000 9118 26105 
78 Russo-Turkish War 1768-1774 6.0 1 6.0 14000 127 2333 
79 Confederation of Bar 1768-1772 4.0 1 4.0 14000 149 3500 
80 *War of the Bavarian Succession 1778-1779 1.0 2 2.0 300 3 150 
81 *War of the American Revolution 1778-1784 6.0 3 15.0 34000 304 2267 
82 Ottoman War 1787-1792 5.0 2 10.0 192000 1685 19200 
83 Russo-swedish War 1788-1790 2.0 1 2.0 3000 26 1500 
84 *French Revolutionary Wars 1792-1802 10.0 6 51.0 663000 5816 13000 
85 *Napoleonic Wars 1803-1815 12.0 6 58.0 1869000 16112 32224 
86 Russo-Turkish War 1806-1812 6.0 2 7.0 45000 388 6429 
87 Russo-Swedish War 1808-1809 1.5 1 1.5 6000 51 4000 
88 War of 1812 1812-1814 2.5 1 2.5 4000 34 1600 
89 Neapolitan War 1815-1815 .2 1 .2 2000 17 10000 
90 Franco-Spanish War 1823-1823 .9 1 .6 400 3 667 
91 Navarino Bay 1827-1827 .1 3 .1 180 2 1800 
92 Russo-Turkish War 1828-1829 1.4 1 1.4 50000 415 35714 
93 Austro-Sardinian War 1848-1849 1.0 1 1.0 5600 45 5600 
94 First Schleswig-Holstein War 1849-1849 1.2 1 1.2 2500 20 2083 
95 Roman Republic War 1849-1849 .2 2 .4 600 4 1500 
96 *Crimean War 1853-1856 2.4 3 6.2 217000 1743 35000 
97 Anglo-Persian War 1856-1857 .4 1 .4 500 4 1250 
98 *War of Italian Unification 1859-1859 .2 2 .4 20000 159 50000 
99 Franco-Mexican War 1862-1867 4.8 1 4.8 8000 64 1667 
100 Second Schleswig-Holstein War 1864-1864 .5 2 1.0 1500 12 1500 
101 *Austro-Prussian War 1866-1866 .1 3 3.0 34000 270 113333 
102 *Franco-Prussian War 1870-1871 .6 2 1.2 180000 1415 150000 
103 Russo-Turkish War 1877-1878 .7 1 .7 120000 935 171429 
104 Sino-French War 1884-1885 1.0 1 1.0 2100 16 2100 
105 Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 1.6 1 1.6 45000 339 28125 
106 ltalo-Turkish War 1911-1912 1.1 1 1.1 6000 45 5454 
107 *World War I 1914-1918 4.3 8 29.9 7734300 57616 258672 
108 *Russian Civil War 1918-1921 3.0 5 13.0 5000 37 385 
109 Manchurian War 1931-1933 1.4 1 1.4 10000 73 7143 
110 ltalo-Ethiopian War 1935-1936 .6 1 .6 4000 29 6667 
111 Sino-Japanese War 1937-1941 4.4 1 4.4 250000 1813 56819 
112 *Russo-Japanese War 1939-1939 .4 2 .7 16000 116 22857 
113 *World War II 1939-1945 6.0 7 28.0 12948300 93665 462439 
114 Russo-Finnish War 1939-1940 .3 1 .3 50000 362 166667 
115 *Korean War 1950-1953 3.1 4 11.3 954960 6821 84510 
116 Russo-Hungarian War 1956-1956 .1 1 .1 7000 50 70000 
117 Sinai War 1956-1956 .1 2 .1 30 0 300 
118 Sino-Indian War 1962-1962 .1 1 .1 500 1 5000 
119 Vietnam War 1965-1973 8.0 1 8.0 56000 90 7000 
Notes: *Denotes Great Power war. The units of measurement are as follows: duration-years; extent-number of Powers; 
magnitude-nation-years; severity-battle deaths; intensity-battle deaths per million European population; concentration-battle 
deaths per nation-year. 
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The frequency of war is defined simply as the number of wars per 
unit of time. The only question is what unit of time is most appropri-
ate, and that depends on the particular question under investigation. 
Singer and Small refer most often to a five-year period; Sorokin uses 
a twenty-five-year period. Both periods are used here, and a one-year 
period is used in considering some questions involving the amount of 
war under way. The choice of the unit of temporal aggregation is 
important both for frequency and for other aggregated indices because 
the particular unit of time used to group the data can have an impor-
tant effect on the observed relationship between variables. This is a 
very complex problem, which is rarely acknowledged by social scien-
tists. Most of the relationships dealt with in this study, however, are 
not overly sensitive to the aggregation problem (though exceptions 
will be noted). Moreover, since my concern is with the description of 
a theoretical universe rather than with making inferences from a 
sample to a universe, many of the standard problems of temporal 
aggregation are of no direct concern. 23 Still, the choice of a temporal 
unit for each analysis must be justified to fit the question under 
consideration. 24 
The War Data 
Each of the 119 wars is measured according to the procedures devel-
oped above. The resulting set of data for all interstate wars involving 
the Great Powers is presented in Table 4.1. All other relevant sets of 
war data can be derived from this basic data set (including the amount 




of the Wars 
The data in Table 4.1 can now be used in an attempt to answer a 
variety of questions regarding the nature of war among the Great 
Powers. (1) What are most wars like? How long do they last, how 
many Great Powers do they involve, and how destructive are they in 
loss of life? What are the central tendencies of the various characteris-
tics of war, and how great are the variations? (2) How warlike has the 
Great Power system been? How frequently does war occur? What is 
typical yearly amount of war? (3) What is the relationship among the 
various dimensions of war? Are there generally more casualties in 
long wars than shorter wars? Is the severity of war inversely related 
to its frequency? (4) Are there any significant historical trends in war? 
Are wars becoming more or less frequent, longer or shorter, more or 
less destructive? Or does the level of war tend to follow a cyclical 
pattern? (5) Is the amount of war in one period related to the amount 
of war in previous periods? Does war beget war? Or does war generate 
a repulsion against conflict and a period of relative peace? 
The first three sets of questions concerning the nature of the wars, 
the warlikeness of the Great Power system as a whole, and the rela-
tionship among the various dimensions of war will be examined in this 
chapter. The questions of historical trends in war and the contagion 
of Great Power war behavior will be treated in Chapters 6 and 7, 
respectively. Since the analysis of a given theoretical question may be 
sensitive to the particular empirical indicators used, it will often be 
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necessary to examine each question from a variety of perspectives, 
each representing a different operational slant on the general theoreti-
cal question. In doing so I hope to resolve a number of ambiguities 
in the literature deriving from the failure to make these analytical 
distinctions. 
Characteristics of Individual Wars 
In this section, the distributions of the war indicators will be exam-
ined. What have most wars been like along each of the dimensions 
defined earlier? What is the value of each indicator for the average war 
and to what extent do most wars deviate from this average? 
This information is presented both graphically and numerically. In 
Figure 5.1, frequency histograms for each interstate war indicator are 
displayed. For a given interval on the horizontal axis (listing a range 
of values of the war indicator in question), the number of wars for 
which the value of the indicator falls within that interval is plotted on 
the vertical axis. Additional information about the nature of the wars 
is provided in Table 5.1, where the mean, median, minimum, maxi-
mum, and standard deviation for each indicator are given (rounded 
to two significant digits). Statistics on Great Power wars as well as 
interstate wars involving the Powers are given in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 indicates that the typical (median) interstate war involv-
ing the Great Powers lasts about three years and involves about two 
Great Powers, five nation-years of war, and 17,000 battle deaths (180 
fatalities per million European population and 3,400 fatalities per 
nation-year of war). Many of the wars deviate significantly from these 
central tendencies, as indicated by the frequency histograms and the 
minimum, maximum, and standard deviation statistics. This variation 
is particularly large for the severity, intensity, and concentration in-
dicators, whose distributions are more highly skewed. 1 Figure 5.1d 
suggests that over 80 percent of the wars involve fewer than 100,000 
casualties, in seventeen wars there are between 100,000 and a million 
casualties, and in five wars over one million fatalities, raising the 
Figure 5.1. Histograms of the War Indicators 
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Table 5 .1. Characteristics of the Wars 
Standard 
Indicatora Mean Median Minimum Maximum Deviation 
Interstate Wars Involving the Great Powers 
Duration 4.4 3.0 .1 26 4.7 
Extent 2.2 1.8 1.0 8.0 1.5 
Magnitude 10 4.8 .1 65 14 
Severity 280000 17000 30 13000000 1400000 
Intensity 2300 180 .2 94000 10000 
Concentration 19000 3400 ISO 460000 55000 
Great Power Wars 
Duration 5.5 4.0 .1 21 4.6 
Extent 3.2 2.5 2.0 8.0 1.6 
Magnitude 16 11 .4 65 16 
Severity 500000 34000 300 13000000 1900000 
Intensity 4100 420 2.7 94000 14000 
Concentration 24000 4000 150 460000 69000 
3The units for the indicators are: duration-years; extent-number of Great 
Powers; magnitude-nation-years; severity-battle deaths; intensity-battle deaths 
per million European population; concentration-battle deaths per nation-year. 
average (mean) to over a quarter million. The standard deviation is 
five times larger than the mean. Because of the highly skewed nature 
of these distributions the median is a better measure of central ten-
dency than is the mean, particularly for the fatality-based indicators. 
The variation and skewness in the other indicators is somewhat less 
but still significant. The standard deviation of the magnitude indicator 
is three times the magnitude of the typical war. Two-thirds of the wars 
are over within five years, and nearly 90 percent within ten years, but 
five wars have lasted more than fifteen years. The distributions of the 
extent and magnitude indicators are similar to those for the duration 
indicator. The vast majority of the wars (nearly three-fourths) involve 
two Powers or less, and more than half of these (forty-seven), a single 
Power. Several wars have involved more Powers, however, and two 
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wars involve seven or eight Powers. The magnitude of half the wars 
is less than five nation-years, but ten wars exceeding thirty nation-
years. 
These characteristics can be compared to those for Great Power 
wars. Slightly over half (sixty-four) of all interstate wars involving a 
Great Power are Great Power wars. As expected, these are more 
serious than the larger set, as indicated by their summary statistics. 
Great Power wars typically (on the median) last a year longer, involve 
over twice as many nation-years of war and battle deaths, and are 
more concentrated in space and time. It is not surprising that wars 
between the Powers, whose military strengths are roughly compara-
ble, last longer than wars between states of unequal military strength 
and result in greater loss of life. Histograms of the Great Power war 
indicators would be similar to those for wars in general, except that 
there are fewer cases ranking low on each of the indicators. Since both 
sets of distributions are far from being normal or even symmetrical, 
many of the assumptions underlying most tests of statistical signifi-
cance are not satisfied by the data generated in this study, and caution 
must be exercised in the use and interpretation of significance tests. 
Yearly Amount of War 
In this section the focus shifts from the characteristics of the wars to 
the frequency and yearly amount of war under way. The number of 
wars (and Great Power wars) beginning, the number of wars (and 
Great Power wars) under way, the number of Great Powers at war, 
the magnitude of war under way, the severity of war under way, and 
the concentration of war under way are all determined. 2 
Histograms for these indicators are presented in Figure 5.2, and the 
key summary statistics are given in Table 5.2. There can be no doubt 
regarding the pervasiveness of interstate war involving the Great 
Powers. The Powers have been involved in interstate wars for nearly 
75 percent of the 481 years of the system, and in 60 percent of these 
years they have been involved in Great Power war. On average, a new 
war begins every four years and a Great Power war every seven or 
Figure 5.2. Histograms: Yearly Amount of War Under Way 
(Number of years characterized by a given value or range of values of each indicator) 
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Table 5.2. Yearly Amount of War Under Way: Summary Statistics 
Standard 
lndicatora Mean Median Minimum Maximum Deviation 
Number wars beginning .25 .13 0 3 .52 
Number GP wars beginning .13 .07 0 2 .36 
Number wars under way 1.3 1.1 0 7 1.2 
Number GP wars under way .82 .73 0 4 .83 
Number powers at war 2.7 2.5 0 8 2.3 
Magnitude 3.2 2.7 0 13 2.8 
Severity 69000 6500 0 1900000 270000 
Concentration 12000 2300 0 310000 38000 
a Magnitude is measured in nation-years, severity in battle deaths, and concen-
tration in battle deaths per nation-year. 
eight years. In the typical year (and again the median rather than the 
mean is used because of the skewed nature of some of the distribu-
tions), slightly over one war involving the Great Powers and slightly 
less than one Great Power war is under way, two and a half Great 
Powers are at war, there are nearly three nation-years of war, and 
6,500 battle deaths (or about 2,300 fatalities per Power at war). 
Many years do not conform to this typical pattern. Although about 
one-fourth of the last 481 years have been free of interstate wars 
involving the Powers, some years as many as seven wars were under 
way (including four Great Power wars), with a total of eight Great 
Powers, thirteen nation-years of war, and nearly two million battle 
deaths. In more than one-sixth of the years two or more Great Power 
wars were under way, and in over 60 percent of the years two or more 
Great Powers were at war. There have been more than 1,000 battle 
deaths in most (75 percent) years, more than 100,000 fatalities in forty 
years, and over twelve years with more than a million fatalities. 3 
Although this analysis describes the typical year on the basis of 
certain parameters of conflict, it does not provide a complete descrip-
tion of the frequency and amount of war over time. It would make 
a difference, for example, if the more conflictual years in the system 
were concentrated together or dispersed more widely. Therefore, an 
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analysis based on longer time intervals is needed. For these periods 
it is more appropriate to examine the amount of war beginning than 
the amount of war under way, for the latter is less meaningful when 
the duration of many wars falls short of the unit of temporal aggrega-
tion. Let us first consider the frequency of war. 
Histograms for the frequency of war indicator for five and twenty-
five-year periods of aggregation for interstate wars involving the Pow-
ers and for Great Power wars are presented in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. 
As noted earlier, there has been one war every four years and a Great 
Power war every seven and one-half years over the last five centuries. 
As we see from the histograms, twenty-eight of the ninety-six five-year 
periods since 1495 (30 percent) have been characterized by the ab-
sence of a new war beginning, and half (fifty) have been spared a Great 
Power war. Longer periods are rarely free of war: histograms based 
on ten year intervals would show that in only five of the forty-seven 
periods have there been no new wars, and Figure 5.4 shows that no 
twenty-five-year period has been perfectly peaceful. Two twenty-five-
year periods have been free of the outbreak of a Great Power war, 
however. Nor are the wars themselves particularly concentrated in 
time. Of the sixty-eight five-year periods characterized by war, over 
half have only one war, and over 80 percent have two or less. All of 
this information is suggestive, but we shall save for Chapter 6 an 
analysis of whether war begets war. 
Summary statistics for the other dimensions of the amount of war 
beginning per five-year period are presented in Table 5.3. The distribu-
tions are similar to those for the individual war indicators (except for 
twenty-eight periods in which there were no wars), so the histograms 
are not presented. The distributions of the indicators for Great Power 
war are similar to those for interstate wars involving the Powers, so 
they are not included here. 
Table 5.3 indicates that in the typical five-year period there is one 
new outbreak of war, lasting two and one-half years, involving two 
Great Powers and four nation-years of war, and resulting in 17,000 
battle fatalities. The variation is considerable, however. Twenty-eight 
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Table 5.3. Characteristics of Aggregated War Data, Five-Year Periods 
Standard 
Indicatora Mean Median Minimum Maximum Deviation 
Frequency 1.2 1.1 0 6 1.2 
Duration 5.4 2.4 0 33 7.1 
Extent 2.8 2.2 0 12 2.8 
Magnitude 13 4.0 0 87 18 
Severity 350000 17000 0 13000000 1600000 
Intensity 2900 160 0 96000 12000 
Concentration 23000 4400 0 720000 81000 
a Measured in the following units: frequency-number of wars; duration-years; 
extent-number of Great Powers; magnitude-nation-years; severity-battle deaths; 
intensity-battle deaths per million European population; concentration-battle 
deaths per nation-year. 
five-year periods have witnessed no new outbreak of war, while many 
others have seen much higher levels of war. In eight of these five-year 
periods, wars involving more than forty nation-years of conflict are 
begun, and in one-quarter of the ninety-six periods there are more 
than 100,000 fatalities. A large number of periods are also character-
ized by 10,000-100,000 fatalities. The resulting distributions of the 
fatality-based indicators are therefore bimodal. The next question 
concerns the relationships among the war indicators. Are wars that 
are serious in some respects equally serious in all respects? 
Relationships among the War Indicators 
A variety of statistical measures of association might be used to 
determine the empirical relationships among the various war indica-
tors. The best for our purposes is Kendall's tau-b, a rank-order mea-
sure of association. An ordinal-level correlation coefficient has the 
advantage of being less sensitive to the highly skewed nature of the 
distributions of some of these war indicators and thus does not allow 
a limited number of extreme cases to dominate the analysis. In addi-
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Figure 5.3. Histograms: Frequency of War 
(Number of periods characterized by a given frequency of war 
outbreak) 
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Figure 5.4. Histograms: Frequency of Great Power War 
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tion, an ordinal measure of association better reflects the inherent 
uncertainty in some of the war data, in that it is based only on rank 
order rather than quantitative differences. 4 Some caution must be 
exercised, in interpreting these statistics, however, for tau-b is a mea-
sure of the strength of association, not causation. Further research is 
often necessary to determine the direction of causation and whether 
the correlation is spurious. 
In addition, the magnitude of the test statistics (for example, tau-
b) is of more concern than their levels of statistical significance. This 
study deals with the entire universe of interstate wars involving the 
Great Powers rather than a sample from that universe (or popula-
tion), and there is considerable debate regarding the relevance of 
significance tests for populations. Moreover, the distributions of the 
war indicators are highly skewed so that a number of the assumptions 
upon which significance tests are based may not be satisfied here. 
Nevertheless, significance levels provide a standard benchmark for 
comparison and interpretation in the social sciences. They can also be 
used to indicate the sensitivity of the analysis to the coding rules for 
the various indicators. A large number of statistically significant rela-
tionships would suggest that a change in coding rules that would 
generate nonsystematic changes in the data would have only a mar-
ginal impact on the resulting analysis. 5 Thus significance levels are 
generally given in the following analyses, though the emphasis is on 
the size of the correlation coefficients. For general purposes of inter-
pretation, correlations below .30 in absolute magnitude are defined as 
low, those exceeding .70 as high, and those between .30 and .70 as 
moderate.6 
Characteristics of the Wars 
The empirical associations among the various war indicators for the 
119 wars involving the Great Powers since 1495 are given in the 
correlation matrix in Table 5.4. 
Many of the correlations are as expected. Several of the high corre-
lations may be deceiving, however, because some of the indicators are 
mathematically very similar by virtue of their definition. Thus severity 
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Table 5.4. Correlation Matrix (tau-b) of War Indicators 
Indicator Dur Ext Mag Sev Int Con 
Duration 1.00 
Extent .25 1.00 
Magnitude .79 .51 1.00 
Severity .52 .46 .64 1.00 
Intensity .53 .47 .65 .92 1.00 
Concentration .07 .19 .13 .52 .47 1.00 
Note: Twelve of the fifteen correlations below the diagonal are statistically 
significant at the .001 level. 
and intensity are highly correlated, as are duration and magnitude. It 
is perhaps a little surprising that the severity-intensity correlation is 
as high as tau-b = .92 (r = .998), suggesting that the human losses 
in warfare have generally increased as rapidly as population. The table 
suggests a moderate relationship between the number of casualties 
and the duration, extent, and magnitude of war (tau-b =.52, .46, and 
.64, respectively) but a considerably weaker relationship between the 
duration of war and number of Powers involved ( tau-b = .25). These 
figures suggest that wars involving a larger number of Powers do not 
tend to last much longer than wars involving fewer Powers and, 
conversely, that longer wars do not generally involve significantly 
more Powers than do shorter wars. This finding appears to have some 
relevance for theories of escalation processes, because it suggests that 
longer wars do not generally tend to draw in additional Powers. The 
severity of war is moderately associated with its duration, extent, and 
magnitude. These same general patterns hold true for Great Power 
wars. Nearly all of the rank-order correlations differ from those in 
Table 5.4 by less than .05, and in no case do the differences exceed 
.10. 
Thus most of the empirical associations among the war indicators 
are moderate, indicating that the various theoretical dimensions of 
war are distinct but not completely independent. This conclusion is 
consistent with the view that the various dimensions are nonredun-
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dant measures of the more general phenomenon of war and that war 
is a multidimensional concept. 
Yearly Amount of War 
The relationships among the various measures of the yearly amount 
of war may be sensitive to the temporal period of aggregation and also 
to whether the focus is on the amount of war beginning, under way, 
or ending. The correlation between the number of wars beginning 
each one-year period and the number of wars under way, for example, 
is only r = .27, suggesting that knowledge of the number of wars 
beginning tells us very little about the number of wars under way. It 
will be necessary, therefore, to examine the relationships among the 
war indicators for both the amount of war under way and the amount 
of war beginning. For a particular substantive question, of course, one 
set of indicators may be more appropriate than the others. 
In examining relationships among the war indicators (and later in 
examining historical trends in war), it is not necessary to control for 
the number of Great Powers in the system. The correlations between 
the number of Powers in the system and each of the indicators of the 
yearly amount of war under way are surprisingly low. None of the 
tau-b 's exceed .20. Thus the amount of war in the system (including 
even the number of Powers at war) is relatively independent of the 
number of Great Powers. 7 
Let us begin by examining the amount of war under way on a yearly 
basis and consider the relationships among the number of wars under 
way, the number of Great Powers at war, and the magnitude, severity, 
and concentration of war under way. The rank-order (tau-b) correla-
tion matrix ofthe war indicators is presented in Table 5.5. A separate 
analysis of Great Power war& is not included here, because of the high 
correlation between the number of wars under way and the number 
of Great Power wars under way (r = . 76) and the small differences 
(generally less than .04) between their respective correlations with the 
other indicators. All of the correlations are moderate to high, confirm-
ing our expectations. One result of some substantive significance is 
Quantitative Description of the Wars 107 
Table 5.5. Correlation Matrix (tau-b) of Indicators for War Under Way 
per Year 
Number 
Number of Powers 
Indicator of Wars at War Mag Sev Con 
Number wars 1.00 
Number powers at war .67 1.00 
Magnitude .75 .93 1.00 
Severity .54 .74 .73 1.00 
Concentration .42 .59 .56 .84 1.00 
Note: All correlation coefficients are significant at the .001 level. 
that the number of battle deaths is more closely associated with the 
number of Powers at war than with the number of wars under way, 
suggesting that the severity of war is affected more by the number of 
Great Powers at war (regardless of the number of wars for each) than 
by the total number of wars under way. This finding is consistent with 
the earlier argument that general wars involving nearly all the Great 
Powers account for a disproportionately high number of the total 
fatalities from war. 
Having established the relationships among the measures of the 
amount of war under way per year, let us now consider longer periods 
of temporal aggregation. Here it is most useful to focus on the amount 
of war beginning. These relationships are examined for five-, ten-, and 
twenty-five year periods. The resulting rank-order correlations are 
presented in Table 5.6. The items in each cell refer to correlations for 
the three time intervals. The intensity indicator has been excluded 
because of its nearly perfect correlations with the other fatality-based 
indicators (tau-b = .96, .98). 
The results are surprising: not only do the relationships between the 
indicators vary over different units of aggregation, but these variations 
are much greater than anticipated and often substantively significant. 
The associations between frequency and severity, for example, move 
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Table 5 .6. Correlation Matrices (tau-b) of War Indicators for Five-, 
Ten-, and Twenty-Five-Year Periods 




Duration .72 1.00 
.55 1.00 
.40 1.00 
Extent .79 .71 1.00 
.72 .59 1.00 
.81 .39 1.00 
Magnitude .66 .86 .78 1.00 
.46 .83 .65 1.00 
.25 .77 .34 1.00 
Severity .60 .72 .73 .80 1.00 
.41 .55 .64 .67 1.00 
-.16 .01 .06 .17 1.00 
Concentration .50 .46 .55 .52 .72 1.00 
.26 .21 .40 .30 .64 1.00 
-.20 -.54 -.39 -.40 .43 1.00 
Note: The three items in each cell refer to tau-b for five-, ten-, and twenty-
five-year periods of temporal aggregation, respectively. 
from tau-b = .60 at five-year intervals to tau-b =- .16 at twenty-
five-year intervals. The former implies a fairly strong tendency 
for periods of frequent wars to be the most costly in the loss of life, 
whereas the latter implies (if anything) a very slight tendency 
for periods of frequent wars to be the least costly in loss of life. In 
nearly all cases, the correlation declines as the length of the pe-
riod of aggregation increases, reflecting the increased variation 
generated by the higher number of wars in longer periods. This sen-
sitivity of the correlations to the length of the period of temporal 
aggregation suggests that we must be extremely careful in inter-
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preting these statistics and making inferences about empirical asso-
ciations among the war indicators. Many of the theoretical general-
izations in the literature are not sufficiently precise because they 
fail to make a distinction between the short run and the long 
run. 
For five-year periods of aggregation among the indicators for the 
amount of war, all of the correlations (tau-b) are positive and moder-
ate to high (all exceed .45). Thus periods ranking high on one dimen-
sion of war behavior tend to rank high on all other dimensions as well. 
But all of the indicators are positively correlated with the frequency 
of war, and these other correlations may therefore be spurious. The 
cumulative amount of war in any period would be expected to increase 
with the number of wars in that period. On the other hand, a common 
generalization found in the literature is that there is an inverse rela-
tionship between the frequency and seriousness of war; at some times 
war is frequent but limited-where "limited" is interpreted to refer 
to low magnitude and severity-and at other times relatively infre-
quent but more serious. Preston and Wise, for example, characterize 
eighteenth-century warfare as frequent but limited, whereas Inis L. 
Claude, Jr., refers to the "frequent" but "localized and limited" wars 
of the nineteenth century.8 
This hypothesized inverse relationship between the frequency and 
seriousness of war cannot be fully tested here, for many "limited" 
wars have been excluded from this compilation. Wars not involving 
a Great Power, imperial and colonial wars, civil wars, and wars 
involving less than 1,000 battle deaths have all been excluded. Never-
theless, it remains an important question whether wars involving the 
Great Powers are either frequent but limited or infrequent but serious. 
The evidence here suggests that this particular inverse relationship is 
not valid. If anything, there may be a slight tendency for interstate 
wars involving the Great Powers to be most serious when they are 
most frequent and less serious when they are less frequent, at least in 
the short term. Over the long-term (twenty-five-year periods of aggre-
gation), however, there may be a slight inverse relationship between 
the frequency and severity of war. 
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Table 5.7. Correlations (tau-b) between Frequency of War and 
Characteristics of the Average War 
Tau-b (freq, Wi) 
Unit of Aggregation 
War Indicator (Wi) 5-year I 0-year 25-year 
Duration .07 .004 -.04 
Extent -.006 .06 -.12 
Magnitude .02 .08 -.15 
Severity .02 .07 -.41 
Concentration -.08 -.01 -.16 
It is not clear, however, whether the "seriousness of war" refers to 
the total amount of war in a period or to the nature of the average 
war during that period. The hypothesis based on the latter conceptual-
ization can be tested empirically by computing the correlations be-
tween the frequency of interstate war involving the Powers and the 
characteristics of the average war (W;) for each period.9 These rank-
order correlations (tau-b) for five-, ten-, and twenty-five-year periods 
of aggregation are given in Table 5.7. 
For a five-year period, the statistics in Table 5.7 show no relation-
ship between the number of wars and the nature of the average wars, 
as indicated by the near-zero correlation for all indicators. Thus the 
hypothesized inverse relation between the frequency and seriousness 
of war is not supported by the empirical evidence. This conclusion is 
valid for ten-year periods as well, as indicated by the statistics in 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7. Over a twenty-five-year period, however, there is 
some evidence of a moderate inverse relationship between the fre-
quency of war and the severity of the average war. Moreover, all of 
the characteristics of the average war, not just severity, demonstrate 
an inverse relationship (however weak) with frequency. 
The relationship between the frequency and seriousness of war 
varies depending on whether seriousness is defined as the total amount 
of war or the characteristics of the average war, and depending on 
whether wars are aggregated over the short term (five to ten years) 
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or the long term (twenty-five years). It must be emphasized further 
that these findings are valid only for interstate wars involving the 
Great Powers (and at least 1,000 fatalities) and therefore do not 
constitute a valid test of the more general hypothesis that wars are 
either frequent but limited or infrequent but serious. 10 
Relationships between the other indicators of the average amount 
of war per period can also be determined. All of the correlations are 
positive and moderate in strength except for those involving the con-
centration of war (which is related only to the other fatality-based 
indicators). These relationships are generally not as strong as those for 
the total amount of war per period (here tau-b < .55, except for the 
duration-magnitude relationship), since the spurious impact of the 
frequency of war has been removed. These results are only slightly 
dependent on the particular period of temporal aggregation and are 
substantively unchanged if only Great Power wars are considered. 
The relationships between severity and the duration and extent indica-
tors are similar to those for the total amount of war. Although tau-
b is comparable for the severity-extent and severity-duration relation-
ships, Pearson's r suggests that severity is determined more by the 
number of Powers than by the duration of war. 
The next problem to be discussed is the extent to which the patterns 
of war behavior uncovered in this chapter are consistent over the 
five-century span of the Great Power system. That is, are there any 




Trends in War 
The twentieth century has been characterized as a particularly warlike 
era because of the destructiveness of the two world wars, the high level 
of tension and frequent crises of the Cold War, the persistent madness 
of the arms race between the two Superpowers, and the seemingly 
continuous conflicts among lesser states. A counterargument is that 
the world has not experienced a major war since 1945, that the im-
pression that war is widespread derives more from the expanded role 
of the media in making war a more immediate and personal experi-
ence than from the actuality of war itself, and that war is in fact much 
less common today than it was centuries ago. A resolution of these 
contradictory views need not rest on impressions and speculation, 
however, for the data base generated here has been designed to answer 
these kinds of questions. The focus here, of course, is not on war in 
general but on interstate war involving the Great Powers. This chap-
ter is concerned primarily with the question of whether these wars are 
increasing or decreasing. Cyclical trends in war will be discussed 
briefly and the respective levels of war for the last five centuries will 
be compared. 
Linear Trends 
Several scholarly efforts have addressed the question of whether war 
has been increasing or decreasing with time. Singer and Small find no 
significant trend in the frequency, magnitude, severity, or intensity of 
international war since 1815 for either the international system as a 
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whole or the central European system. 1 Richardson examines the 
period from 1820 to 1950 and finds a very slight downward trend in 
the frequency of war, a slight tendency for wars of high severity to 
become more frequent and those of low severity to become less fre-
quent, and no upward trend in the per capita losses of life from war. 2 
Frank H. Denton analyzes the Richardson data and finds that the 
frequency of war has been relatively constant since the Congress of 
Vienna, but the size of war (defined as a combination of the other 
dimensions identified here) has been increasing. 3 These studies of 
historical trends in war based on the Richardson or Singer-Small data 
are of limited value because they describe only the last century and 
a half and provide no basis for generalization to the Great Power 
system (or the modem state system) as a whole. Their starting point 
immediately after the Congress of Vienna introduces a serious bias 
into trend analysis, for this was the most peaceful period in the last 
five centuries. Richardson recognizes the need to extend the analysis 
over a broader time span. 4 
Analyses of long-term trends in war have been undertaken by 
Woods and Baltzly, Wright, and Sorokin. Woods and Baltzly focus 
on the proportion of years of war during each half century and find 
that by this measure war has been on the decline over the last five 
centuries. 5 Sorokin describes a continuous increase in army size and 
an even faster increase in casualties over the last eight centuries 
(ending in 1925), except for a definite drop in both variables in the 
nineteenth century. Sorokin rejects the arguments that war has been 
either increasing or decreasing steadily over time and concludes that 
war fluctuates erratically. 6 Wright finds that the frequency of Eu-
ropean wars has declined since 1480 and that both the absolute and 
per capita human and economic costs have increased. Military activ-
ity is becoming more concentrated in time, with longer intervals of 
peace between wars, and also more extended in space. 7 
Clearly, scholars do not agree on the question of whether war is 
increasing or decreasing over time. By the definitions used here, 
Wright finds a downward trend in the frequency of war, but Richard-
son and Singer and Small fail to detect any trend in either direction. 
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Wright identifies an increase in the severity and intensity of war, but 
Sorokin, Richardson, and Singer and Small find no trend. It is diffi-
cult, however, to make direct comparisons between these diverse and 
occasionally contradictory findings because each of the studies focuses 
on different characteristics of the wars under consideration, the opera-
tional indicators of the key variables, and the temporal span of the 
analysis. Woods and Baltzly, for example, focus only on a single 
indicator (the proportion of years of war per half century) and there-
fore do not adequately capture the full multidimensional nature of 
war. The Singer-Small and Richardson studies cover only the period 
since the Congress of Vienna and include all interstate wars, including 
those involving smaller states. Although the Woods and Baltzly, 
Sorokin, and Wright studies cover a longer temporal span and focus 
on the major European states, none of their major power systems is 
perfectly congruent with the Great Power system identified here. 8 
Furthermore, some states are included in these analyses during peri-
ods before they rose to or after they fell from Great Power status. 
Consequently, these conclusions may not be applicable to the war 
behavior of the Great Powers as defined here. The finding by Woods 
and Baltzly, for example, that war is diminishing may simply reflect 
the lower level of war behavior of medium powers as compared to 
Great Powers and the fact that many Great Powers have left the 
system. Their data show a diminishing level of war for states that 
could no longer claim Great Power status but no such tendency for 
the continuing Great Powers. The utility of the Woods and Baltzly 
study is further limited because their historical system ends in 1900, 
after the most peaceful century in modem history and just before two 
of the most destructive wars of all time. The following analysis of 
historical trends in the war behavior of the Great Powers is necessary 
because of the limitations of these earlier studies. 
Methods of Analysis 
An analysis of historical trends in war must distinguish between the 
levels, dimensions, and units of analysis of war conceptualized earlier. 
This section examines linear trends in the frequency of war, the 
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characteristics of the individual wars, and the aggregate amount of 
war per period, including both the annual amount of war under way 
and the amount of war per twenty-five-year period. Both Great Power 
war and interstate war involving the Powers are analyzed. Discussion 
of each category begins with a graphical representation of the war 
data. Increasing or decreasing trends can be identified, and a rough 
estimate of the strength of these trends can be made. The extremely 
large variation in the war indicators precludes a high degree of preci-
sion in a visual analysis, however, and a statistical analysis of the war 
data is necessary to permit a quantitative measurement of the change 
in war over time. 
Several quantitative techniques are available for determining the 
historical trends in the war data. Here a combination of frequency 
counts and percentages, regression analysis, and rank-order correla-
tion analysis is used. If war indicator W; is regressed against time (the 
year in which the war or period begins), the regression coefficient b 
(or slope) measures the strength of the historical trend by the average 
yearly change in W;. To compare the relative magnitude of the trends 
in two different indicators, the standardized regression coefficients 
(b*) can be compared. 
If the linear regression model is applied to the fatality-based indica-
tors, the least-squares criterion gives excessive influence to extreme 
cases, with the result that the two world wars have a disproportionate 
impact on the trend lines. To eliminate this effect deriving from the 
method of analysis (rather than from the true importance of the wars), 
two alternative methods are employed. First, the rank-order correla-
tion coefficients (tau-b) between each indicator and time are provided. 
These measure whether war indicator W; is increasing over time but 
incorporate no information regarding the amount of increase. Second, 
the logarithms of the severity, intensity, and concentration indicators 
are regressed against time. These will reveal the same positive or 
negative trends as for the regular regressions (since a logarithmic 
transformation is a monotonically increasing function) but the inter-
pretation is equivalent. Since this technique is equivalent to running 
an exponential curve throughout the raw data, the beta coefficient is 
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equivalent to the percentage increase in the war indicator per unit 
change in time. 9 Given beta, the doubling time of any indicator can 
be calculated.10 Another advantage of both logarithms and rank-
order correlations is that they are less sensitive than regression coeffi-
cients to measurement errors in the data. Rank-order correlations 
require only ordinal-level precision, a requirement basically met even 
by the fatality-based indicators for the pre-1815 period. The use of 
these multiple methods of analysis minimizes the possibility that the 
conclusions will be determined by the idiosyncracies of particular 
techniques. 11 
The Frequency of War 
Scattergrams of the frequency of war indicator are presented in 
Figure 6.1 a-d for interstate wars involving the Great Powers and for 
Great Power wars. Both five and twenty-five-year periods of aggrega-
tion are used. The decline in the frequency of interstate war involving 
the Great Powers is evident from the scattergrams, particularly for 
the longer period of aggregation. This trend is confirmed by a regres-
sion analysis of frequency against time, based on a one-year unit of 
aggregation. For interstate wars involving the Powers, b = -.0049 and 
b * = -.13, significant at p = .004. The decline amounts to 1.2 fewer 
wars per five-year period (or six fewer wars per twenty-five-year pe-
riod) over the five-century span of the system. This declining fre-
quency of war is significant substantively as well as statistically; the 
average frequency of war is only 1.2 per five-year period. Therefore, 
the decline in the frequency of war over the five-century span of the 
system is equal to the average frequency of war, which attests to the 
strength of this historical trend. 
The overall decline in the frequency of Great Power war is even 
more pronounced, as portrayed by Figure 6.1 b and d. The number of 
Great Power wars declined continuously from the sixteenth to the 
nineteenth centuries, with a very slight increase in the twentieth cen-
tury. Over 75 percent of the Great Power wars occurred in the first 
half of the 480-year system (before 1735); less than 25 percent oc-
curred in the last 240 years. An examination of the data based on a 
five-year period of aggregation demonstrates that only 25 percent of 
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the half decades since 1815 have witnessed the initiation of Great 
Power war, compared to nearly 60 percent in the previous three 
centuries. The relative absence of Great Power war in the nineteenth 
century (except for the 1850-75 period) is striking, particularly in 
contrast with the relatively high frequency of Great Power war in 
earlier periods (ranging up to nine in one twenty-five-year period in 
the sixteenth century). Great Power war has been only one-fourth as 
frequent in the twentieth century as in the sixteenth century. 
The strength of this downward trend is confirmed by a correlation 
and regression analysis. The rank-order correlation between time and 
frequency of war per five-year period gives tau-b = -.36 (the corre-
sponding statistics for ten- and twenty-five-year periods are -.44 and 
-.61). The rate of decline can be measured by a linear regression 
analysis. Regressing frequency against time (using one-year periods) 
produces a b of -.00053 and a b * of -.20 (statistically significant at 
.000). This means that the number of wars per year has been declining 
by .00053 each year (or .25 wars per year over the last five centuries). 
In other words, the average decade today is characterized by 2.5 fewer 
Great Power wars than the average decade 480 years ago. This decline 
is significant substantively, given that it is roughly two times the 
average frequency of Great Power war per decade for the entire period 
(1.3). It is evident from Figure 6.lc that this trend was under way long 
before the twentieth century and the development of modern military 
technology. 
Characteristics of the Individual Wars 
Given that interstate war involving the Powers and particularly 
Great Power war have been declining in frequency, the next question 
is whether the individual wars have become more or less serious along 
the dimensions of duration, extent, magnitude, severity, intensity, and 
concentration. Interstate wars involving the Great Powers and Great 
Power wars are analyzed separately because there are significant 
differences between them. 
The scattergrams of the indicators for interstate war involving the 
Great Powers are presented in Figure 6.2a-f. The fatality-based in-
dicators are plotted on a logarithmic scale. 
Figure 6.1. Scattergrams: Frequency of War and Great Power War 
a. Frequency of war, 5-year periods 
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None of the linear trends in war appears particularly dramatic. 
Perhaps the most noticeable is that interstate wars involving the 
Powers are getting shorter in duration. Figure 6.2a reveals that only 
one war of the post-Vienna period has lasted longer than seven years, 
whereas in the pre-Vienna period there were nearly twenty wars of 
this duration. This downward trend in the duration of war is con-
firmed by the statistics presented in Table 6.1. 
The downward trend, as indicated by the negative tau-b and b, is 
fairly strong. The b of -.0064 indicates that individual wars are 
diminishing in duration by about .0064 years (2.3 days) each year 
(regardless of whether a war actually occurs). This is equivalent to a 
decline of about three years per war since the beginning of the system 
in 1495, which is dramatic considering that the average war during 
this period was only four and a half years long. 
The scattergram of the extent indicator demonstrates an interesting 
pattern, but no long-term trends. The low b and tau-b in Table 6.1 
(small enough that they have opposite signs) indicate that the number 
of Powers participating in these wars has changed very little over 
time. 
The magnitude of war also follows an interesting pattern. Other 
than the two world wars the only time wars have exceeded twenty in 
magnitude was from the late sixteenth century to the early nineteenth 
century, followed by a particularly low magnitude in the nineteenth 
century. The slightly downward trend overall is confirmed by Table 
6.1. The magnitude of war has declined by .0073 nation-years of war 
per year, or 3.5 nation-years over the entire span of the system. This 
decline is fairly strong (the mean is ten nation-years) but not as strong 
as the decline in the duration of war, as demonstrated by the standard-
ized betas. The downward trend in both indicators can be explained 
in part by the occurrence in the first two centuries of the system of 
several protracted Turkish wars. 
The scattergram shows that the severity of war has become increas-
ingly variable over time and that the number of battle deaths has been 
increasing, but that this trend is not as great as we might have ex-
pected. This positive but relatively small increase is confirmed by 
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Table 6.1. Historical Trends in War: Tau-b and Regression Coefficients 
for the Individual Wars 
Significance 
Dimension Tau-b b b* Level of b 
Interstate Wars Involving the Powers 
Duration -.17 -.0064 -.20 .03 
Extent -.06 .0005 .05 .6 
Magnitude -.16 -.0073 -.08 .4 
Severity .04 .00015 .02 .8 
Intensity -.05 -.00069 -.10 .3 
Concentration .25 .0018 .42 .000 
Great Power Wars 
Duration .02 -.0022 -.06 .6 
Extent .32 .0058 .48 .000 
Magnitude .14 .022 .18 .16 
Severity .27 .0027 .40 .001 
Intensity .20 .0020 .31 .01 
Concentration .36 .0029 .57 .000 
Note: The regression coefficients (band b *) and significance levels for the 
severity, intensity, and concentration indicators are from the regressions of the 
logged values of the indicators against time. 
tau-b (0.4), b (.00015), and b* (0.2). Beta indicates that the number 
of battle deaths per war has been increasing at the average rate of .015 
percent per year, but this is not statistically significant. 
Before rejecting the common view that casualties from war have 
been increasing dramatically, we must recognize that these conclu-
sions may reflect the particular methodological procedures used. A 
logarithmic transformation result in a slight downward bias on ob-
served trends. If battle deaths (rather than their logarithm) are re-
gressed against time, a fairly strong positive trend emerges (b = 2200, 
b * = .22, significant at p = .0 13), indicating that the average battle 
deaths per war have increased by a million (or four times the mean) 
over the span of five centuries. This result demonstrates the sensitivity 
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of the analysis to the methods used. Yet some methods are more 
appropriate than others for certain questions and certain data. When 
there are a limited number of outlying cases, it is neither appropriate 
nor conventional to use a least-squares method on untransformed 
data. The use oflogarithms is entirely consistent with existing practice 
for data of this sort, 12 and the fact that another acceptable method 
(tau-b) gives similar results tends to provide additional support for 
this analysis. It is true that the most severe wars of any age are 
becoming increasingly destructive in loss of life. 13 With respect to the 
general question of historical trends in war, however, we must con-
clude that the severity of interstate wars involving the Great Powers 
is increasing but at an extremely slow rate. 14 
It is not surprising to find similar trends in the intensity of war, 
given the high correlation between severity and intensity. The inten-
sity of war may actually be decreasing slightly over time, as indicated 
by tau-b and b (not statistically significant). The intensity of wars has 
been declining by about .07 percent per year, suggesting that the 
destructiveness of war has not quite kept up with the increase in 
population. 15 The historical increase in the concentration of war is 
less ambiguous (see Figure 6.1f). Fatalities per nation-year of war 
have been increasing by .18 percent per year, faster than any other 
indicator and about ten times as fast as the severity of war. This 
finding confirms the view of Wright and others that war is becoming 
much more concentrated in space and time. 
Thus except for their duration and concentration dimensions, inter-
state wars involving the Great Powers have changed little over time. 
The nature of Great Power wars has changed, however, as is evident 
from the scattergrams for the Great Power war indicators, which are 
presented in Figure 6.3a-d. The intensity and concentration indi-
cators are excluded because of the similarity of their distributions 
to that of the severity of Great Power war and to the intensity and 
concentration indicators for interstate wars involving the Great 
Powers. 
The scattergrams suggest an increase in most of the indicators 
except perhaps duration. These impressions are confirmed by the beta 
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coefficients and rank-order correlation coefficients presented at the 
bottom ofTable 6.1. The duration of Great Power wars has remained 
basically constant since the late fifteenth century, but their extent has 
increased sharply. The b of .0058 indicates that the number of Powers 
participating in Great Power war has been increasing by approxi-
mately .006 per year, or by over one Power every two centuries. 
(Recall that the average number of Powers participating in a single 
Great Power war is only 3.2 and the median only 2.5). The scatter-
gram in Figure 6.3b reveals additional information. Before the Thirty 
Years' War, no conflict involved more than four Powers and most 
wars involved two Powers. From the early seventeenth century to the 
early nineteenth century, the number of warring Powers varied from 
two to six, the median being four. No war in the nineteenth century 
involved more than three Powers, but the two world wars in the 
twentieth century involved seven and eight Powers, respectively. Fur-
thermore, the proportion of Great Power wars involving a large num-
ber of Powers is much higher in recent times than previously. Since 
Vienna, for example, two-thirds of these wars have involved three or 
more Powers, whereas previously this ratio was less than half. Thus 
the proportion of conflicts that expanded into larger wars involving 
several Powers has been increasing over time. 16 
The magnitude of Great Power war has also been increasing but less 
than half as fast as its extent (as indicated by the b * of .18 compared 
to .48 for extent). The b of .022 suggests that the magnitude of war 
has been increasing by over two nation-years each century (compared 
to a mean of 16, median of 11). This is not statistically significant, 
however (p = .16), given the large variance in magnitude. 
All of the fatality-based indicators show that Great Power wars 
have also become increasingly destructive, as demonstrated by the 
tau-b and regression coefficients. The severity of Great Power war has 
been increasing at an average rate of .62 percent each year. At this 
rate, the average number of battle deaths in a Great Power war has 
doubled every 110 years or so. The intensity of war has increased 
nearly as rapidly (.46 percent per year), doubling every 150 years. The 
most pronounced trend in Great Power war, as indicated by the b * 
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of .57, is its increasing concentration over time. The number of battle 
deaths has increased at a rate of .67 percent per year, doubling every 
100 years. An examination of the scattergrams of the data clearly 
reveals that these upward trends are not simply the product of the 
enormous destructiveness of two world wars but would hold true 
without them. 
The Aggregate Amount of War 
It is clear that the frequency of interstate war involving the Powers 
has been declining while the individual wars themselves have become 
more serious in some respects and less serious in others. Great Power 
wars have declined markedly in frequency but have become more 
serious in every respect but duration. The question here is the impact 
of these divergent trends on the aggregate amount of interstate war 
involving the Great Powers. Are the yearly fatalities from war or the 
total magnitude of war increasing or decreasing? An answer to these 
questions requires that we examine the yearly amount of war under 
way and the amount of war beginning in a given period. 
The relevant indicators for the annual amount of war and Great 
Power war under way are the number of wars and Great Power wars 
under way, the number of Powers at war, and the annual magnitude, 
severity, and concentration of war under way. The scattergrams of 
these indicators are very revealing in many respects and will provide 
the basis for some of the analysis that follows. Each consists of 481 
annual data points, however, and therefore does not provide a clear 
and uncluttered plot of manageable size. For this reason these scatter-
grams are not presented here. 
The scattergrams would show a noticeable decline in the yearly 
number of wars under way. There have been a disproportionately 
large number of years without war in the post-Vienna period (about 
60 percent of the years are without war) compared to the continuity 
of war in earlier times (when only 10 percent of the years were without 
war). Moreover, rarely in the last three centuries have more than two 
wars been under way in any given year, a phenomenon that was 
common in earlier historical periods. The decline of Great Power war 
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is even more pronounced. There has been a relative absence of Great 
Power war in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when it has been 
under way only about one-sixth of the time. In the sixteenth, seven-
teenth, and eighteenth centuries, by contrast, Great Power war was 
under way about 80 percent of the time. During the first 250 years of 
the system there were only eighteen years in which all of the Powers 
were at peace and only twenty-five years in which two or more Great 
Powers were not at war. The simultaneous existence of more than one 
(and up to four) Great Power war was common before the eighteenth 
century but extremely rare since then. 
A related fact is that the phenomenon of precisely two Powers at 
war, common before the nineteenth century, has practically ceased to 
exist, occurring only three times since the early nineteenth century. 
In the last two centuries only three Great Power wars have been 
limited to two Powers (whereas eight have involved three or more 
Powers). In the previous three centuries about half of the wars were 
limited in this manner. Thus in earlier times dyadic wars between two 
Powers did not always escalate through the intervention of third 
Powers. Such restraint by a third Power is much less common in more 
recent times. One possible explanation is that the capabilities and 
resources available to the Great Powers makes it more feasible than 
in the past to intervene quickly in an ongoing war, particularly in 
remote areas. Another explanation, based on incentives rather than 
capabilities, is that more often in recent times than in the past the 
Great Powers have perceived their vital security interests to be seri-
ously threatened by dyadic wars between other Powers. This classic 
balance-of-power behavior is as evident in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries as it was in the Golden Age of the balance of power 
in the eighteenth century and before. It would be interesting to 
hypothesize that this strong tendency for two-Power wars to escalate 
may be an added deterrent to war and may help explain the relative 
infrequency of war since 1815. The correlation between the extent of 
the average war and the frequency of Great Power war is negative 
(particularly at twenty-five-year intervals), which tends to support 
this view. 
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The patterns in the magnitude of war under way generally follow 
those for the number of Great Powers at war and need not be dis-
cussed any further here. The scattergrams of the (logged) severity and 
concentration indicators are more difficult to interpret because of the 
gap between the values of the indicators for war and no-war years 
(which derives from the war/no-war dichotomy and the use of the 
1,000 battle-death threshold to define war). If we look only at years 
in which war was under way, we find a slight upward trend in severity 
and concentration. The relative infrequency of war in recent times 
results, however, in an overall, though very slight, decrease in these 
indicators over time. 
The observed downward trends in all of the war indicators 
are confirmed by a statistical analysis based on a regression of the in-
dicators against time and a rank-order correlation analysis. The 
correlation and regression coefficients are presented in Table 6.2. 
All of these coefficents are statistically significant17 and all are 
negative, indicating that the annual amount of war under way has 
been declining over time for all dimensions, including severity and 
concentration. The amount of this decline can be evaluated in com-
parison with the average values of the indicators (refer back to Table 
5.3 for five-year averages). 18 The average number of wars under way 
has dropped by 1.9 over the 480-year span of the system, which 
exceeds the average number of wars under way (1.3). The decline in 
the number of Great Power wars under way is even more dramatic 
-1.6 wars over the span of the system, twice the size of the mean (.8). 
The declines in the number of Powers at war and in the magnitude 
of war under way are not as large as those in the number of wars, but 
the total decline of each still equals its average annual value (2. 7 fewer 
Powers at war compared to an annual average of 2.7, and 3.4 fewer 
nation-years of war, compared to an annual average of 3.2). The 
yearly severity and concentration of war have declined by .5 percent 
and .4 percent, respectively. Again, this is contrary to the common 
impression that losses of life from war have been increasing rapidly 
over time. 
These historical trends in the aggregate amount of interstate war 
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Table 6.2. Historical Trends in the Amount of War Under Way: Tau-b 
and Regression Coefficients 
Indicator tau-b b b* 
Number wars under way -.39 -.0039 -.47 
Number GP wars under way -.47 -.0033 -.55 
Number powers at war -.24 -.0056 -.34 
Magnitude -.26 -.0071 -.35 
Severity -.10 -.005 -.35 
Concentration -.05 -.0039 -.32 
Note: The regression coefficients (band b *)for the severity and concentration 
indicators are from the regressions of the logged values of the indicators against 
time. All beta coefficients are significant at the .001 level. 
involving the Great Powers are generally confirmed further if we 
examine the amount of war beginning for various periods of aggrega-
tion as well as the annual amount of war under way. Graphs of the 
amount of interstate wars involving the Powers per twenty-five-year 
period are presented in Figure 6.4a-f. The patterns for intensity are 
nearly identical to those for severity, so the former is excluded. The 
rank-order correlations (tau-b) and regression coefficients for five-, 
ten-, and twenty-five-year intervals and for both interstate war involv-
ing the Great Powers and Great Power war are presented in Table 6.3. 
The results show a consistent pattern of decline in war over time. Both 
tau-b and b are negative (and most are statistically significant) for all 
periods of aggregation and for Great Power wars as well as all wars, 
for the frequency, duration, extent, and magnitude indicators. This is 
unambiguous evidence of the decline in the amount of war over time 
along these dimensions. The statistics for the severity and concentra-
tion indicators are more ambiguous, however, for their direction and 
strength vary somewhat with the length of the period of aggregation. 
If five- and ten-year periods are used, the severity and concentration 
of both war and Great Power war appear to be declining slightly, 
whereas the use of a twenty-five-year period points more in the direc-
tion of a slight increase in the severity and concentration of wars and 
Figure 6.4. Graphs: Amount of War, Twenty-five-Year Periods 
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Table 6.3. Historical Trends in the Amount of War Beginning: Tau-b 
and Regression Coefficients 
All Wars Great Power Wars 
Unit of Aggregation 
Indicator 5-year 1 0-year 25-year 5-year 1 0-year 25-year 
Regression Coefficients (b) 
Frequency -.0024 -.0041 -.01 -.0027 -.0054 -.013 
Duration -.019 -.038 -.095 -.016 -.033 -.081 
Extent -.0048 -.0086 -.022 -.0052 -.010 -.025 
Magnitude -.034 -.069 -.17 -.031 -.065 -.16 
Severity -.0036 -.0029 .0017 -.0065 -.0069 -.0017 
Concentration -. 0015 -.00063 .0037 -.0047 -.0042 .00069 
Rank-Order Correlations (tau-b) 
Frequency -.23 -.26 -.42 -.36 -.44 -.61 
Duration -.27 -.37 -.59 -.32 -.40 -.63 
Extent -.21 -.26 -.36 -.25 -.31 -.39 
Magnitude -.23 -.31 -.45 -.26 -.30 -.45 
Severity -.12 -.05 .31 -.20 -.11 .30 
Concentration .04 .18 .77 -.17 -.03 .46 
Note: All statistics except those in italics are significant at the .OS level. The 
regression coefficients for the severity and concentration indicators are from the 
regressions of the logged values of the indicators against time. 
of Great Power wars. This difference in results shows the importance 
of aggregation in the analysis of time-series data. The explanation for 
the differences observed here lies in the fact that all but two of the ten 
five-year periods from 1900 to 1950 were characterized by a relatively 
small number of battle deaths from wars beginning in those periods. 
In seven of the ten periods there were no fatalities from Great Power 
war. These wars naturally shift the regression lines downward if five-
or ten-year periods are used, since these eight periods dominate over 
the two with the world wars. Similarly, the analysis of the amount of 
war under way on a yearly basis showed downward trends in severity 
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and concentration. A twenty-five-year period of aggregation, how-
ever, collapses these ten periods into two, each encompassing one of 
the world wars. Thus the periods without fatalities are absorbed into 
the periods dominated by the world wars. Similarly, the many other 
periods in the last century and a half that are characterized by the 
absence of war are absorbed into adjacent periods of war, thus reduc-
ing their impact on the trend lines and rank orders. 
In this sense, these results may be partially an artifact of the partic-
ular statistical methods used. It must be concluded, however, that the 
data are sufficiently ambiguous to point against the argument that the 
aggregate severity and concentration of war have been increasing 
rapidly over time. It can be concluded that the most violent periods 
(measured by fatalities from war) have become even more violent and 
the most severe Great Power wars have become more severe, but in 
general there has been no significant increase in the total losses of life 
from wars involving the Great Powers or from Great Power wars. 
Summary of Linear Trends 
In the previous section a variety of indicators, representing different 
levels, dimensions, and units of analysis of war, were used to deter-
mine the nature of historical trends over time. The results are not 
perfectly congruent across all of these indicators, but some overall 
patterns emerge. In general, interstate war involving the Great Pow-
ers has been diminishing over time. There has been a strong decline 
in the frequency of war and particularly in the frequency of Great 
Power war. The amount of war under way in any given year has also 
been declining, for all dimensions. The yearly amount of war has been 
decreasing in nearly every respect, increasing only in that the bloodi-
est years are getting bloodier-absolutely, as a proportion of the 
population, and for each Great Power. The patterns for the character-
istics of the individual wars are somewhat different. Interstate wars 
involving the Powers have become considerably shorter, slightly 
lower in magnitude, much greater in concentration, and unchanged 
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in the number of Powers involved and in severity and intensity. The 
most severe wars, however, are becoming more severe. In contrast to 
the general decline of war in most respects, Great Power wars are 
becoming much less frequent, but those that do occur are much 
greater in extent, severity, intensity, and concentration, somewhat 
greater in magnitude, and unchanged in duration. 19 
Cyclical Trends 
To this point the concern has been with increasing or decreasing 
trends in war over time. It is possible that superimposed upon these 
secular trends may be cyclical fluctuations. The possibility of peri-
odicity in war is an interesting descriptive question in its own right. 
It is also of some relevance for substantive theoretical considerations. 
Many hypotheses regarding the causes or consequences of war or 
systemic transformation involve cyclical variables and imply cyclical 
trends in war, so that the existence or nonexistence of cyclical trends 
has an important bearing on the validity of these hypotheses. Some 
of these hypotheses are related to the phenomenon of war contagion 
and will be discussed in the following chapter. The concern here is 
with the question of the actual existence of cyclical trends and with 
empirical research dealing with it. 
There have been a number of attempts to determine empirically the 
existence or absence of any cyclical trends in war. It is consistently 
found that the outbreak of war is random rather than contagious, 
regardless of whether we look at short-term contagion or long-term 
periodicity. Sorokin finds "no regular periodicity, no uniform rhythm, 
no universal uniformity" in war during the ancient Greek system or 
in the European system. He finds little more than a "trendless shifting 
in the rhythm and in the number of recurring internecine wars." 
Wright's data are somewhat ambiguous. He claims to see fluctuations 
of war and peace every fifty years of modem civilization. Denton and 
Warren Phillips, using Wright's data, find that before 1680 there was 
a peak in the amount of war (per five-year period) every twenty years. 
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Since 1680 the period of each cycle has been about thirty years. 
Richardson, however, finds no periodicity in Wright's data over the 
last five centuries. Singer and Small find no evidence of periodicity (of 
forty years or less) in either the frequency or magnitude of interna-
tional war since 1815. Singer and Cusack confirm this finding: 
"Clearly, the evidence does not support the cyclical view; the intervals 
are too irregular, and the occurrence of war entries have been indiffer-
ent to the passage of time since the prior war. Moreover, when we 
control for the outcome of the prior war or its duration or its fatality 
level, we still find that the probability of the next war entry is basically 
unrelated to the passage of time." Similarly, Sorokin concludes: "His-
tory seems to be neither as monotonous and uninventive as the parti-
sans of the strict periodicities and 'iron laws' and 'universal 
uniformities' think; nor so dull and mechanical as an engine, making 
the same number of revolutions in a unit of time. It repeats its 'themes' 
but almost always with new variations. In this sense it is ever new, 
and ever old, so far as the ups and downs are repeated. So much for 
periodicity, rhythms, and uniformity."20 
The absence of empirical support in the literature for hypotheses 
of cyclical trends in war is confirmed by a visual inspection of the 
scattergrams presented earlier in this chapter. There are no hints of 
any cyclical patterns in either the occurrence of war or in any of its 
other dimensions. For each of the war indicators, the highest peaks 
in war as well as the periods of no war appear to be scattered at 
random. 
It would be possible, of course, to test for cyclical trends statisti-
cally. The statistical tests required for this purpose, however, are very 
complex. Singer and Small, for example, apply spectral analysis, 
which is based on a Fourier transform of the autocovariance func-
tion. 21 In the absence of any hints of the existence of cyclical trends 
either in the scattergrams or in earlier studies, however, it is very 
unlikely that sophisticated statistical techniques could uncover any 
patterns that are sufficiently strong to have any substantive signifi-
cance. For this reason these tests are not applied here. This tentative 
138 War in the Modern Great Power System 
finding of the absence of cyclical trends in war will draw further 
support in the following chapter, for the analysis of short-term conta-
gion in war has direct implications for the existence of short-term 
cyclical trends. 
Comparison of Historical Periods 
An examination of the relative amounts of war in various historical 
eras is useful for several reasons. It will permit an assessment of the 
historical validity of many of the conventional wisdoms concerning 
this question. It will also provide empirical evidence bearing on some 
macrohistorical theories of conflict or systemic transformation. Fi-
nally, this analysis is relevant to our earlier discussion of linear trends 
in war and can be interpreted as an alternative means of identifying 
those trends. 
The basis for comparison of these different historical periods is 
simply the average amount of war for each period, as measured by the 
following indicators: (1) percentage of years of war under way; (2) 
average yearly amount of war, measured in frequency, duration, ex-
tent, magnitude, severity, and concentration; and (3) the characteris-
tics of the average war, measured in median duration, extent, 
magnitude, severity, and concentration. Measures of the average 
amount of Great Power war will also be considered. The significance 
of the differences between centuries will be evaluated with respect to 
the estimated measurement error in each indicator. The measurement 
error ranges from 5-10 percent for the frequency and extent of war 
to 10-15 percent for the duration and magnitude of war and 25-30 
percent for the fatality-based indicators. Differences less than this 
measurement error will not be treated as substantively significant. 
First, the relative amount of war in each of the last five centuries 
is compared. The percentage of years of war, average yearly amounts 
of war, and characteristics of the typical (median) war for each of the 
centuries are given in Table 6.4. The rankings of the centuries along 
each war indicator can be computed, and the average rank of each 
century over all indicators is given at the bottom of Table 6.4 (with 
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Table 6.4. Comparison of the Centuries by Amount of War 
Century 
Indicator 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 
Years war under way 95% 94% 78% 40% 53% 
Average Yearly Amount of War 
Frequency .34 .29 .17 .20 .20 
Duration 1.60 1.7 1.0 .38 .45 
Extent .68 .71 .49 .36 .49 
Magnitude 3.20 4.0 3.0 .93 1.3 
Severity 9400 40000 38000 26000 290000 
Concentration 2900 10000 13000 28000 220000 
Average War (Median) 
Duration 3.1 4.0 4.8 .95 1.4 
Extent 2.0 1.9 2.2 1.4 1.3 
Magnitude 7.2 6.0 8.0 1.0 1.4 
Severity 18000 15000 34000 5600 16000 
Concentration 3000 3000 4400 4000 23000 
Average ranka 2.71 2.42 2.46 4.29 3.12 
a Based on the mean rank order of each century across all indicators, 1.0 being 
the most warlike. 
1.0 being the most warlike). 22 These average rankings provide a rough 
indicator of the relative amount of war in each century. They should 
be interpreted with caution, however, for they are based on the simpli-
fying but not fully acceptable assumption that each of the twelve 
indicators is equally important as a measure of war. 
As expected on the basis of the earlier analysis of the relationships 
among the various dimensions of war, the rankings of the centuries 
according to the amount of war vary with the particular war indicator 
used as the basis for comparison. Some generalizations can be made, 
however. First, the nineteenth century is without question the most 
peaceful; for only one of the twelve indicators-the average yearly 
concentration of war-was this century more warlike than the aver-
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age. Second, the twentieth century is particularly warlike only in the 
fatality-based indices. The average yearly severity and concentration 
of war in the twentieth century are dramatically higher than in earlier 
times (although the severity of the typical war in the twentieth century 
is just about average). In all other respects, however, the twentieth 
century ranks below average. War has been under way about half the 
time, compared to 95 percent of the time in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries and nearly 80 percent of the time in the eighteenth 
century; only the nineteenth century ranks lower, with war under way 
40 percent of the time. 
The eighteenth century was the least war-prone with regard to 
frequency, yet the wars that did occur were generally more serious 
than the typical wars of other centuries. This finding is precisely the 
opposite of the hypothesis that eighteenth-century wars were frequent 
but limited in nature. In addition, the number of years of war under 
way and the average yearly amount of war in the eighteenth century 
were just about average. 
The greatest continuity in war is to be found in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, which are similar in nearly all of the war in-
dicators, yet different from later periods. Of all the centuries, these 
two were the most warlike in terms of the proportion of years of war 
under way (95 percent), the frequency of war (nearly one every three 
years), and the average yearly duration, extent, and magnitude of war. 
The average yearly severity and concentration were relatively low, 
however (particularly in the sixteenth century), and the typical war 
during these periods was about average in most respects (though very 
low in concentration). To the extent that the average overall rankings 
reflect (though imperfectly) some measure of the relative amount of 
war, the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries were consid-
erably more warlike than the twentieth and particularly the nine-
teenth centuries, with the sixteenth century being slightly more bellig-
erent than the two centuries that followed. These patterns confirm the 
general trend discovered earlier toward the diminishing level of war 
in the system over time. 
These conclusions refer to interstate war involving the Great Pow-
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Table 6.5. Comparison of the Centuries by Amount of Great Power War 
Century 
Indicator 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 
Years GP war 
under way 89% 88% 64% 24% 25% 
Average Yearly Amount of War 
Frequency .26 .17 .10 .05 .07 
Duration 1.4 1.0 .77 .15 .22 
Extent .58 .59 .40 .16 .35 
Magnitude 2.9 3.2 2.7 .69 1.1 
Severity 8800 38000 35000 23000 290000 
Concentration 3000 12000 13000 33000 260000 
Average War (Median) 
Duration 3.2 5.2 6.5 .6 3.1 
Extent 2.1 3.1 4.0 2.8 5.0 
Magnitude 8.2 13 21 3.0 13 
Severity 24000 110000 68000 180000 960000 
Concentration 3000 6200 3200 50000 85000 
Average ranka 3.25 2.42 2.75 3.96 2.62 
a Based on the mean rank order of each century across all indicators, 1.0 being 
the most warlike. 
ers. The patterns for Great Power wars are somewhat different, as 
seen in Table 6.5. The nineteenth century was still the most peaceful, 
and, except for the twentieth century, there has been a general decline 
in the average yearly frequency, duration, extent, and magnitude of 
Great Power war and proportion of years with war under way. The 
precipitous drop in the number of years with war under way in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries (as well as the mild decline in 
the eighteenth century) is particularly noticeable. Overall, however, 
the twentieth century appears relatively more warlike than it did in 
the earlier analysis of interstate war involving the Powers, in the sense 
that the relatively few Great Power wars that did occur were typically 
more serious than those in earlier centuries. The sixteenth century, on 
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the other hand, appears more peaceful relative to other centuries than 
in the earlier analysis. It ranks first in frequency of Great Power wars, 
but these wars were typically rather limited. This finding may not be 
very meaningful, however, in the context of hypotheses relating to 
limited war. The concept of limited war suggests that the empirical 
domain not be restricted to Great Power wars, as is done here. For 
this reason, interstate war involving the Great Powers (Table 6.4) is 
generally a better approximation of the total amount of war in the 
system. 
Some will object to the preceding analysis, however, and argue that 
a periodization of the centuries based strictly on time is artificial and 
that a more substantively based periodization would be more mean-
ingful. Such a periodization, following the conventions of historians, 
would exclude the Napoleonic Wars from the nineteenth century and 
the French Revolutionary Wars, Spanish Succession, and Second 
Northern Wars from the eighteenth century.23 The latter two are 
generally included in an "extended" seventeenth century, while the 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars are often excluded al-
together. This exclusion raises serious questions regarding the validity 
of such a periodization, but because it is conventional the results are 
presented in Table 6.6. 
It is clear that of the modified centuries the nineteenth was still by 
far the most peaceful, ranking above fourth on only one war indicator 
(yearly concentration). The seventeenth century was the most war-
like, ranking lower than average only on the concentration indicator. 
The sixteenth century is characterized by below-average severity and 
concentration of war, but it ranks high on most of the other indica-
tors. Generally less warlike than the sixteenth century are the twen-
tieth and (attenuated) eighteenth centuries. War in the modified eigh-
teenth century was relatively infrequent (tied for last with the 
nineteenth century) and only average in both the characteristics of the 
typical war and the average yearly amount of war. The common 
argument that eighteenth-century wars were frequent but limited is 
still contradicted. 
These findings have bearing on some common assumptions and 
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Table 6.6. Comparison of Modified Centuries by Amount or War 
Period 
I500- I600- I7I4- 18I6- I900-
Indicator I599 I7I3 I789 I899 I975 
Years war under way 95% 95% 7I% 29% 53% 
Average Yearly Amount of War 
Frequency .34 .27 . I 8 . I 8 .20 
Duration 1.6 1.8 .76 .I8 .45 
Extent .68 .69 .47 .30 .49 
Magnitude 3.2 4.3 2.2 .28 1.3 
Severity 9400 47000 24000 7600 290000 
Concentration 2900 I IOOO I IOOO 27000 220000 
Average War (Median) 
Duration 3. I 4.2 3.5 .7 1.4 
Extent 2.0 2.0 2.0 I.4 1.3 
Magnitude 7.2 6.3 6.3 1.0 1.4 
Severity I8000 22000 I6000 5600 I6000 
Concentration 3000 3000 3500 2IOO 23000 
Average ranka 2.3 1.9 3.0 4.6 3.0 
a Based on the mean rank order of each century across all indicators, 1.0 being 
the most warlike. 
practices in the theoretical and empirical literature on international 
conflict. First, the patterns of warfare involving the Great Powers in 
the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries were fundamen-
tally similar. No significant turning point in the history of warfare 
occurred at the mid-seventeenth century, as some have suggested. 
This conclusion supports my earlier argument that the Treaty of 
Westphalia was merely a formal ratification of a system that had been 
operating for over a century, that the diplomacy and war behavior of 
the Powers did not change after Westphalia, and that there is no 
compelling reason to exclude the pre-Westphalia period from a study 
of international war involving the Great Powers. 
These findings also have certain implications for the common prac-
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tice in contemporary empirical research to distinguish between the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Most of the studies associated 
with the Correlates of War Project conduct separate analyses for these 
centuries and often find significant differences in substantive relation-
ships involving war. It has repeatedly been demonstrated, for exam-
ple, that the alliance-war relationship was negative in the nineteenth 
century but positive in the twentieth century.24 Singer argues more 
generally that the findings of the Correlates of War project "suggest 
rather strongly that (a) today's world is different from that of the 
nineteenth century; but (b) the most discernible changes occurred 
around the tum ofthe century and not with World War I or II or [the 
nuclear era]."25 
Although the differences between the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries cannot be denied, it would be wrong to infer that the begin-
ning of the twentieth century marks a new era in warfare. Rather, the 
nineteenth century should be viewed as an anomaly in an otherwise 
continuous pattern of warfare over the last five centuries. By almost 
any indicator the nineteenth century was unquestionably the most 
peaceful of the modem period. The twentieth century, though charac-
terized by a high severity and concentration of war and low frequency 
of Great Power war, is generally comparable to the earlier centuries 
in most other respects. According to the key indicators used here, the 
similarities between twentieth-century war involving the Great Pow-
ers and sixteenth-to-eighteenth-century warfare are more profound 
than their differences. It does not necessarily follow that the causes 
(or consequences) of twentieth-century war are similar to those of 
earlier centuries, but that possibility cannot be excluded. These 
findings suggest that the assumed irrelevance of pre-nineteenth-cen-
tury warfare for an understanding of present and future war involving 
the Great Powers may be seriously exaggerated. 
Interpretation of Historical Trends 
The description of historical trends is of course easier than their 
explanation. To attempt to explain the observed trends in all of the 
indicators of different levels and dimensions of war would be impracti-
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cal. The focus here is on what are undeniably among the most impor-
tant-the trends in Great Power war. It has been found that during 
the last five hundred years Great Power wars have been rapidly dimin-
ishing in frequency but increasing in extent, severity, intensity, con-
centration, and (to a certain degree) magnitude. How can these trends 
be explained? 
Before it could be fully accepted any explanation would have to be 
tested against the historical evidence, which would require the opera-
tionalization and measurement of the explanatory variables (and plau-
sible control variables as well) in as systematic a manner as has been 
done with the dependent variable. This is an enormous task lying far 
beyond the scope of this study. Having rigorously and systematically 
described longitudinal trends in Great Power wars, here I can only 
hypothesize about their theoretical explanations by identifying the 
important variables and suggesting plausible theoretical linkages. 
Of all the trends, perhaps most puzzling is the relatively unchang-
ing duration of Great Power war. We might have expected that im-
provements in communications and logistics would have increased 
the speed of military operations on the battlefield and that innovations 
in military technology and the increasing destructiveness of military 
conflict would have increased the costs of war. Both would presum-
ably force an earlier termination of the hostilities. Obviously, there are 
other variables that have counteracted this tendency.26 While the 
costs of war have become much greater, the gradual industrialization 
of basically agricultural societies has increased their economic capac-
ity to sustain a war and accept the costs. We might also hypothesize 
that, in spite of the enormous changes in military technology, the 
defense has managed to keep up with the offense, so that it takes 
equally long to obtain a decisive advantage on the battlefield. 27 Fi-
nally, the increasing organizational momentum and incrementalism 
generated by a larger and more firmly entrenched bureaucracy, and 
the increasing political insecurity of elites (deriving from the decline 
of dynastic legitimacy) in conjunction with increasing nationalist 
pressures, both make it ever more difficult to withdraw from a costly 
but inconclusive war.28 
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An ever-increasing number (and proportion) of Great Powers have 
been participating in these wars. We might hypothesize that this 
derives in part from the increasing interdependence of the modem 
Great Power security system. As the Great Powers evolved from 
dynastic to nation-states their interests, as well as their capabilities to 
project power in defense of these interests, tended to expand, and their 
commercial relationships became closer. The Great Powers came 
increasingly to perceive their own strategic and economic interests as 
dependent on power relationships in the system as a whole and were 
increasingly likely to intervene in external wars to maintain a balance 
of power or their own influence and prestige. Hence the extent (and 
also the magnitude) of Great Power war has increased over time.29 
Let us now consider the increasing destructiveness of war as mea-
sured by severity, intensity, and concentration. The most obvious 
explanation, of course, is technological: the major changes not only 
in the destructive power of weapons but also in their range, accuracy, 
volume of fire, mobility, and penetrability, and the speed and effi-
ciency of military transport and communications systems. In addi-
tion, there has been an increasing economic capacity to produce a 
larger quantity of weapons and support systems. Much of the in-
creased capacity for violence over the past centuries can be traced to 
the changes in production and transport generated by the industrial 
revolution; the mechanization of war at the beginning of the twentieth 
century;30 the development of airpower a few decades later; and (in 
potential for future destruction) the development of nuclear weapons 
and global delivery systems by the second half of this century. 
Technological innovation alone, however, cannot fully explain the 
increasing destructiveness of Great Power wars in the last five centu-
ries. Several interrelated political, socioeconomic, and cultural factors 
have also contributed to the gradual emergence of total war. Let us 
briefly consider these in approximate chronological sequence. 31 First 
was the increasing rationalization of military power under the state, 
beginning in the late fifteenth century and intensifying after the legal 
codification of the existing sovereign state system at Westphalia.32 
The wars for the personal honor, vengeance, and enrichment of kings 
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and nobles in the Middle Ages (which may have contributed to their 
frequent but limited nature) were increasingly replaced by the "ra-
tional" use of force as an efficient instrument of policy for the achieve-
ment of political objectives, first by dynastic/territorial political sys-
tems and ultimately by nation-states. The seriousness of the wars grew 
proportionally with the expansion of these political objectives, from 
personal gain, to the territorial aggrandizement of the state, to the 
national ambitions of an entire people. 
Reinforcing the rational use of force was the increasing centraliza-
tion of political power within the state. Feudal interests were gradu-
ally subordinated to centralized state authority in the early sixteenth 
century, and the centralization of power intensified in the late seven-
teenth century with the development of an administrative and finan-
cial system capable of supporting a military establishment and 
providing the logistical basis for an expanded military effort. 33 
Contributing further to the power of states and their ability to make 
war was the commercialization of war beginning in the early seven-
teenth century. The relationship between the state and the commer-
cial classes became increasingly symbiotic. Commerce generated the 
wealth necessary to sustain war, 34 and war in turn became a means 
of expanding commerce. In the mercantilist conception, commerce 
was a continuation of war (with an admixture of other means) and war 
was a continuation of commerce. 35 The merchants' enthusiasm for 
war diminished somewhat as the mercantilist system was replaced by 
free trade in the late eighteenth century, but the link was not broken, 
and subsequent economic progress contributed further to the state's 
capacity for war. 
This period also marked the emerging popularization of war: the 
rise of nationalism and popular ideology, the institution of con-
scripted manpower, and the creation of the "nation in arms."38 Each 
of these phenomena contributed to the enhancement of the military 
power of the state. 
The state's ability to use these expanding resources was furthered 
by the professionalization of military power in the late nineteenth 
century-the development of a peacetime military establishment di-
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rected by a new professional military elite that was independent of the 
aristocracy, headed by a general staff system, run according to new 
principles of scientific management, and supported by a system of 
military academies. 37 These developments not only increased the effi-
ciency of the conduct of war. They also enhanced the legitimacy of 
the military profession and contributed to the trends toward milita-
rism, defined by the acceptance of the values of the military subculture 
as the dominant values of society. 38 At the same time, the earlier 
moral and cultural restraints on war associated with the Christian and 
humanist traditions were gradually eroded by the materialism and 
individualism of industrial society.39 
These trends culminated in World War II with what Millis calls the 
scientific revolution in war: the harnessing, for the first time, of the 
entire scientific, engineering, and technological capacities of the na-
tion directly for the conduct of the war. 40 Mobilization of the intellec-
tual as well as material and social resources of the nation for the 
purposes of enhancing military power continues now in peacetime. 
These political, social, and cultural developments, in conjunction with 
technological innovation, have been largely responsible for the in-
creasing destructiveness of war. 
Let us consider some plausible explanations for the declining fre-
quency of Great Power war. It can generally be argued that the 
potential benefits of Great Power war have not kept up with their 
rising human and economic costs. Warfare has resulted in enormous 
increases in casualties and human suffering, the physical destruction 
of industrial infrastructure, and opportunity costs for society deriving 
from increasing costs of weapons systems, manpower, and logistics. 
The greater tendency toward external intervention in Great Power 
war (described above) further raises the costs or reduces the potential 
benefits from war, whether by adding the military burden of an addi-
tional enemy or by necessitating the sharing of the gains with an ally. 
The declining legitimacy of Great Power war has increased its diplo-
matic and domestic political costs. Finally, the changing bases of 
national power and the declining value of territorial conquest have 
reduced the potential benefits of Great Power war,41 as has the in-
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creasing congruence between state and ethnic boundaries (at least for 
the Great Powers). These increasing costs of Great Power war relative 
to its perceived benefits have reduced its utility as a rational instru-
ment of state policy and largely account for its declining frequency. 42 
These statements should be interpreted as hypotheses to be tested 
rather than empirically confirmed theoretical generalizations. The 
existing literature on the evolution of war, much of which has been 
cited earlier in this study, provides an ample reservoir of information 
from which data can be extracted to test these hypotheses. Such a 




The last two chapters have provided a quantitative description of the 
nature of international war involving the Great Powers and an analy-
sis of historical trends in war over the past five centuries. The theoreti-
cal question to be examined in this chapter is whether the occurrence 
of one war has any impact on subsequent war. Is international war 
involving the Great Powers characterized by diffusion over time and 
space, much like the epidemiological phenomenon of the spread of 
contagious disease? Does war beget war, inhibit war, or have no 
impact on subsequent war? This question has attracted considerable 
attention in the literature on international conflict. 
Conceptualization of War Contagion 
Several theoretical arguments have been advanced in support of the 
view that war begets war. (1) The victorious state may be stimulated 
by its success and its newly acquired power and seek to further its 
gains (revolutionary France). (2) The defeated state may move to 
recover its losses from an earlier war (Austria after the Silesian Wars) 
or overturn a punitive peace settlement (Germany after Versailles). 
(3) A dispute over the division of the spoils of war may turn the 
victorious states against one another (the Second Balkan War). (4) 
The expansion of an ongoing war by the use of military force against 
nonbelligerents may be perceived as necessary for victory or the 
achievement of other national objectives (the Japanese attack against 
Pearl Harbor as an expansion of the Sino-Japanese War). Wars also 
frequently expand because of the (5) intervention of third states to 
defend an ally, protect their own interests, maintain the existing bal-
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ance of power, or perhaps demonstrate their own credibility (World 
War 1). Similarly, (6) these nonbelligerents may perceive that their 
rivals have been militarily weakened or diplomatically isolated by war 
and decide to exploit this opportunity and intervene militarily (the 
Italian intervention in the Austro-Prussian War). (7) Seeing that third 
states are engaged in a war that precludes their intervention else-
where, a state may take that opportunity to advance its interests by 
force in another country (the French invasion of Mexico in 1862). 
There are also a number of theoretical arguments why war, rather 
than begetting war, should reduce the likelihood of subsequent war. 
(8) War may deplete a nation's resources and leave it incapable of 
fighting another war. (9) War, particularly if unsuccessful, may gener-
ate the belief that another war should not be undertaken unless the 
likelihood of victory is nearly certain. (10) War, particularly if unsuc-
cessful, may induce a change in the political elite and bring to power 
those committed to a more peaceful policy. Or, (11) war, especially 
if it is long and destructive, may generate a general revulsion against 
violence and an immunity against subsequent war until the memory 
of war gradually fades-the well-known war-weariness hypothesis. 
Richardson, for example, argues that "a long and severe bout of 
fighting confers immunity on most of those who have experienced 
it." 1 It is more difficult to imagine how (12) war-weariness might 
inhibit subsequent war by others, though there may be some historical 
cases (the systemic effects of U.S. use of the atomic bomb). A more 
likely form of negative contagion is (13) a war between states A and 
B rendering the subsequent use of force by state C unnecessary against 
the weakened loser and too risky against the strengthened winner. 
Toynbee also speaks of war-weariness and the resulting cycles of 
war and peace. He suggests, however, that these cycles can be better 
explained as manifestations of the underlying dynamics of the interna-
tional system. A bid for world domination evokes a defensive coalition 
of all other Great Powers and a "General War" to maintain the 
balance of power. The result is the defeat of the "arch-aggressor" and 
a "breathing-space" of peace. Such a peace is uneasy, transient, and 
improvised, for the unsettled issues over which the general war was 
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fought are not yet capable of resolution. The result is a burst of short 
and relatively mild wars ("Supplemental Wars"), which resolve the 
outstanding issues and generate a tranquil and lasting "General 
Peace." Ultimately the gradual building of new forces explodes into 
a new episode of general war as a new Power seeks domination, and 
the cycle begins anew, approximately once every century.2 
There are other cyclical theories of war. Closely related to Toyn-
bee's theory is Modelski's "long cycle" of global politics and wars, 
driven by the struggle for world leadership based on military power 
of global reach. Doran and Parsons speak of a cycle of national power 
and wars governed by internal capability changes and political dy-
namics rather than international interactions. 3 Other cyclical theories 
are based on business cycles, American isolationism and intervention-
ism, and even astrological phenomena.4 Not all of these cyclical theo-
ries should be conceptualized as war contagion, however, a point to 
which I will return. 
It is clear that the occurrence of war may affect the likelihood of 
subsequent war in a variety of ways that involve different causal 
linkages operating at different levels of analysis and over different 
periods of time. First, a state's participation in war may lead to 
subsequent war behavior by that same actor, as suggested in argu-
ments 1-4 above. This is what William W. Davis, George T. Duncan, 
and Randolph M. Siverson call "addiction" and Benjamin A. Most 
and Harvey Starr call "positive reinforcement." Alternatively, war 
behavior by one dyad may increase the likelihood of war involvement 
by other actors (arguments 5-7 above). This contagion process in-
volves new actors and is analytically distinct from addiction. It is 
referred to as "infection" or "positive spatial diffusion. " 5 A further 
analytic distinction between two kinds of infectious contagion which 
is not emphasized in the literature is the intervention by external 
actors in an ongoing war and their initiation of a new war. This 
involves the systemic level of analysis and the difficult question of how 
a single war is to be defined, a point to which I will return. Contagion 
can also be negative. War participation by one actor may reduce the 
likelihood of subsequent war behavior by the same actor (arguments 
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8-11), which Most and Starr call "negative reinforcement." Or, war 
behavior by some may reduce the likelihood of subsequent war behav-
ior of others (arguments 12-13), referred to as "negative spatial diffu-
sion."6 
The cyclical theories mentioned above are more difficult to fit into 
neat analytical categories. The phenomenon of long-term periodicity 
or cyclical fluctuations in war is generally thought of as distinct from 
contagion and involving different causal linkages, but this distinction 
has not been adequately conceptualized. 7 Davis, Duncan, and Siver-
son differentiate between contagion and heterogeneity and appear to 
classify most cyclical theories of war as involving time-heterogeneous 
processes. They see the probability of war as a function of time: "The 
evolution of the process may be governed by different rules at different 
times." This analytical distinction is valid if the cyclical fluctuations 
in war are driven by factors themselves generated independently of 
war (such as climatological or seasonal changes). Yet many of the 
factors generating fluctuations in war behavior are affected by previ-
ous war, and in this case the distinction between contagion and 
heterogeneity begins to blur. Davis, Duncan, and Siverson recognize 
that "warfare changes the factors which determine the future inci-
dence of warfare" and that these other sources of time heterogeneity 
are "not so easily handled."8 Thus contagion and heterogeneity are 
very difficult to distinguish empirically.9 It appears that the implicit 
criterion most often used to distinguish between war contagion and 
cyclical theories of war is time. Contagion refers to relatively short-
term causal effects (less than five or ten years at the most), while most 
cyclical theories posit wavelengths of at least twenty years. This study 
is restricted to the analysis of short-term war contagion rather than 
long-term periodicity, which was examined in the previous chapter. 
It was noted in the previous chapter that most empirical studies of 
short-term war contagion as well as long-term periodicity have con-
cluded that the outbreak of war is random rather than contagious. 10 
Evidence has been accumulating, however, that the expansion of war 
is characterized by contagion. That is, a war already under way may 
expand by drawing in external actors through an infectious process. 
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Davis, Duncan, and Siverson focus on the dyad rather than the nation 
as the unit of analysis and conclude that the outbreak of dyadic war 
over the 1815-1965 period follows an infectious contagion model. 
Infection is enhanced by geographical contiguity, as Richardson and 
Starr and Most have demonstrated. 11 Alliances also play a key role 
in the infection process, as Siverson and Joel King find. Certain char-
acteristics of alliances are particularly conducive to contagion. 12 
The weakest aspect of the empirical literature on war contagion is 
the analysis of short-term contagion in the outbreak (as opposed to 
expansion) of war. These analyses are usually the by-products of 
longer-term periodicity studies and lack the intensive focus on the 
short term that is necessary to uncover important but subtle relation-
ships. These studies have also failed to answer other questions. First, 
are the findings for the 1815-1965 period based on the Singer-Small 
data also valid for earlier historical eras? The few studies for earlier 
periods are of questionable validity because of the limitations of exist-
ing data. Second, is the absence of contagion or periodicity also valid 
for the wars of the Great Powers? Many contagion studies fail to 
distinguish between wars involving secondary states and those involv-
ing the Great Powers. Given the central role of the Powers in interna-
tional politics, it is important to know whether their wars are 
contagious. Finally, are some kinds of wars more contagious than 
others and does the seriousness of a war or series of wars have any 
impact on its contagious effects? Most of the contagion and peri-
odicity studies focus on the question of whether the outbreak of one 
war leads to another and fail to examine the possible effects of other 
dimensions. 
For these reasons the focus here is on the question of short-term 
contagion in the outbreak of war involving the Great Powers over an 
extended historical period, with particular attention to the question 
of whether war might be affected by the nature or seriousness as well 
as the occurrence of previous wars. Hypotheses suggesting that civil, 
imperial, or small power wars may affect the likelihood of wars involv-
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ing the Great Powers (or vice versa), while not unimportant, cannot 
be tested here with the available data. 
This study is conducted at the systemic level. Some contagion 
hypotheses, such as social-psychological addiction hypotheses, are 
most appropriate at the national or dyadic level, whereas others are 
appropriate at the systemic level. Given the interdependence of the 
Great Powers with respect to security issues, it is reasonable to ask 
whether the likelihood of interstate war anywhere in the Great Power 
system is affected by previous war in the system (as statesmen continu-
ously claim), regardless of which Powers participate. To answer the 
question of whether war is contagious at the systemic level it is not 
necessary to make the distinction between addictive and infectious 
contagion. Furthermore, given the equal plausibility of the various 
arguments for positive and negative contagion presented earlier, this 
study is exploratory in purpose, in an attempt to determine the 
net contagion effects of these diverse causal linkages. The descrip-
tive question of whether or not contagion exists is important in 
itself. 
My inquiry is guided by the following theoretical questions, derived 
from the contagion literature and representing a series of refinements 
of the more general question of whether war begets war. First, is the 
outbreak of war generally followed by the outbreak of subsequent 
wars, either while the first is still in progress or soon after its termina-
tion? Do the various dimensions of the first war have any impact on 
the subsequent outbreak of war? Are particularly severe wars more 
likely to be followed by relatively infrequent wars or by a prolonged 
period of peace, as the war-weariness hypothesis might suggest? Do 
history's most destructive wars have a unique impact on subsequent 
war? Second, is there any relationship between the frequency of war 
in one period and the frequency of war in the following period? Third, 
are any of the key measures of the amount of war in one period related 
to the incidence of subsequent war? Which dimensions of war, if any, 
have the greatest contagion effects? Is the outbreak of war affected 
more by the number of earlier wars or by their destructiveness? Does 
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the total amount of war in one period, measured by a combination of 
war indicators, have any impact on war in the subsequent period? 
The Contagion of Individual Wars 
The first question concerns the possible contagion of individual wars. 
One hypothesis is that the occurrence of war increases the probability 
of the outbreak of another war while the first is still in progress. The 
empirical testing of this hypothesis is more difficult than would first 
appear. The most serious problem concerns the aggregation or disag-
gregation of simultaneous wars, treated in Chapter 3. If the second 
war is defined as an extension ofthe first rather than as a separate war, 
the possibility of contagion is defined away. This problem can be 
avoided by focusing on the dyad rather than the war as the unit of 
analysis (as Davis, Duncan, and Siverson and Siverson and King have 
done), but the systemic-level orientation followed here requires focus-
ing on the war as the unit of analysis. In Chapter 2 considerable 
attention was given to the problems involving the aggregation of war 
-and to the lack of serious attention to these problems in the litera-
ture. The coding rules used in this compilation of war data involve the 
aggregation of wars unless there are compelling reasons to do other-
wise. This tendency not to identify "new" conflicts as separate wars 
generates a bias in favor of the null hypothesis of no contagion. Since 
the most difficult cases involve the aggregation of simultaneous wars 
rather than the temporal aggregation of sequential wars, the bias 
noted above is strongest with respect to the infectious contagion of an 
ongoing war (spatial diffusion) and weakest for the contagion of a war 
that has already ended. 
A second problem involves the questions of causality and spurious-
ness. If wars are frequently followed by other wars, is this empirical 
correlation the result of the causal effect of the first war or are both 
wars caused independently by the same antecedent variables? Espe-
cially if the systemic causes of war dominate, two temporally proxi-
mate wars may have the same set of causes without the first war 
having any causal impact on the second. This problem is related to 
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the earlier discussion of the contagion/heterogeneity distinction. It is 
particularly serious because it involves the possibility of a systematic 
bias that cannot be assumed to be mitigated by the randomization of 
extraneous variables over the lengthy temporal domain of the study. 
No answer is provided here, for the empirical resolution of the prob-
lem would require a fully operational theory of the causes of war and 
the measurement of all relevant variables over the five-century span 
of the modem system. 
The hypothesis is tested by comparing the average frequency of war 
when war is under way with the average frequency of war over the 
entire span of the system, regardless of whether war is under way. The 
yearly average number of wars occurring while another is under way 
is .37, compared to .25 wars per year over the period as a whole. This 
difference indicates a slight tendency for wars to occur while another 
is under way, but it is not statistically significant at the conventional 
.05 level (t-test, p = .10).13 Similarly, wars are somewhat more likely 
to occur while Great Power wars are under way (.34 wars per year) 
than at other times (.25 wars per year), but this is not statistically 
significant (p = .15). The average frequency of Great Power war is 
.13 wars per year, but increases to .17 wars per year while another war 
is under way (p = .15) and .21 wars per year while a Great Power 
war is under way (p = .07). There may be a slight tendency, therefore, 
for the likelihood of war to increase while another war is under way, 
particularly for Great Power wars. The p-values fall slightly outside 
the critical range for statistical significance, but this is outweighed by 
the strong bias toward the null hypothesis noted earlier. 14 This con-
clusion is consistent with the finding by Davis, Duncan, and Siverson 
of positive contagion in the expansion of war. 
Does this possible contagious effect also hold true after the first war 
has ended, as many hypotheses suggest? Because my concern is short-
term contagion, the three years following the termination of war are 
examined. The average yearly number of wars occurring in the three-
year period following war is .25 (or .26 following Great Power war), 
compared to .25 wars per year overall. The incidence of Great Power 
wars during these periods is .16 per year, only slightly greater than 
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their overall average of .13. Neither of these differences is statistically 
significant. 15 We can conclude that the likelihood of war does not 
increase during the period immediately following the termination of 
a previous war. 
The next question that arises is whether the incidence of war is 
affected by the characteristics of the war that is under way. This set 
of relationships is best measured by a simple correlation analysis 
involving each of the war indicators and various measures of the 
incidence of subsequent war: the number of wars occurring within 
three years after the termination of war, the number of Great Power 
wars during and immediately after war, the time elapsed until the 
outbreak of the next war and the next Great Power war, and similar 
measures of the number of wars following a Great Power war. The 
resulting product-moment correlations are presented in Table 7.t.l 6 
The results in Table 7.1 demonstrate the absence of any meaningful 
relationship between the seriousness of a given war and the outbreak 
of subsequent war. None of the correlations exceeds .3, indicating that 
no indicator of war can account for 10 percent of the variance in any 
measure of the incidence of subsequent war. Most of the correlations 
involving the number of wars are negative, indicating that the more 
serious wars are followed by a slightly lower incidence of war, but 
these correlations are too small to be meaningful. A few are statisti-
cally signficant but the absence of any consistent pattern lessens their 
substantive significance. Although correlations are weak their general 
direction runs contrary to the popular war-weariness hypothesis that 
the most destructive wars are followed by the longest periods of peace. 
First, the elapsed time indicator is inversely related to most of the war 
indicators, suggesting that more serious wars are followed by a shorter 
period of time until the next war. Second, the severity of war, which 
is generally regarded as the best measure of its destructiveness, has the 
weakest associations with subsequent war. All of these findings also 
hold for the contagion of Great Power wars. We can conclude that 
none of the attributes of war has any significant impact on the number 
of wars occurring during or immediately after that war or on the 
length of the period until the next war. 
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Table 7 .1. Correlation (r) between War Indicators and Measures of 
Subsequent War 
Indicators of 
War Indicators (Wt, i) 
Subsequent War(Wt + 1, i) Dur Ext Mag Sev Con 
Yearly number of new 
wars during a war -.10 -.10 -.11 -.04 .04 
Yearly number of wars 
within 3 years .04 -.13 -.04 -.11 -.17* 
Yearly number GP wars 
during a war -.04 -.09 -.11 -.06 -.08 
Yearly number GP wars 
within 3 years .04 -.16* -.07 -.10 -.17* 
Elapsed time to next war -.29* -.10 -.22* -.08 .1 0 
Time to next GP war -.20* -.03 -.10 .00 .18* 
*Denotes statistical significance at the .05 level. 
Some would argue, however, that the war-weariness hypothesis 
does not imply a linear relationship between the seriousness of a war 
and the peacefulness of the following period but rather a threshold 
effect--once the seriousness of a war reaches a certain level, war-
weariness and therefore a period of relative peace are induced. Such 
effects should be reflected in the linear correlation method applied 
earlier, but a more direct and perhaps better test of this hypothesis can 
be performed by examining the consequences of general wars involv-
ing nearly all the Great Powers and high casualties (as defined in 
Chapter 3). For each of these general wars, the number of wars and 
number of Great Power wars occurring within ten years after its 
termination and the length of time to the next war and the next Great 
Power war are determined. The averages of these summary measures 
can then be compared with those for the typical ten-year period over 
the entire span of the system and with the mean duration of peace 
following the average war in the system to determine the relative 
peacefulness of the periods following general wars. 17 
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The results of this analysis are as follows. The average number of 
wars in the ten-year period immediately following the end of a general 
war is 2.0 wars and 1.3 Great Power wars, compared to the 2.5 wars 
and 1.3 Great Power wars during the average ten-year period over the 
last five centuries. These differences are not statistically significant, 
suggesting that, contrary to the hypothesis, war is no more or less 
likely to occur in periods following general wars than in any other 
period. 
This finding is confirmed by the use of another method based on 
a Poisson probability model. A Poisson process describes the number 
of events per unit of time generated from a random, independent, 
stationary, stochastic process. If the distribution of wars deviates from 
a Poisson distribution, it can be concluded that wars are not distrib-
uted randomly and that they are not independent (that is, the occur-
rence of one war in some way alters the likelihood of subsequent 
wars). If, on the other hand, the distribution of wars does fit a Poisson, 
then we cannot reject the null hypotheses that the wars are distributed 
randomly and that they are independent. 
More technically, if events are generated randomly, the number of 
periods in which x events occur is given by 
where N is the total number of observations (for example, 96 five-year 
periods) and A is the average number of events per period (119 
wars/96 periods = 1.24). The actual number of periods characterized 
by k wars (where k = 0, 1, 2, ... ) can be computed from the data. 
The observed and theoretical distributions can then be compared by 
a chi-square goodness-of-fit test. 18 
If wars occur randomly (independently of general wars), the num-
ber of ten-year periods containing zero wars, one war, and so on can 
be determined by a Poisson probability model and compared with the 
observed distribution by a chi-square test. It is found that the periods 
following general wars are no different with regard to the frequency 
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of interstate war or Great Power war than would be expected from 
a purely random distribution of wars (p = .32 and .67, respectively). 
Also, the median elapsed time between the end of a general war and 
the incidence of another war (or Great Power war) is five years, 
compared to an average of 1.8 years between the end of one war and 
the beginning of the next and 6.1 years until the next Great Power 
war. Thus after general wars there are on average a few extra years 
of peace until the outbreak of a new war but a slightly shorter period 
until the outbreak of the next Great Power war, as compared with the 
average periods following interstate wars involving the Powers. The 
war-weariness hypothesis would have predicted, if anything, the op-
posite-a longer delay before a Great Power war, with perhaps a few 
minor wars in the interim. The thrust of this evidence, then, is con-
trary to the war-weariness hypothesis. There is no empirical evidence 
that periods following wars are more peaceful than other periods, nor 
is there any evidence that periods following the more serious wars are 
any more peaceful than those following less serious wars. This does 
not mean that no war ever induces an inhibition against war, but only 
that this is not a general tendency that repeatedly occurs. 
In this section it has been found that the incidence of war (or Great 
Power war) may increase slightly after the outbreak of an earlier war 
but only while the first war is under way and independently of the 
attributes of that war. The incidence of war is unaffected by the 
outbreak of an earlier war once that war has been concluded. It is 
conceivable, however, that the incidence of war is affected not by the 
existence or seriousness of a single preceding war but rather by the 
number of wars occurring within a given period of time. 
Frequencies of War in Successive Periods 
The question here is whether the frequency of war in one period is 
related to the frequency of war in the period immediately following. 
Because of the focus on relatively short-term contagion effects, a 
five-year period of temporal aggregation is used. 19 Longer time lags 
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would be more relevant to questions of cyclical trends or periodicity 
than contagion. 
Several statistical techniques can be used to test the hypothesis of 
empirical association. The most direct is a simple correlation analysis. 
The product-moment correlation between the frequencies of wars in 
successive periods is -.07 for wars involving the Powers and .17 for 
Great Power wars. Both are relatively low, and neither is statistically 
significant at the .10 level, suggesting the absence of any relationship. 
This finding is confirmed by a Durbin-Watson test for autocorrela-
tion. The Durbin-Watson d-statistic is defined as a function of the 
residuals e1: 
d= 
By comparing the d calculated from the actual residuals with the d 
predicted by the theoretical sampling distribution (derived from a 
population characterized by no serial correlation), the existence of 
serial correlation in the data can be determined. 20 
The resulting Durbin-Watson coefficients of 2.24 for all wars and 
2.09 for Great Power wars are well within the limits denoting the 
absence of autocorrelation. This result provides additional support for 
the argument that the number of wars in one period has no effect on 
the frequency of war in the years that follow. 
Still more evidence for the sequential independence of war initia-
tions is provided by a Poisson test for randomness. The actual distri-
bution of wars can be compared with a theoretical Poisson 
distribution for randomly generated wars. The results are presented 
in Table 7.2. 
The distribution of the frequency of war appears to fit the theoreti-
cal Poisson distribution, but a more formal statistical test is necessary 
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Table 7 .2. The Distribution of Wars: Theoretical Poisson vs. Observed 
Number of Wars per Five-Year Period (k) 
0 2 3 4 5 6 
Number periods with k wars 28 36 20 8 2 1 
Theoretical Poisson 
(Ne-A.""J-...kjk!) 27.8 34.4 21.4 8.8 2.7 0.7 0.1 
for confirmation. The appropriate method here is a chi-square good-
ness-of-fit test. The chi-square statistic is defined as 
where lo is the observed frequency and le is the expected frequency 
based on the theoretical distribution (in this case the Poisson) for each 
category or period k The chi-square value computed from the data 
can then be compared to the theoretical sampling distribution for 
chi-square, and the level of statistical significance can be determined. 
When the chi-square test is run on the war data, collapsing the last 
two categories, the result is x2 = 2.4. This is a rather low chi-square 
value, representing a minimal deviation between the observed and 
theoretical distributions. Its level of statistical significance is about .5, 
indicating that a truly random process would generate a chi-square 
this large about half the time. We must conclude, therefore, that the 
occurrence of war does fit a Poisson distribution and that the null 
hypothesis of sequentially independent wars cannot be rejected. A 
similar analysis for Great Power wars yields a p-value of .35 for the 
goodness-of-fit test, suggesting the independence of sequential Great 
Power wars. Analyses based on other units of temporal aggregation 
generally yield similar results. 
The convergence in the results from the three different methods of 
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analysis increases our confidence in their validity. It must be con-
cluded that there is no relationship between the frequency of war in 
one period and the frequency in the following period, either for wars 
involving the Great Powers or for Great Power wars. 
Contagion of the Total Amount of War 
It has been found that the likelihood of war is not affected by the 
occurrence of a previous war, the seriousness of such a war, or the 
frequency of these wars. It is conceivable, though, that the likelihood 
of war may be affected by the total amount of war in the period 
immediately preceding, in terms of battle-deaths, nation-years of war, 
or any of the other indicators or combinations of them. The questions 
here are whether any measure of the aggregate amount of war in one 
period affects the frequency of war in the period that follows and 
which dimensions of war have the greatest impact on subsequent war 
or peace. 
The most direct way of determining whether the incidence of war 
is related to any of the temporally aggregated dimensions of war in 
the previous period is a simple correlation analysis. The correlations 
between the frequency of war in one period and each of the war 
indicators for the previous period, using a five-year period of aggrega-
tion, are presented in Table 7.3. The results for wars involving the 
Powers and for Great Power wars are included. The relatively low 
correlations and their lack of statistical significance demonstrate 
the absence of relationships between the frequency of war in one 
period and any other dimension of war in the previous five-year 
period.21 
These are only simple correlations. To compare the impacts of the 
various indicators and determine the total impact of all of the indica-
tors a multiple regression analysis must be used. It would be redun-
dant to include all of the war indicators in the analysis because of the 
intercorrelations among them. Instead, the analytically independent 
dimensions of frequency, duration, extent, and severity are used as 
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Table 7.3. Correlations (r) between Frequency of War and 
Lagged War Indicators 
Lagged War Interstate Great Power 
Indicator War Wars 
Frequency -.07 .17 
Duration -.05 .02 
Extent -.10 .02 
Magnitude -.12 -.09 
Severity a -.02 .08 
Concentration a .03 .09 
Notes: Five-year period of aggregation. None of the r's is signifi-
cant at the .10 level. 
8 The logarithms are used because of the highly skewed nature of 
these distributions. 
lagged variables predicting to the frequency of war in the following 
period. The standardized beta coefficients and total amounts of vari-
ance explained are presented in Table 7.4. 
The incidence of interstate war among the Great Powers is basically 
unaffected by the total amount of war in the five-year period immedi-
ately preceding. Only 3 percent of their variance can be accounted for 
by the lagged war indicators. This result is consistent with the earlier 
findings of the absence of war contagion. 
The results for Great Power wars are more ambiguous. The fre-
quency of Great Power war is affected to a certain degree by the total 
amount of Great Power war in the period immediately preceding, in 
that 11 percent of its variance can be accounted for by the lagged 
indicators. Although this is statistically significant, the low R2 sug-
gests a relatively weak relationship. It indicates that the contagious 
effects of Great Power war are limited and far less important than the 
causal effects of other substantive variables in the processes leading 
up to war. Note that the frequency of previous war and the total 
number of Powers involved have the greatest impact on subsequent 
outbreaks of war, while severity has the least impact but in a positive 
direction. Although these relationships are relatively weak, these 
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Table 7.4. Regression of Frequency of War on Lagged War 
Indicators: Standardized Betas and Variance Explained 
Lagged Interstate Great Power 
Indicator War War 
Frequency .02 .71 * 
Duration -.04 -.20 
Extent -.28 -.62* 
Severity .24 .18 
R2 .03 .11 
Significance .55 .03 
*Statistically significant at .05. 
findings contradict the implications of the war-weariness hypothesis 
that the bloodiest wars should have the strongest negative contagion 
effects.22 
Summary and Interpretation 
This chapter has been concerned with short-term war contagion 
rather than long-term periodicity in war and with the outbreak of new 
war rather than the expansion of ongoing war. It has considered the 
impact of various attributes of war and of the frequency of these wars. 
The analysis has been guided by a number of more specific hypotheses 
representing different operational perspectives on the general theoreti-
cal question of war contagion and has used a multiplicity of statistical 
techniques. Regardless of how the question is defined or operational-
ized the results are remarkably consistent. There may be a slight 
tendency for the occurrence of war to increase the likelihood of the 
outbreak of a second war, but only while the first is under way and 
independently of its characteristics. Once a war (or a series of wars) 
is over, neither its incidence nor its seriousness has any impact on the 
likelihood of war in the period immediately following, regardless of 
its characteristics or frequency of occurrence and regardless of the 
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total amount of war in a given period. These findings are valid for 
Great Power wars as well as for interstate wars involving the Powers 
over the last five centuries of the modem Great Power system. 
These findings are generally consistent with recent empirical re-
search on war contagion, though they are generated by a different 
conceptual orientation and operational procedures. These findings 
appear to be consistent with those of Davis, Duncan, and Siverson 
regarding the infectious contagion of dyadic wars. Although my focus 
on wars as the unit of analysis differs from their focus on dyads, it is 
clear that there is considerable empirical overlap between the concur-
rent outbreak of new war and the contagion of dyadic war. 23 In spite 
of the differences between these studies, 24 or perhaps because of them, 
my finding of positive contagion of ongoing wars reinforces their 
finding of the positive infection of dyadic war, for I have demonstrated 
that this phenomenon operates at the systemic as well as dyadic level 
of analysis and over the sixteenth to eighteenth as well as the nine-
teenth to twentieth centuries. 
More generally, our findings are consistent with a long line of 
empirical research going back to Sorokin. These earlier studies have 
repeatedly demonstrated the absence of contagion or periodicity in the 
outbreak of war. The similarity of the empirical generalizations in 
conjunction with the distinctiveness of the approach I have used 
makes this an important contribution to the contagion literature. The 
demonstration of the absence of contagion in the outbreak of war over 
this spatial/temporal domain establishes the generality and compre-
hensiveness of earlier findings and greatly enhances confidence in their 
validity. 
Particularly interesting are the implications of these findings for the 
popular war-weariness hypothesis. Not only are most of the relevant 
test statistics relatively weak and statistically insignificant, but they 
tend to run in a direction contrary to that implied by the hypothesis. 
Neither war nor a series of wars retards subsequent war (or Great 
Power war). The severity of war has the smallest (rather than the 
largest) impact, and periods of most destructive war (as measured by 
severity) tend to be followed by more (not fewer) Great Power wars. 
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If anything, the duration of war appears to have the greatest impact, 
but the longer wars tend to be followed by the shortest elapsed time 
until the next war or Great Power war. Finally, Great Power wars 
follow even more quickly after the .very destructive general wars than 
after other wars. These tendencies run counter to the implications of 
the war-weariness hypothesis, but they are too weak to provide sup-
port for hypotheses of positive war contagion. 
These findings of the absence of contagion do not necessarily mean, 
however, that none of the separate contagion hypotheses summarized 
earlier is valid. They mean only that there are no net systemic conta-
gion effects of all of these separate processes operating simultaneously. 
Even if there are no individual contagion effects, there are several 
other possibilities: ( 1) some or all of these distinct contagion linkages 
may operate but simply cancel out; (2) under some conditions war 
begets war but under other conditions war retards war; (3) war is 
positively contagious for some states but negatively contagious for 
others. Each of these possibilities, or some combination of them, could 
generate the observed results of no net contagion at the systemic level. 
The contagion process, in other words, may be considerably more 
complex than indicated by present theory and empirical research. The 
discovery of the absence of any net contagion effects has been impor-
tant in itself. Now that this question has been resolved, subsequent 
research ought to be directed toward the construction and testing of 
more complex causal models of the contagion process, with attention 
given to the question of spuriousness and antecedent variables. 
8 
Conclusion: 
A Base for Further 
Investigation 
This concludes the first part of a multiphase study of war in the 
modern Great Power system. The primary objectives have been to 
define and identify the Great Powers, to generate a data base for all 
international wars involving the Powers over the last five centuries, 
and to analyze the characteristics ofthe wars, their changes over time, 
and the impact of war on subsequent war. Given the nature of these 
tasks, their completion does not easily lead to an extensive summary 
or grand conclusion at this point. This study has made several impor-
tant contributions to the literature on international conflict, however, 
and these should be put in perspective. 
First, this is one of the few attempts to define the concept of a Great 
Power, identify the primary behavioral characteristics of the Powers, 
and use these operational criteria to determine the historical identity 
of the Powers over the last five centuries of the modern system. 
Second, the data base generated in this study provides the foundation 
for the systematic empirical analysis over an extended time span of 
some important theoretical questions regarding the causes and conse-
quences of international war involving the Great Powers. A third 
major contribution of this study is the descriptive empirical analysis 
of the nature of the wars, their interrelationships, and their changes 
over time. 
First, consider the nature ofthe wars themselves. Over the 480-year 
span of the system, there have been 119 interstate wars involving the 
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Great Powers, or about one every four years. Slightly over half have 
been Great Power wars, and nine have been general wars involving 
most of the Powers and resulting in very high casualties. The typical 
war lasts about three years and involves about two Powers, five na-
tion-years of war, and 17,000 fatalities (about 180 per million Eu-
ropean population and about 3,400 per year for each participating 
Power). Many wars are considerably more serious than this average. 
Ten involve more than thirty nation-years of war and five result in 
more than a million casualties. War is present three times more fre-
quently than it is absent, and in the typical year there are about 6,500 
fatalities from war. There is a moderate empirical association between 
most of the war indicators, but there is no relationship between the 
number of Powers in the system and the frequency or destructiveness 
of the wars that occur. Interstate wars involving the Powers tend to 
be slightly more destructive during those quarter centuries in which 
they are least frequent. This relationship is sensitive to the time span 
under consideration, however, and is not valid for shorter periods. 
Therefore there is mixed evidence for the hypothesis that the fre-
quency and seriousness of war are inversely related. 
With respect to historical trends in war, it has been found that 
interstate war involving the Great Powers has generally been dimin-
ishing over time. The frequency of war has been declining. Every 
dimension of the yearly amount of war has been decreasing except 
that the bloodiest years are getting bloodier. The wars that do occur 
have become considerably shorter, slightly lower in magnitude, and 
much greater in concentration. They are no greater in the number of 
Powers involved or in severity, although the most severe wars are 
becoming worse. Although Great Power wars have become much less 
frequent, when they do occur they are much more serious than in 
earlier times in every respect but duration. The nineteenth century 
was by far the most peaceful, and the twentieth century has been 
about average (or slightly below) in every respect except severity and 
concentration. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were generally 
the most warlike, although they involved relatively few casualties. 
Wars occurred relatively infrequently in the eighteenth century but 
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those that did occur were serious, a finding that contradicts the popu-
lar conception of that century as one characterized by frequent but 
limited wars. There is no evidence of any cyclical patterns in war over 
time. 
Finally, there is little empirical support for most war contagion 
hypotheses. War appears to be contagious only in the sense that the 
likelihood of war breaking out is greatest while another war is under 
way. This contagion effect is independent of the attributes of the first 
war and ceases once the first war is concluded. The length of the peace 
is unaffected by the seriousness of the previous war. Neither the 
frequency of war nor the aggregate amount of war (along several 
dimensions) in one period has any impact on the frequency or aggre-
gate amount of war in the following period. Moreover, the severity of 
war has the least impact on subsequent war. These results are directly 
contrary to the war-weariness hypothesis. 
This study has been restricted to the univariate analysis of interna-
tional war involving the Great Powers and has been primarily descrip-
tive-empirical in orientation. The next phase of this ongoing research 
project is to use the war data generated here to test some important 
theoretical propositions regarding the causes of war. Of particular 
interest are balance-of-power theory and related realpolitik hypothe-
ses that have long dominated the study of international conflict. The 
systematic testing of these hypotheses requires, however, the prior 
definition, operationalization, and measurement of all key causal vari-
ables (and also of all extraneous variables whose impact is to be 
controlled) over the five-century span of the modern system. This is 
an enormous task, which must be reserved for subsequent studies. A 
central aim of the first phase of this project has been to generate the 
data base that make further studies possible. In this way, I hope, the 
present study will ultimately help to expand our knowledge of the 
causes of war. 
Appendix: 
Estimation of Missing 
Battle Death Data 
As noted in Chapter 3, battle fatality data are incomplete for several 
wars. In this Appendix general principles are suggested for the estima-
tion of the missing battle death data, and these principles are applied 
to particular cases. 
Wars of the Ottoman Empire 
A simple way to estimate these data would be to assume that Turkish 
casualties were similar to those of the enemy, whose battle deaths are 
known in most cases. Various historical accounts suggest, however, 
that the Turks often suffered much greater casualties than their oppo-
nents. Consequently, I shall attempt to estimate an average ratio of 
the battle deaths for Turkey as compared to her opponents. My source 
was Harbottle's Dictionary of Battles. For purposes of comparison, all 
battles involving Turkey and for which casualty estimates are given 
for both sides were selected. The ratio of Turkish fatalities to enemy 
fatalities for each of the resulting nine battles is computed. This ratio 
ranges from 1.4 (Battle of Villach in 1492) to 58 (Battle of Zenta in 
1679), with a median ratio of 6. This result is as expected, given 
superior European technology and the prolonged and costly sieges 
embarked upon by the Turks. Yet large battles cannot be taken as 
fully representative of the wars as a whole, and an average ratio 
computed from the data probably would be excessive. I have decided, 
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therefore, to make a more conservative estimate and assume that in 
wars with another Great Power Turkish casualties were twice those 
of the enemy. When additional states (Great Powers or otherwise) 
allied against Turkey, creating more than one front so that Turkish 
forces were spread out and consequently weakened, it is assumed that 
Turkish casualties were three times those listed for the enemy Great 
Powers. To estimate the casualties for the Ottoman Empire in bivari-
ate wars against lesser European states, a different approach is needed, 
because casualty data are not available for the latter. Here, the average 
Turkish casualty rate in bivariate wars with the Great Powers is 
estimated. For eleven wars, the average rate was 3,800 battle deaths 
per year. Assuming that the Turkish casualty rate was the same in 
wars with lesser powers, the total number of battle deaths for the 
entire war can be estimated. One exception here is the Polish-Turkish 
War of 1583-90. Sorokin gives Polish casualty figures of 1,200 for a 
1582 war (which is excluded here). If we assume the same rate (based 
on 30,000 troops and a 4 percent casualty rate), and again assume 
twice this many for Turkey, we get 16,800 battle fatalities for Turkey. 
Wars Involving Other Powers 
For other wars, a variety of estimation procedures are used. In bivari-
ate wars between Powers of roughly equal strength, equal casualties 
are assumed. If another comparable war between the given Powers is 
identified easily, figures from that war are used as a basis of compari-
son. If data on army size are available, the Sorokin estimation proce-
dures are used. Other quantitative sources mentioned previously 
(Bodart and Vedel-Peterson) are also referred to. 
Here I list the war in question, the Powers for which casualty data 
are not available, known battle-death data for key states, and other 
relevant information. On the basis of this information, approximate 
estimates of the missing battle death data are induced. 
1536-38 Third War of Charles V 
Missing data for France. Sorokin estimates losses of 26,000 for the 
United Hapsburgs. This war was concurrent with the Ottoman war 
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against the Hapsburgs. The French effort was directed largely against 
Venice and consisted primarily of a naval war. French casualties are 
estimated at 5,000. 
1589-98 War of the Three Henries 
Missing data for Spain. French casualties were 8,000, and assuming 
equal losses, Spanish battle deaths are estimated at 8,000. 
1618-48 Thirty Years' War 
Missing data for Sweden. Mowat estimates 36,000 Swedish troops in 
Germany. Sorokin estimates 20,000 French troops and 100,000 Haps-
burg (Austrian) troops in Germany. In the second phase of the war, 
Sweden fought against Prussia and Poland (9,000 casualties). Army 
strength for Sweden is estimated as follows: Phase II-20,000; Phases 
III and IV-35,000. The casualty rates for the Thirty Years' War 
ranged from one-fourth to one-third, so the Swedish casualty rate is 
estimated at 30 percent (per year). The Swedish casualties can then 
be estimated: 
Phase II (3 years) 
Phase III (5 years) 
Phase IV ( 13 years) 




18,000 battle deaths 
52,000 battle deaths 
136,000 battle deaths 
Missing data for England. Previous wars between England and 
Scotland, excluding those with French intervention, resulted in 
4,500 (2 years), 3,000 (1 year), and 7,500 (4 years) battle deaths, or 
an average of 2,100 per year. English fatalities are estimated at 
2,000. 
1654-60 Great Northern War 
Missing data for Sweden. Russia (10,000 battle deaths), Poland (9,-
600), Prussia (1,800), and Denmark formed a coalition against Swe-
den. Swedish battle deaths are estimated at 15,000. 
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1665-66 Sweden-Bremen War 
Missing data for both. Given the limited nature of this short war, 
Swedish casualties are estimated at 1,000. 
1672-78 Dutch War of Louis XIV 
Missing data for Sweden, which invaded Brandenburg (1675-78) as an 
ally of France. The Germans suffered 1,600 casualties in one year, 
while Sweden suffered "disastrous" defeats at Fehrbellin and Kioge 
(naval war). I estimate 10,000 battle deaths for Sweden in three years. 
1700-21 Second Northern War 
Missing data for Sweden. A coalition against Sweden consisted of 
England (average 580 battle deaths per year), Russia (16,700), Prussia 
(600), and Poland (2,000). A conservative estimate is 3,000 battle 
deaths per year for Sweden, or approximately 60,000 battle fatalities 
for the entire war. 
1726-29 British-Spanish War 
Missing data for both. This was a naval war and a land siege of 
Gibraltar. A comparison was made with the three-year war of 1656-59 
between the two, resulting in 7,500 casualties each. The same number 
of casualties is assumed here. 
1739-48 War of the Austrian Succession 
Missing data for Russia. The main Russian fighting lasted one year 
with 10,000 troops. The French and English casualty rate was 11 
percent each, so the same is assumed for Russia. The estimate is 1,000 
battle deaths. 
1806-12 Russo-Turkish War 
Missing data for Britain. A British squadron forced passage of the 
Dardannelles, losing two ships, and occupied Alexandria against vig-
orous opposition. A conservative estimate is 500 British fatalities. 
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Chapter 2. The Modern Great Power System 
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an International System?" 
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99. 
30. Sir Charles Petrie, Earlier Diplomatic History, pp. 1-2, 11; Charles 
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32. Preston and Wise, Men in Arms, p. 98; Ropp, War, pp. 19, 24; Michael 
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Palmer marks 1713 as the date of England's appearance as a Great Power. 
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p. 108; Dehio, Precarious Balance, p. 28. 
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fifteenth century is explicitly recognized by Hill (History of Diplomacy, 
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Diplomatic History, p. 89; Anderson, Eighteenth Century Europe, pp. 7-8; 
Hill, History of Diplomacy, 3: chap. 5. Admittedly, an argument can be made 
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Diplomacy, p. 199; Dehio, Precarious Balance, p. 105; Hill, History of Diplo-
macy, 3:343; Anderson, Eighteenth Century Europe, pp. 9, 14; and Ragnhild 
Hatton, "Charles XIII and the Great Northern War," p. 679. An argument 
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a major power from 1714 to 1789 (International Subsystems Data, p. 20). 
73. M.S. Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth Century, 1713-1783, pp. 2, 
217-18; Albrecht-Carrie, "European Diplomacy," p. 1092. 
74. Robert K. Massie, Peter the Great, pt. 2. 
75. W. Bruce Lincoln, The Romanovs, chap. 7; Massie, Peter the Great, 
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76. The date 1721 is supported by Petrie, Earlier Diplomatic History, p. 
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Succession ("International Relations," p. 204). 
77. I have argued previously that the Soviet Union should not be excluded 
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81. This date is supported by B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, p. 106; Lindsay, 
"International Relations," p. 206; Dorn, Competition for Empire, p. 134. 
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period. 
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84. For the Soviet concern with Germany, see Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet 
Power and Europe, 1945-70, pp. 27-31. Adam Ulam argues that the issue of 
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tence, p. 663). 
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wars. 
86. Rene Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplomatic History of Europe since the Con-
gress of Vienna, p. 235; Taylor, Struggle for Mastery, pp. xxii-xxx. 
87. This determination is consistent with Taylor, Struggle for Mastery, p. 
xxiii. Singer and Small begin a year earlier, which is premature; Haas uses 
1872. 
88. See Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy; Foster Rhea Dulles, Ameri-
ca's Rise to World Power, 1898-1954; Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt 
and the Rise of America to World Power. This date is also used by Singer and 
Small, Wages of War, p. 23. 
89. This view is consistent with that of Albrecht-Carrie, Diplomatic His-
tory, p. 245, and Modelski, Principles of World Politics, p. 150. The Anglo-
Japanese Treaty of 1902 is not enough to advance Japan's rise to Great Power 
status. 
90. Singer and Small, as well as Haas and Modelski (Principles of World 
Politics, p. 150), exclude Japan during this period. 
91. One of the best examples is the testimony of Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1966 (The Vietnam 
Hearings, pp. 3-58). See also the November 1964 memo from Assistant 
Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton to Robert McNamara, noted in 
The Pentagon Papers, p. 255. 
92. China is included as a Great Power by Singer and Small, Modelski 
(Principles of World Politics, p. 150), and Bull (Anarchical Society, pp. 203-5). 
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93. A good discussion of the decline of Venice can be found in G. V. 
Scammell, The World Encompassed, pp. 132-54. 
94. Venice is often mentioned as a maritime power, but rarely as a Great 
Power, in most historical studies of the period. See Petrie, Earlier Diplomatic 
History, chap. 2; Dehio, Precarious Balance, p. 26. 
95. Albrecht-Carrie, "European Diplomacy," p. 1082. 
96. Montross, War, p. 204. 
97. Modelski, "Long Cycle," pp. 218-19. 
98. Mattingly (Renaissance Diplomacy, pp. 156-57) refers to Portugal as 
"almost a major power" and the "greatest of the lesser powers" in the six-
teenth century on the basis of the wealth from her empire. 
99. A contrary view is that of Barbara Jelavich, who includes Poland a8 
a Great Power for a time (A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 1814-1914, 
p. 4). 
100. As noted earlier, the decision to treat the union of the Haps-
burgs under Charles V as a single Great Power might also be challenged. 
Chapter 3. Definition and Identification of the Wars 
1. Bronislaw Malinowski, "An Anthropological Analysis of War," p. 247. 
This definition is similar to the one suggested by L. L. Bernard in War and 
Its Causes, p. 28. 
2. Wright defines war as "the legal condition which equally permits two 
or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force" (Study of War, 
p. 8). This legalistic focus is not relevant to the military conflicts in the 
pre-Westphalia period before the codification of international law or to the 
contemporary period of undeclared and unconventional wars. Wright modi-
fies this definition later when he provides operational criteria for the identifi-
cation of wars. He includes "all hostilities ... which were recognized as states 
of war in the legal sense or which involved over 50,000 troops ... [or which] 
led to important legal results such as the creation or extinction of states, 
territorial transfers, or changes of government" (p. 636). The troop require-
ment is not consistent with Wright's definition and will be discussed later. The 
criterion of "important legal results" is not very useful because it is subjective 
and raises additional problems by defining a phenomenon in terms of its 
consequences. Moreover, many important legal results are achieved without 
war. 
3. For alternative definitions of war, see Karl von Clausewitz, On War, 
chap. 1; Julian Lider, On the Nature of War; Wright, Study of War, chap. 
17; Bernard, War, chap. 2. 
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4. Richardson, Deadly Quarrels, pp. 6-7. Gaston Bodart; Losses of Life in 
Modern Wars, p. 79; Singer and Small, Wages of War, p. 35. This criterion 
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see David Wilkinson, Deadly Quarrels. There is no doubt about the original-
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7. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, 3:283. 
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Power, Alliances and Technology." 
11. Thomas Harbottle, Dictionary of Battles. 
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the cause of war." 
13. Wright, Study of War, p. 638. 
14. Singer and Small, Wages of War, pp. 19-22. 
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Small, Wages of War, pp. 33-34. A bias is introduced, because this procedure 
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to maintain the status quo by means of external military intervention. In 
addition, some groups that are not states are excluded on the basis oflegalistic 
criteria in spite of their undeniable political importance (for example, the 
PLO or the early Viet Minh). Interstate war is important in itself, however, 
and problems such as these cannot be avoided. 
16. Ibid., p. 34. 
17. Small and Singer, Resort to Arms, p. 227. TheW estern allies attempted 
to seize the Russian war stocks at Murmansk, Archangel, and Vladivostok 
to keep them out of German hands. This action brought them into direct 
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conflict with the Bolshevik army. Japan sought to control the northern end 
of the Manchurian railroad in China and to win concessions from the Rus-
sians in Kamchatka, Siberia, and Sakhalin. The conflicts were exacerbated by 
ideological differences between the Bolshevik regime and the other Powers. 
For an analysis of the allied interventions, see Robert D. Warth, The Allies 
and the Russian Revolution; George F. Kennan, Russia and the West under 
Lenin and Stalin, chaps. 5-8; Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, chap. 3. 
18. Another general issue raised by the Russian Civil War is what casualty 
figures to include for internationalized civil wars. The measurement of battle 
deaths will be discussed in the following chapter, but a few comments are 
necessary here. When the regime against which the rebellion is being con-
ducted is a Great Power, should-and can-the casualties from the interstate 
dimension of the war be determined separately from those from the internal 
dimension of the war? This question is important because many civil wars 
involve enormous casualties. In the Russian Civil War, for example, there 
were roughly a half million fatalities, but less than three thousand of these 
belonged to the Western allies (presumably the number was comparable for 
the Soviet Union in her war against the allies). Lumping all casualties together 
would greatly exaggerate the seriousness of the international dimension of the 
war. For this reason, casualties from the internal civil war should be excluded 
from the estimates for the interstate war. The Sorokin data are presented in . 
a way that generally makes separation possible. When no breakdown is given, 
estimates can be made based on the data for the other Powers in conjunction 
with the general criteria for estimating missing data presented in the Appen-
dix. 
19. Singer and Small, Wages, p. 34; Richardson, Deadly Quarrels, p. 179. 
20. See John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free 
Trade." 
21. One minor difficulty arises because a particular military conflict is often 
given different names. Singer and Small ignore the war labels altogether in 
comparing the Wright, Sorokin, and Richardson compilations with their 
own. Yet some description is useful for the purposes of identification, and in 
cases for which Wright, Sorokin, and Woods and Baltzly differ, I consult 
other historical authorities. 
22. Wright, Study of War, p. 636. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Richardson, Deadly Quarrels, pp. 15-16. 
25. Singer and Small, Wages of War, p. 45. 
26. R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military 
History. 
27. Wright, Study of War, p. 636. 
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28. Singer and Small, Wages of War, pp. 79-80. 
29. Wright, Study of War, Table 33. Wright also identifies ten distinct 
peace treaties settling different aspects ofthe conflict: Nikolsburg, Ulm, Mun-
ster, Liibeck, Strohm, Cherasco, Osnabruck, Prague, Miinster, and 
Bromsbro. 
30. Langer, Encyclopedia of World History, p. 431. Mowat and Wright 
identify identical periods, with only negligible differences. Wright ends the 
Bohemian period in 1623 and Mowat in 1624; Mowat begins the last period 
in 1636 and calls it the Franco-Swedish period (Mowat, History of European 
Diplomacy, p. 93; Wright, Study of War, Table 33). 
31. Wright, Study of War, Tables 36-37; Sorokin, Social and Cultural 
Dynamics 3:551-52. 
32. See Singer and Small, Wages of War, chap. 5. 
33. This definition of general war as one involving nearly all the Powers 
is consistent with the definitions of "general war," "hegemonic war," or 
"world war" by Blainey, Causes of War, p. 196; Toynbee, Study of History, 
9:251; Osgood, "Expansion of Force," p. 52; Gilpin, War and Change, p. 200; 
Mandlebaum, Nuclear Revolution, p. 71; Wallerstein, "Three Instances of 
Hegemony," p. 6. Wright's definition (Study of War, p. 649) is considerably 
broader. 
34. Here involvement is defined to require at least 1,000 battle fatalities, as 
measured in the following chapter. Wars in which many Powers participate 
but only in a nominal way (the Korean War, for example) are excluded. 
35. This list is similar to Gilpin's (War and Change, p. 200); the primary 
difference is the inclusion here of the two great wars of the mid-eighteenth 
century, the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War. The 
most noticeable exclusion from this list, the Crimean War (involving three out 
of five of the Great Powers), is often noted for its failure to escalate into a 
general European war. (Richard Smoke, for example, in War, includes the 
Crimean War in his comparative case studies for this reason.) The Crimean 
War was both less severe and less intense than any of the nine general wars 
identified here. Wars satisfying the extent but not the intensity criterion are 
the Russian Civil War (1918-20), War of the Polish Succession (1733-38), the 
First and Second Wars of Charles V (1521-26, 1526-29), and the War of the 
Holy League (1511-14). None of these is usually regarded as being as impor-
tant as any of the general wars listed in Table 4. 
Chapter 4. Measurement of the Wars 
1. For a good summary of various conceptualizations of internal war, see 
Small and Singer, Resort to Arms, chap. 12. 
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2. Singer and Small, Wages of War, chap. 3. They also make some use of 
the duration and frequency dimensions. 
3. Blainey, Causes of War, p. 196; Osgood, "Expansion of Force," p. 52; 
Toynbee, Study of History, 9:251; Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revo-
lution, p. 71. 
4. For some purposes, the total number of states participating in war might 
also be useful. This dimension might be called the scope of war but is not 
included in this study. The number of participating Great Powers is generally 
more important than the number of participating states. 
5. This usage follows that of Singer and Small rather than Richardson, who 
defines magnitude as the logarithmic transformation of the number of battle 
deaths. 
6. The magnitude of war is not fully dependent mathematically upon the 
extent and duration measures, for it is the length of the war for each Power 
(and not the duration of the war as a whole) that determines the magnitude. 
7. Singer and Small (Wages of War, p. 130) state that "the single most valid 
and sensitive indicator of the 'amount of war' experienced by the system is 
that of battle deaths, or severity." The number of battle deaths is also the 
central concern of Bodart (Losses of Life), Samuel Dumas and K. 0. Vedel-
Peterson (Losses of Life Caused by War), and Richardson (Deadly Quarrels). 
8. Singer and Small, Wages of War, chap. 3. 
9. In this study the intensity indicator is based on the total population of 
Europe rather than that of individual states. 
10. Singer and Small, Wages of War, pp. 147-49. 
11. Ibid., p. 45. 
12. This concept of the magnitude of war assumes that the contribution of 
one year is equivalent to that of one Great Power. For example, a war 
involving two Powers and lasting four years is equal in magnitude to one 
involving four Powers and lasting two years. The indicator also assumes that 
all Powers are somehow equal and that all years are equal. It is true, of course, 
that for some years and some Powers the conflict is more "intense" than for 
others, but the magnitude indicator is to tap only the spatial and temporal 
aspects of war and not the intensity. 
13. Richardson, Deadly Quarrels, pp. 8-9. 
14. Singer and Small, Wages of War, p. 48. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Richardson, Deadly Quarrels, p. 7. 
17. Singer and Small, Wages of War, p. 50. 
18. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, 3:285. 
19. Ibid., p. 382 
20. Ibid., chap. 10. 
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21. With the geographical expansion of the Great Power system in the 
twentieth century, the population rates for some of the non-European Powers 
may deviate from the population rates for Europe. 
22. Walter F. Wilcox, ed., International Migrations, p. 78; Alexander M. 
Carr-Saunders, World Population; R. R. Kuczynski, "Population," p. 241 
(Kuczynski's original source was Wilcox, and the same data are reprinted in 
Wright, Study of War, p. 612); John V. Grauman, "Population." Grauman's 
estimates for the year 1910 are his own. For the years before 1900 Grauman's 
estimates are identical to those of Kuczynski, so these two data sets can be 
merged. 
23. See William Wu-Shyong Wei, "The Effect of Temporal Aggregation on 
Discrete Dynamic Time Series Models"; Arnold Zellner and Claude Mont-
marquette, "A Study of Some Aspects of Temporal Aggregation Problems in 
Econometric Analysis"; R. F. Engle and T. C. Liu, "Effects of Aggregation 
over Time on Dynamic Characteristics of an Econometric Model." 
24. A good example of a questionable choice of the unit of aggregation is 
the study of nineteenth-century alliance formation by Patrick J. McGowan 
and Robert M. Rood, "Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems." A 
one-year period of aggregation is used, and the conclusion is that alliance 
formation is independent of past alliance formation. Since the test for inde-
pendence of events (alliance formation) is based on the Poisson distribution 
the crucial factor is the number of events in each period, from which the 
number of periods having x alliances is determined. If two alliances are not 
in the same period, they might as well be separated by fifty years as far as the 
model is concerned. Consider the numerous alliances of the Bismarckian 
period, 1872-90. Using a one-year period of aggregation, few of these alliances 
would fall into the same period, whereas a five-year period would reflect the 
temporal concentration of alliances in this era. Since one year is too short to 
reveal any sequential dependence in alliance formation, a different conclusion 
might result if a five-year period were used. 
Chapter 5. Characteristics of the Wars 
1. The values of these indicators are plotted on a logarithmic scale in 
Figure 5.1 d-f, which collapses the scale and partially conceals the skewness. 
The skewness is enhanced by the fact that most conflicts involving under 
1,000 battle deaths have been excluded by the operational criteria used to 
define the wars. 
2. A war is defined as under way in a given year if any fighting takes place 
in that year, regardless of how long that fighting lasts. The number of wars 
in which a Power participates is incorporated into the magnitude of war under 
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way but not into the number of Powers at war (so that the latter is not 
equivalent to the extent indicator defined in Chapter 3). The severity and 
concentration of war under way present a problem, however, for battle death 
data are not available on a yearly basis. As noted previously, yearly fatalities 
can be approximated by assuming that the number of battle fatalities in any 
war is distributed evenly over the course of the war. The intensity indicator 
is excluded because it so closely resembles severity (see Figure S.le). Histo-
grams of the magnitude and concentration indicators have been excluded; the 
first resembles that for the number of Powers at war and the second resembles 
that for severity. 
3. The twelve years in which casualties exceeded one million are those of 
the two world wars in this century. Of the years exceeding 100,000 casualties 
only 40 percent were in this century, indicating that earlier historical periods 
also suffered from huge losses of life in war. 
4. Although I can be fairly confident that my data correctly establish which 
of two wars involve more fatalities or more nation-years of war, I am much 
less confident regarding the actual differences in fatalities (or other character-
istics) between two wars. An interval-level statistic such as Pearson's product-
moment coefficient (r) implies exact knowledge of differences as well as rank. 
Another ordinal measure of association that might be used is Spearman's rho, 
but that statistic is excessively sensitive to a large number of ties and is 
therefore inappropriate for this data. (In general, the correlations between the 
war indicators tend to be about 20 percent higher for Spearman's rho than 
for Kendall's tau-b.) 
5. For an argument for the applicability of significance tests for statistical 
populations, see Margaret Jarman Hagood, "The Notion of a Hypothetical 
Universe." 
6. These criteria are technically more appropriate for the Pearson's r, 
where r = . 7 indicates that about 50 percent of the variance in one variable 
is accounted for by the other, which is fairly high. An r of .3, on the other 
hand, indicates that less than 10 percent of the variance is accounted for, 
which is fairly low. In the analysis of the war data I have found that the 
magnitude of Kendall's tau-b differs little from that of Pearson's r, except for 
the fatality-based indicators. These cutoff points can be applied, therefore, to 
the tau-b statistic. 
7. This is consistent with the findings of Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., and John 
H. Aldrich, "The Relationship between Size and Stability in the Major Power 
International System." 
8. Preston and Wise, Men in Arms, chap. 9; Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and 
International Relations, p. 71. 
9. The characteristics of the average war in the kth period are defined by 
each of the i indicators Wk; = Wk;lfreqk, where freqk is the frequency of wars 
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in period k and Wk; is the sum of the values of indicator i over all wars in 
period k. Periods in which there are no wars are excluded from the analysis, 
for in these cases the average is undefined. The alternative of defining the 
averages as zero in the absence of war would introduce a serious bias into the 
analysis. 
10. In a different study, I have conducted a similar analysis including the 
imperial wars of the Great Powers and their other wars involving fewer than 
1,000 fatalities. It was found that the frequency and seriousness of war are 
inversely related but that the relationship is not particularly strong (Jack S. 
Levy and T. Clifton Morgan, "Are Wars Either Frequent But Limited or 
Infrequent But Serious?"). 
Chapter 6. Historical Trends in War 
1. Singer and Small, Wages of War, chap. 8; their analysis controls for the 
size of the international system. 
2. Richardson, Deadly Quarrels, chap. 4. 
3. Frank H. Denton, "Some Regularities in International Conflict." 
4. Richardson, Deadly Quarrels, p. 167. 
5. Woods and Baltzly, Is War Diminishing? chap. 2. 
6. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, 3:336-37, 347, 360-62. 
7. Wright, Study of War, pp. 121, 237, 242, 248, 638. 
8. Sorokin excludes Turkey, Sweden, the United States, and Japan from his 
analysis but includes Poland (Social and Cultural Dimensions, chap. 11 ). 
Wright includes Savoy, Denmark, and Poland as well as the Great Powers 
defined here (Study of War; Appendix XX). In addition to the Austrian 
Hapsburgs, England, France, Holland, Prussia, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and 
Turkey, Woods and Baltzly include Denmark and Poland. 
9. Ronald J. Wonnacott and Thomas H. Wonnacott, Regression, pp. 120-
24; Edward R. Tufte, Data Analysis for Politics and Policy, pp. 124-28. 
10. Since I am using common logarithms, the percentage change in the war 
indicator, or growth rate, is given by r = beta*loglO(e), or 2.3 beta. The 
doubling time is then .69/r. 
11. Problems of autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity can arise in 
regression analysis. An examination of the scattergrams shows that several 
of the indicators, and particularly the severity-based ones, are heteroscedastic, 
generally with increasing variances over time. Also, a Durbin-Watson test for 
serial correlation reveals autocorrelation in the duration and possibly the 
magnitude indicators but in none of the others. These problems of heteros-
cedasticity and autocorrelation would not result in biased estimators of the 
population regression coefficent (which is the main concern here), but they 
would result in underestimation of the variance of and reduction in the 
194 Notes to Pages 125-128 
efficiency of the estimator. However, I am using the least square method only 
to describe a trend in an existing set of data. I am dealing with the universe 
rather than a sample so there is no need to estimate population parameters. 
Problems ofheteroscedasticity and autocorrelation therefore do not affect this 
analysis. Furthermore, they have no impact on the rank-order correlations 
used to supplement the regression analysis. See J. Johnston, Econometric 
Methods, pp. 214-21; ArthurS. Goldberger, Econometric Theory, pp. 238-41; 
Taro Yamane, Statistics, p. 1000. 
12. The use of logarithmic transformations in an analysis of historical 
trends in the severity of war has ample precedent. Richardson defines his 
indicator as the log of the fatalities (Deadly Quarrels, p. 6), and Singer and 
Small use logarithms in analyzing historical trends (Wages of War, p. 200). 
13. At the same time, it appears (Figure 6.2d) that the least severe wars 
are becoming less destructive. Unfortunately, this latter trend is in part a mani-
festation of my selection procedures and demonstrates the sensitivity of the 
analysis to the particular operational indicator used to represent a general 
theoretical concept. In operationally defining wars, I have followed Singer 
and Small and included wars in which there were fewer than 1,000 fatalities 
if more than 1,000 active troops were involved. This method tends to include 
more low-severity wars in recent times because the Singer-Small data are good 
enough to identify these wars. If all wars under 1,000 in severity are excluded, 
we find that in a logged regression analysis of severity against time, tau - b 
= .13, b = .0013, and b * = .22, with a statistical significance of .02. This 
finding suggests a somewhat stronger trend toward an increasing severity of 
war. 
14. It should be recalled from Chapter 3 that the severity indicator has 
been defined as battle-connected deaths of military personnel. Most common 
hypotheses regarding casualties from war are ambiguous, so that it is gener-
ally unclear whether they refer only to fatalities of military personnel or to 
all possible battle-related casualties, including civilians. If the concern is with 
the latter, however, there may be a slight downward bias in the trends 
uncovered in this analysis. As noted in Chapter 3, in more recent times 
battle-related civilian casualties have become substantial in interstate wars. 
(A study of civil war would be more seriously affected by the exclusion of 
civilian casualties.) 
15. If the untransformed intensity indicator is used, we find a moderate 
increase in the intensity of war over time. Or, if all wars with fewer than 1,000 
fatalities are eliminated we get a tau-b = .03 and b = .0005, both positive 
but neither strong nor statistically significant. 
16. Earlier it was demonstrated that neither the extent indicator nor any 
of the others are even moderately correlated with the size of the system. This 
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suggests that the upward trend in these war indicators is not simply a function 
of the slight increase in the size of the system. 
17. The very low p-values (.000) are deceiving, for they derive as much 
from the large n ( 481) as from the strength of the relationships. 
18. The mean is used for all but the severity and concentration indicators; 
the medians are smaller and would make these declines in war appear even 
greater. 
19. These results are fairly stable in that they are not particularly sensitive 
to small changes in the data generated by changes in coding rules. In an earlier 
study I conducted a similar analysis using a slightly different data base, with 
108 wars rather than 119 (and 58 Great Power wars rather than 64) and some 
other small changes ("Military Power," chap. 5). The resulting changes in the 
beta coefficients in the regression analyses are practically insignificant. For 
example, in the regression analysis of the individual war indicators against 
time, the changes in beta are about .003 for duration, .00025 for extent, and 
.007 for magnitude. The standardized beta for the frequency of Great Power 
war changes from .19 to .20. As noted earlier, the statistical significance of 
the coefficients is another indicator of their stability. The changes in the other 
statistics are equally small. 
20. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, 3:352-60; Wright, Study of 
War, p. 378; Frank H. Denton and Warren Phillips, "Some Patterns in the 
History of Violence"; Richardson, Deadly Quarrels, pp. 128-31; Singer 
and Small, Wages of War, pp. 205-7; Singer and Cusack, "Periodicity." 
When Singer and Small examine the magnitude of international war un-
der way rather than beginning in a given period, however, "a rather strong 
periodicity emerges, with the dominant peaks about 20 years apart." Fur-
thermore, this trend is more pronounced for central system (European) 
wars. They admit, though, that "the evidence is far from conclusive" (Wa-
ges of War, pp. 215-16). Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, 3:359-
60. 
21. Singer and Small, Wages of War, pp. 206-7. See also George E. P. Box 
and Gwilym M. Jenkins, Time Series Analysis, chap. 2. 
22. When the difference between centuries is less than the estimated mea-
surement error, tied ranks are used. 
23. M. S. Anderson, for example, entitles his books Europe in the Eigh-
teenth Century, 1713-1783 and 18th Century Europe, 1713-1789. 
24. J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "Alliance Aggregation and the 
Onset of War, 1815-1945." 
25. Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, "Capability Distribution," p. 296. For 
other examples of distinct findings for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence 
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and Duration of War"; Gochman, "Status"; Yoshinobu Yamamoto and 
Stuart Bremer, "Wider Wars and Restless Nights." 
26. If the duration of a war were inversely related to its costs, a strong 
negative correlation between duration and concentration would be expected. 
The tau-b of .07 suggests the absence of any significant relationship. 
27. Wright (Study of War, pp. 1519-20) argues that military invention has 
in the long run tended to benefit defense more than offense, generating a 
stalemate that would result in wars of increasing duration. Wright is not 
always consistent on this point, however (see p. 292). 
28. Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End. 
29. This argument would appear to contradict the classic liberal notion 
that economic interdependence is the best guarantee of peace (see Edmund 
Silbemer, The Problem of War in Nineteenth Century Economic Thought.) 
The emphasis in my study, however, is on the interdependence of the security 
system rather than the economic system. 
30. Walter Millis, Arms and Men, chaps. 2 and 4; J. F. C. Fuller, The 
Conduct of War, 1789-1961, chap. 5; Osgood, "Expansion of Force." 
31. This conceptualization generally follows and attempts to build upon 
that of Osgood, "Expansion of Force." 
32. Osgood (ibid., pp. 42-45) suggests that the rationalization of force did 
not begin until the eighteenth century. This argument minimizes the impor-
tance of the use of force as a political instrument by territorial states. See the 
discussion in Chapter 1, above. 
33. Osgood, "Expansion of Force," pp. 44-45. 
34. Blainey, Causes of War, chap. 6. 
35. Howard, War in European History, p. 47. 
36. Osgood, "Expansion of Force," pp. 51-52; Millis, Arms and Men, chap. 
1; Preston and Wise, Men in Arms, chap. 12. 
37. Osgood, "Expansion of Force," pp. 53-56; Millis, Arms and Men, chap. 
3; Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pt. 1. 
38. Howard, War in European History, pp. 109-10; Alfred Vagts, A History 
of Militarism. 
39. Nef, War, chaps. 6, 17, 19. 
40. Millis, Arms and Men, chap. 5. 
41. Klaus Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age, chaps. 
2-3. 
42. Since the frequency of Great Power war has declined but its extent has 
increased, I have hypothesized that the initiation of Great Power war has 
become less rational (in perceived benefits relative to costs) and that interven-
tion in an ongoing war between Great Powers has become more rational (at 
least in the prenuclear age). These hypotheses are consistent if the structure 
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of threats and opportunities is sufficiently asymmetric to ensure that the 
incentive to maintain the status quo is far greater than the incentive to change 
it in one's favor. 
Chapter 7. War Contagion 
1. Richardson, quoted in Blainey, Causes of War, p. 6. 
2. Toynbee, Study of History, 3:251-54, 322-23. Toynbee applies his theory 
to the post-Alexandrine Hellenic and post-Confucian Sinic international sys-
tems as well as the modern Western system (1494 on). 
3. Modelski, "Long Cycle"; Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, "War and 
the Cycle of Relative Power." 
4. A. L. Macfie, "The Outbreak of War and the Trade Cycle"; Frank 
Klingberg, "The Historical Alternation of Moods in American Foreign Pol-
icy"; Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, 3:353. 
5. William W. Davis, George T. Duncan, and Randolph M. Siverson, "The 
Dynamics of Warfare, 1816-1965," pp. 777-78; Benjamin A. Most and Har-
vey Starr, "Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War," 
p. 933. 
6. Most and Starr, "Diffusion," p. 933. 
7. Nor is this distinction always explicit in the empirical literature on 
contagion. Much of this literature is descriptive rather than explanatory, 
focusing on whether contagion exists rather than its possible causes. Although 
the explanations for these phenomena may be different, many of the mathe-
matical models are the same (with different parameters, of course), and the 
same statistical methods are used to analyze both phenomena. 
8. Davis, Duncan, and Siverson, "Dynamics of Warfare," p. 776. 
9. Given the interrelationships among many social phenomena, the main 
question is not simply the existence or absence of a causal connection with 
earlier war, but rather the relative strength or weakness of the causal effect 
and its proximity or remoteness along the causal chain. This is hardly condu-
cive to a neat analytical distinction or a practical operational criterion for 
differentiating between heterogeneity and contagion. 
10. Singer and Small find, however, some tendency for victorious states to 
be more inclined to embark on another war ("Foreign Policy Indicators"). 
11. Richardson, Deadly Quarrels, pp. 273-87; Harvey Starr and Benjamin 
A. Most, "The Substance and Study of Borders in International Relations 
Research," pp. 608-10; Most and Starr, "Diffusion." 
12. Randolph M. Siverson and Joel King, "Alliances and the Expansion 
of War, 1815-1965"; Siverson and King, "Attributes of National Alliance 
Membership and War Participation, 1815-1965." 
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13. More weight is given to significance levels in this chapter than previ-
ously. Whereas the focus in the earlier discussion was on the population of 
wars as a whole, here different samples within that population are compared. 
Significance tests are clearly appropriate to determine whether these samples 
deviate from those that might be randomly generated. 
14. Since the relationships under consideration are very sensitive to minor 
changes in operational procedures for the aggregation of wars, these results 
should be taken as tentative until aggregation procedures are further refined 
and fully operationalized. 
15. It was noted earlier that the definitional bias toward the null hypothesis 
is less for cases of sequential wars than for simultaneous wars. 
16. There is no significant difference if tau-b is used instead of r. 
17. A ten-year period (instead of three years) is used because it is often 
suggested that general wars have more prolonged (as well as more intense) 
effects than most wars. A ten-year period allows this hypothesis to be tested. 
If we look at the three years immediately after general wars we find that the 
incidence of war (.55 wars per three years) is slightly lower than average (.74 
wars per three years). Similarly, there are an average of .33 Great Power wars 
(compared to .40 normally). These differences are not statistically significant, 
however. In addition, the small number of wars (five) following within three 
years of the nine general wars makes generalization very difficult. 
18. James S. Coleman, Introduction to Mathematical Sociology, chap. 10; 
Yamane, Statistics, chap. 20. 
19. The use often-year periods yields similar results for each of the statisti· 
cal techniques applied here. 
20. For a discussion of the Durbin-Watson d-statistic, see Charles W. 
Ostrom, Jr., Time Series Analysis, pp. 31-35; Johnston, Econometric Methods, 
pp. 250-52; Yamane, Statistics, pp. 1000-1006. 
21. The finding that all but one of the correlations for interstate wars 
involving the Powers are negative and all but one of the correlations for Great 
Power wars are positive is precisely the opposite that a war-weariness hypoth-
esis would predict, for the more serious Great Power wars should be more 
likely to retard other wars. The observed relationships are very weak, how-
ever. These results are nearly identical for a ten-year period of aggregation. 
22. The positive frequency coefficient in conjunction with the negative 
extent coefficient suggest that numerous "small" (and short) Great Power 
wars are more likely to be followed by subsequent Great Power wars than one 
larger war. These results must be interpreted with caution, however, for some 
bias may be generated by the procedures for the aggregation of wars. A single, 
lengthy war involving many Powers and extending into the following period 
may increase the chances that any new conflict initiation in that period will 
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be classified as a continuation of an ongoing war rather than a new war 
(because of the aggregation procedures). The observed relationship between 
small wars and subsequent war is consequently weaker than the statistics 
imply. 
23. Some of their dyadic infections would not be considered new war 
initiations in my analysis, but all of my concurrent war initiations would be 
classified as separate dyadic wars. 
24. The main difference, and perhaps a significant one, is the longer tempo-
ral span of their infectious process. 
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